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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This is a law and economics study trying to analyze China’s current law and policy about 
landownership. During its fast industrialization and urbanization process, it is widely believed 
that China has been suffering from the inconsistency between the growing demands of 
assembled urban land and factually highly fragmented suburban and rural land. Based on this 
knowledge, the China government’s expropriation power is economically justified. The logic is 
that the traditional absolute property right or privatization conception should yield to the more 
realistic economic benefits, and China’s long-lasting economic miracle endorses this theory.  
However, this theory cannot explain the fact that China’s economic takeoff exactly 
synchronized with its landownership fragmentation process. Also, with stressing on its efficiency 
of saving “transaction cost” by avoiding costly bargaining between right holders and land 
assemblers, this theory selectively ignores the expropriation power’s externality, or the social 
costs. Gradually, these costs become less invisible. Even though, China still has to face the land 
fragmentation problem. When a functional alternative institution has not emerged, the 
government will not disarm itself.  
In this thesis, I try to promote an autonomous bargain institution to substitute the state’s 
direct economic interventions.  Before this proposal, I analyzed that why the current 
expropriation institution could happen in China instead of other “similar” transitional countries, 
and also answered the question that why the same land distribution management promoted 
China’s economy but soon becomes an obstacle after less than 20 years. 
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because he once saved a Kuomintang brigade commander during the civil war. Besides other 
various punishments and humiliations suffered, he was “degraded” to a peasant, and had to learn 
the basic agricultural skills at the very beginning. However, when the Cultural Revolution ended 
and all the accusations to him were dropped, he had turned himself a versatile farmer.  
Then in the early 1980s, he, among nearly a billion of people, was entitled a piece of 
land. Villagers were so happy that, after that, they would have enough flour for the whole year 
instead of the corn flour they disliked. Actually, they had been cultivating wheat for at least 
generations, but they were forced to give the majority of their harvest to the state, and got corn 
flour in return. It was believed that this “low transaction cost” management supported the state’s 
industrialization.  However, a few years after they could feed themselves flour, some pioneers 
abandoned wheat and changed to plant apple trees. Other people secretly mocked and even 
cursed this choice because they were not true “farmers” in their eyes. While, another some years 
later, when they saw the high profits from apple tree plantation, they stopped laughing and 
planted apple trees on their own wheat farms. My grand farther was one of these followers. 
Unfortunately, he and my grandmother both got cancer and died in less than one year. They were 
gone before their trees were mature enough, so they did not have the chance to taste the trees 
they planted.  
They were buried in the small apple orchard. For constructing their tombs, my father cut 
one apple tree down. I can vividly remember my grandpa’s funeral, innumerable small green 
apples fallen everywhere.  
After that, the orchard was rented to a neighbor because my father, their only son, lived 
300 miles away. My grandpa’s village is far from even the nearest city, so it seems unlikely the 
lands there will be taken and urbanized. But if that really happens, what should I do? Should I 
give a price for my grandpa’s orchard? Where I my grandparents are buried? Should I just say I 
have a “subjective value” on that? 
I can also remember one day when I was little. My parents secretly let me in the hall of 
their house. They talked to me they would rebuild the house, and stressed on that they did not 
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need my parents’ money for that. During that period, when the pioneer villagers got rich, they 
started to compete on building fancy houses (fancy at that time). At least in rural China, it was 
the morally responsibility (much powerful than legal one in the society) for the adult sons to help 
their parents build houses, but at that time my father was a poor journalist. He worried so much 
about he could not afford the money. Grandparents were so proud of their son as literati, a 
graduate from a famous university, and they cared about him so much that they even wanted to 
comfort him through the childish me. 
During that secret meeting, in the hall with his grandparents and parents’ portraits, he also 
told me the new house was for me too. “When you grow up, people or foreigners ask you where 
you are from, what will you say? The apartment in the six-floor building? No, here is where you 
from. ” I think now is the time for me to say, I am a grandson of an ex-doctor then peasant. I am 
from a village named Ding Fan Village, Wan Rong County.  
 My grandpa became a peasant because he was punished. Somehow, my father and even 
my grandfather were not ashamed for that. In some way, they were proud of that. Now I can tell 
that the title “peasants” does not indicate they were less intelligent or less diligent. They were 
peasants because the state deprived of a lot of rights and benefits in the name of the nation. They 
should be proud of that because they sacrificed for others. The title does not mean anything else 
but a medal for their contributions to the state. This is the reason I used the term “rural residents” 
in my thesis instead of “peasant ” or “farmer” to stand for this huge group of people. But how 
long should they continue sacrifice? Is this type of sacrifice a right strategy, or at least efficient 
strategy? 
 
I really really do not have time. But I hope my work can buy some time for my 
motherland. If we learn one thing from the various revolutions in the last century, it is that 
revolution should be avoided. It is a good thing to have a concrete deadline, so then you can 
work to meet that. But what if you do not know there is a deadline waiting for you?  
I do not have time, but I want to buy some time for my motherland.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 
This dissertation considers the problems that exist in the current Chinese land-ownership 
system and proposes a solution for addressing those problems. In this chapter I introduce those 
problems by considering a famous recent incident in China – a near-revolt in 2011 by the citizens 
of a southern village regarding the expropriation by their village council of collectively owned 
property in the village and its lease or sale to a wealthy private property development company. 
The incident illustrates a central problem in the current system of Chinese land ownership, its 
inefficiencies, and its social costs.  
Section A recounts the events in Wukan village in southern China. Section B discusses 
why and how the current land-ownership system created the controversy in Wukan (and like 
controversies elsewhere in China) and proposes a solution to these problems through the creation 
of Land Assembly Districts (LADs). Section C then outlines the chapters in the remainder of the 
dissertation.  
 
I. Introductory Case: The Wukan Event And Peng Pai’s Soviet Regime 
 
On 14 December 2011, the readers of the London Daily Telegraph learned were surprised 
to learn that a village of more than 20,000 in south China was surrounded by a police cordon. 
Just before the siege was established, 1,000 armed police attempted to capture the village but 
confronted strenuous resistance from more than 13,000 villagers.1 The villagers then erected 
                                                
1 Malcolm Moore, “Rebel Chinese village of Wukan ‘has food for ten days;’ The rebel Chinese village of Wukan, 
which has driven out the Communist party, has resorted to smuggling in food past a police ring of steel which has 
cut off its population of more than 20,000,” The Daily Telegraph, December 14, 2011, accessed July 4, 2015, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8955295/Rebel-Chinese-village-of-Wukan-has-food-for-ten-
 
 
2 
barricades to prevent local officials and police from re-entering. ''Such criminals guilty of 
vandalism and obstructing official conduct will be severely punished,'' the acting mayor of 
Shanwei, the city whose administration this village was under, was quoted as telling Chinese 
reporters. Then police responded, as the mayor implied, by erecting a roadblock three or four 
miles from the village, stopping food and water from entering, preventing local fishing boats 
from heading out to sea, and checking cars traveling in both directions. They also prevented a 
Wall Street Journal reporter from entering.2 “No food or water is allowed in, and no villagers 
allowed out.”3 On the other side of the blockage, villagers also blocked all entrances to the 
village and “set up checkpoints guarded by 20-30 young men, some holding cudgels.” 
“Journalists from Hong Kong and overseas were the only ones allowed to enter.”4 Rumors were 
spread on the internet that the troops of the 41st and 42nd Group Armies, which were the most 
well-trained field armies in south China, were ordered to move nearby.5 At that time, the 
situation was just like the title of a New York Times article, “Revolt Begins Like Others, But Its 
End Is Less Certain.”  
The besieged village was Wukan, which was located in Lufeng, a county-level city of 
Guangdong province6, the wealthiest province based on the 2013 Provincial GDP ranking. 
                                                
2 Jeremy Page, Brian Spegele and Kersten Zhang, “Land Dispute In China Town Sparks Revolt,” Wall Street 
Journal-Eastern Edition, December 15, 2011, accessed July 4, 2015, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203518404577097532246936046. 
 
3 Moore, “Rebel Chinese village of Wukan.”  
 
4 Andrew Jacobs, “Provincial Chinese Officials Seek to End Village Revolt,” New York Times, December 16, 2011, 
accessed July 4, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/16/world/asia/local-chinese-officials-seek-to-end-village-
revolt.html?_r=0; Michael Wines. “Revolt Begins Like Others, But Its End Is Less Certain,” New York Times, 
December 17, 2011, accessed July 4, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/17/world/asia/wukan-revolt-takes-on-
a-life-of-its-own.html;  
Shenjing He and Desheng Xue, “Identity Building and Communal Resistance against Landgrabs in Wukan Village, 
China,” Current Anthropology 55 (2014): S126-37.  
 
5 “Wukan Protesters face food shortage, legions of armed forces,” Want China Times, December 18, 2011, accessed 
July 4, 2015, http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20111218000068&cid=1103. 
 
6 Basically, there are three different kinds of cities in China’s bureaucratic system: municipality directly under the 
central government, which is a province-level and the highest level division, for example, Beijing and Shanghai; 
prefecture-level city, there are 333 prefecture-level divisions or secondary level divisions under province-level 
governments; county-level cities are under prefecture-level divisions. Under the county-level cities, townships as the 
 
3 
Before this event, Lufeng was well-known for its legendary first Soviet Regime established in 
Oct. 1927, during the Communist Insurgency period.7 The leader of this regime, Peng Pai, was a 
pioneer of the Chinese agrarian movement and a peasants’ rights activist, and one of the leaders 
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at its early stage.8 Peng Pai believed that the success of 
China’s revolution must be based on the peasants, the overwhelming majority of the population 
of China.9 Because of this belief and the peasants’ movements he leaded in Haifeng and Lufeng 
counties, he was deemed one of the two “kings of peasants,” the other being Mao Zedong.10 
During that period, the orthodox revolutionary path of the CCP was to follow the Soviet Union’s 
pattern that the Party should focus on taking industrialized cities and mobilizing the proletariat 
there as the revolutionary power. During Peng’s ephemeral reign, the Soviet Workers, Peasants 
and Soldiers Congress of Lufeng passed “The Bill of Land Expropriation,” which proclaimed the 
principles that “all lands belong to the peasants” and “land to the tiller.” Then the Soviet 
Government expropriated landlords’ land holdings and allocated them to the peasants by 
confiscating the title deeds and tenancy agreements.11 Peng Pai recognized that the land problem 
                                                                                                                                                       
elementary governments directly administer every village. In this case, Wukan as a village subordinates to Donghai 
Township, which is supervised by the government of Lufeng county-level city. At the same time, Lufeng’s 
government is responsible to Shanwei, its upper prefecture-level division.  
 
7 Fernando Galbiati, Peng Pai and the Hai-Lu-Feng Soviet, (California: Stanford University Press, 2005), 273-355 
 
8 Yong-Pil Pang, “Peng Pai from Landlord to Revolutionary,” Modern China, 1 (1975): 297-322.  
 
9 His article, Report on the Haifeng Peasant Movement was believed CCP’s first research on Peasant Movement, 
and deeply affected Mao’s later well-known article, Report on Hunan Peasant Movement.  
See Guo Dehong (ȕë·), “Peng Pai Wei Nongmin Liyi Jugongjincui” (ūţOŌȲǻÆƁ) [Peng Pai: 
Bent Himself for the Peasants unto Death], in Peng Pai Yanjiu Congshu, Di Si Juan Peng Pai Yanjiu Lun Ji ([Zc
jk') [Studies on Peng Pai 4 Symposium], ed. Ye, Zuoneng ~Ò、, (Beijing: Zhonggong Zhongyang 
Dangxiao Chubanshe (HªDľTŮƍ) [Central Party School of the Communist Party of China Press] 2007), 
3-7; Peng Pai, Report on the Haifeng Peasnant Movement, trans. Donald Holoch (Ithaca, NY: China-Japan Program, 
Cornell University, 1973); Peng Pai (ūţ), Peng Pai Xuanji ([Z{) [Peng Pai’s Anthology] (Beijing: Remin 
Chubanshe (*ŌTŮƍ) [Renmin Press], 1981), 101-86. 
 
10 Hung-Yok Ip, Intellectuals in revolutionary China, 1921-1949: leaders, heroes and sophisticates (London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2005), 54-66. 
 
11 Peng Pai zhuan bian xie zu (ūţ3ƴMƪ) [Peng Pai Biography Writing Unit], Peng Pai zhuan ([Z) [Peng 
Pai Biography] (Beijing: Beijing Chu ban she (f(TŮƍ) [Beijing Press], 1984), 161-62.  
 
 
4 
was the fundamental problem of peasant movements; therefore, he argued that the redistribution 
of land holdings should be the primary goal of the revolution.  
However, three months later, the Hai-Lu-Feng Soviet Regime was crashed by 
Kuomintang troops with overwhelming superiority. About one year later, Peng was arrested and 
secretly killed by the Kuomintang troops.12 Peng died as a prophet with his prediction about the 
success of China’s agrarian revolution. After that, China waited 21 more years for the other “king 
of the peasants” (Mao Zedong) to wrest power from Kuomintang government. 
History is full of paradoxes. In 2011 Wukan villagers witnessed a dramatic one: 84 years 
after Peng Pai’s first Soviet Regime, 62 years after the other “king of the peasants” took 
sovereign power, the villagers on the exact territory of Peng’s kingdom had to fight for their 
lands again. The origin of the Wukan Siege was a dispute over land. However, this time, the 
Communist Party was not, at least not totally, on the villagers’ or peasants’ side. A man died 
during this event and was enshrined as a martyr, just like Peng Pai. Some survived this event but 
lost their political lives. 
Before the Dec. 14th siege, the anger of Wukan villagers for losing their collective 
farmland had been accumulating for years. The last straw that broke the villagers’ patience came 
on one day in September: a signboard for Guangdong real estate giant Country Garden on a plot 
of Wukan’s farmland, around which, villagers saw outsiders were working. “This is the last large 
piece of land in the village,” Zhuang Liehong, one of the five villagers later arrested by police, 
was quoted by Life Weekly as saying.13 The workers on site told villagers the company, Country 
Garden, had bought the land from the village. However, the village committee and the Lufeng 
city government both denied any involvement in this transaction when they were asked. Anger 
escalated into action as several angry young people used loudspeakers to call on villagers to 
organize a collective petition to Lufeng city government against Country Garden’s purchase of 
                                                
12 Ibid., 173-192. 
 
13 Sally Wang, “20 years of anger unleashed; Trouble had been brewing over murky collective-property deals 
in Wukan for years before the Guangdong village shot to global attention last month,” South China Morning Post, 
January 4, 2012, accessed July 7, 2015, www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic. 
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the land.14 Villagers also submitted a petition to the government, asked for revocation of the sale. 
When the government did not respond to the petitioners’ request and after it arrested several 
villagers for taking part the petition, hundreds or even thousands of villagers mounted a protest 
outside the Wukan party headquarters and a rowdy siege of a local police station.15 Days later, 
the Lufeng city government promised to send working teams to investigate the problems 
complained of by the villagers and required the village committee to cooperate with the 
investigation. Furthermore, the government expressed compliments to the villager 
representatives’ participation into the investigation. This was a change from previous interactions 
between the government and the villagers; in those earlier interactions the government had been 
dismissive of the villagers’ complaints.  
The protesters’ representatives seemed satisfied with this response, and then the 
government declared the event appeased.16 Later, 13 representatives were elected democratically. 
They set up a Wukan Villager Temporary Representative Committee (WVTRC) to guide further 
petition actions and negotiations with the government. 
However, the promised investigation did not happen; then hundreds of villagers holding 
aggressive slogans which accused government officials of corruption held petitions around 
Lufeng city government on November 21st. More assemblies and strike protests followed.17 
On December 19 Shanwei city government, the higher prefecture-level city government 
above Lufeng county-level city government, held a press conference during which it declared 
                                                
14 Ibid. 
 
15 Chan Minnie, “Calm Returns to Lufeng after two days of riots; Tensions linger in Guangdong city after villagers 
attack a police station in protest at deal to sell their land; developer says nothing was signed,” South China Morning 
Post, September 24, 2011, accessed July 4, 2015, www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic. 
 
16 Hong Jiyu (ŗƳµ), “Lufeng 9•21 Wukan Shijian jiben pingxi, cunmin daibiao zhonghuo manyi dafu (ȩ
9•21/ ĮÚò ĳŌ+ǘƭǎŦóƟ¥) [Lufeng ‘9•21’Wukan Event was almost appeased, villager 
representatives finally got satisfactory response],” Nanfang Wang (Gp) [Guangdong News], September 24, 
2011, accessed July 4, 2015, http://news.southcn.com/d/2011-09/24/content_30399798.htm. 
 
17 Hong Jiyu and Lu Xuan (ŗƳµ, ȩ½), “Lufeng xunsu tuoshan chuzhi cunmin shangfang (ȩ­¤ƶĳŌ
Ǫ) [Lufeng Responded Rapidly to Villagers’ Petition],” Nanfang Ribao(GIA)Southern Daily, November 22, 
2011, accessed July 4, 2015, http://epaper.southcn.com/nfdaily/html/2011-11/22/content_7028389.htm. 
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that the party secretary and deputy party secretary (the village chief) of Wukan were dismissed 
from their offices; the village chief’s resignation was also accepted by the Donghai township 
government (below Lufeng county-level city government). Both the dismissed officials, the party 
secretary and deputy party secretary, were under investigation and prosecution by the Party. The 
higher-level city government also declared that the Wukan Villager Temporary Representative 
Committee (WVTRC) would be disbanded as an illegal institution and that five active 
representatives would be arrested.18  
The Wukan villagers were dissatisfied with the government’s resolution and soon held 
another assembly. Then the higher-level city government ordered a forcible entry into Wukan by 
around 1,000 armed police. As mentioned earlier, the attempt failed because of the resistance of 
tens of thousands villagers.  
On the same day as the police’s retreat, a piece of news released by the Lufeng 
government poured much more oil on the flames: One of the five arrested representatives, Xue 
Jinbo, died three days after being taken into custody.19  
Xue Jinbo was mourned as a martyr during this 42-year-old leather worker’s daylong 
mock funeral, which was held as a part of another assembly.20 The villagers’ fury was ignited 
again by Xue’s daughter’s description of the condition of his body and her strong suspicion that 
government mistreatment was the cause of her father’s death while he was in custody. Villagers 
required the government to release the body and other detained representatives who were still 
under its custody. They also asked for direct intervention from Beijing, or they would make 
                                                
18 Wen Fen (Ėǈ), “Shanwei Tongbao ‘9•21’ Lufeng Wukan Cun shijian chuli jieguo (ŎÇȊÿ‘9•21’ȩĳ
/¤ŷƯĻ) [Shanwei’s Circular About “9•21” Lufeng Wukan Event Treatment],” Nanfang Wang (Gp) 
[Guangdong News], December 24, 2011, accessed July 4, 2015, 
http://news.southcn.com/dishi/shanwei/content/2011-12/09/content_34742612.htm.   
 
19. “Guangdong Lufeng quntixing shijian 1 ming cunmin jiya qijian cusi(Üȩƹ5ð/ 1ĳŌƸĀĬȤ
ŲŊ) [One villager of Guangdong Lufeng Mass Event died of sudden during detention],” Renmin Wang (
Vp) 
[People’s Daily Online], December 12, 2011, accessed July 4, 2015, http://legal.people.com.cn/GB/16570337.html. 
 
20 Michael Wines, “Chinese villagers defiantly hold town; As they mourn a hero, residents say they are hoping for 
invention,” The International Herald Tribute, December 17, 2011, accessed July 4, 2015, 
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic. 
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another protest to the Lufeng City Government.21 Meanwhile, the police besieged the village and 
cut off its supplies and transportation into and out of the village. Soon, news about the Wukan 
Siege spread across the country. At this moment, the initial land dispute was forgotten; all the 
animosities were transferred from the developer Country Garden to the Government. 
In 2007, a 26-year-old girl, Yang Huiyan, was ranked as the richest person in China and 
the wealthiest woman in Asia. She became a billionaire over one night by receiving $16.2 billion 
shares from his father, Yang Guoqiang, the founder, chairman and chief executive of Country 
Garden.22 This property development company was established in 2007 and focuses on building 
high-end residential property. This company is also listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.23 
Yang Huiyan retreated to China's 11th-richest person in 2011 when the Wukan Protests 
happened, according to Forbes.24  
Actually, the plot upon which the signboard was set was leased to Chen Wenqing. Chen, 
Wukan’s former militia captain in the 1960s, fled from Mainland China to Hong Kong, and soon 
got rich through smuggling. After Deng Xiaoping’s Reform and Opening-Up in the late 1970s, 
                                                
21 Michael Wines, “Chinese Protesters Seek Return of Villager’s Body,” The New York Times, December 19, 2011, 
accessed July 4, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/world/asia/wukan-protesters-seek-return-of-xue-jinbos-
body.html; Michael Wines, “Chinese Villagers in Revolt Demand Body of Fallen Comrade,” The International 
Herald Tribute, December 19, 2011, accessed July 4, 2015, www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic. 
 
22 Jane Macartney, “Daughter of Former Bricklayer is China’s richest person with $16bn,” The Times, October 9, 
2007, accessed July 7, 2015, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/business/markets/china/article2614929.ece;  
 Thair Shaikn, “26-year-old is China’s Richest Person with £8.8bn Fortune; Tycoon’s Daughter Inherited Fortune in 
April; Property Sees Dollar billionaires double in Year,” The Guardian, October 9, 2007, accessed July 7, 2015, 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2007/oct/09/china; “China’s Richest Person Is 26-Year Old Woman,” Reuters, 
October 8, 2007, accessed July 7, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/10/09/us-china-richlist-
idUSPEK24602820071009. 
 
23 “Country Garden (2007),” Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx), accessed July 7, 2015, 
http://www.hkex.com.hk/eng/invest/company/profile_page_e.asp?WidCoID=2007&WidCoAbbName=&Month=&l
angcode=e. 
 
24 Yang’s wealth shrank, her fortune decreased from $16.2 billions in 2007 to $4.5 billions. However, in 2011, two 
top ten richest were also doing business in property market. See “The Richest Chinese in 2011,” Forbes, accessed 
July 7, 2015, http://www.forbes.com/lists/2011/74/china-billionaires-11_rank.html; Page Jeremy and Brian Spegele, 
“World News: Beijing Set to ‘Strike Hard’ at Revolt; disputed land project, urge calm, but village’s anger persists,” 
The Wall Street Journal-Eastern Edition, December 16, 2011, accessed July 7, 2015, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204026804577100132882903066. 
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he came back home and made investments there. As his stature grew, he was elected as a 
member of the Guangdong Provincial Political Consultative Conference. 25  One of his 
investments was the leasehold of several hectares of land from the Wukan village committee to 
set up a pig farm in 1990s for his livestock firm.26 Later, as a villager said to a journalist, he 
“colluded with local officials to sell the land to Country Garden, for more than one billion yuan 
($160 million)”.27 Chen claimed that Country Garden was negotiating directly with the local 
authorities when the deal fell through over a difference on price. However, Country Garden said 
it had intended to build a project but has signed no agreements.28 The process was still vague till 
the series of protests. The only thing known to the villagers was that they were never told 
anything about this transaction. This was not the first time villagers suffered from being hidden 
from the truth. Wukan lost plenty of land, which went to hotels, homes, factories, power 
companies and even private funerary temples, while villagers just received nominal 
compensation. 29  If, at the beginning, the purpose of Wukan’s petition was asking for a 
transparent investigation about the many land transactions, now their fury was far too strong to 
be appeased by a promised investigation. No one knew how this siege would end. 
To everyone’s surprise, the event took a favorable turn on Dec. 20th. Deputy Secretary of 
Guangdong Provincial Party Committee Zhu Mingguo (the No.3 pivotal-figure in Guangdong 
province after the Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee and the Governor) met Lin 
Zuhan, the Counselor of the Wukan Villager Temporary Representative Committee (WVTRC). 
                                                
25 Li Guang and Hongge Zhen (ȿÜ, Ź·õ), “Wukan Shijian Diaocha (/ǯļ) [Wukan Event 
Investigation],” Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan ((F#) [China News Weekly], Vol. 1 2012, accessed July 7, 
2015, http://mall.cnki.net/magazine/Article/XWZK201201032.htm. 
 
26 Michael Wines, “Revolt Begins Like Others;” Lau Mimi, “Wukan Blockade in Land rights row,” South China 
Morning Post, April 27, 2013, accessed July 7 2015, www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic. 
 
27 Chan, “Calm Returns.”  
 
28 Wines, “Revolt Begins Like Others.” 
 
29 Michael Wines, “China’s peril: A wave of Wukans; Rage in Southern village over corruption by elite has potential 
to spread,” The International Herald Tribune, December 27, 2011, accessed July 7 2015, 
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic. 
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Zhu agreed to the villagers’ demands, which were returning Xue’s body, inviting five 
international media representatives to examine it, and admitting WVTRC as a legal institution.30 
The government also promised to release other detainees without further charges. On Dec 21st, a 
Provincial working team was sent into Wukan and met “a warm welcome.”31 On the same day, 
slogans were removed, and protests were canceled. 
In Jan 2012, Lin Zuhan, the counselor32 of the WVTRC, was appointed by the Provincial 
Party Committee Organization Department as the new Secretary of Wukan Party Branch.33 An 
election for a new village committee was held in February. Lin was elected as the village chief; 
two deputies and one other committee member (four in total) were also former WVTRC 
representatives.34 Xue Jinbo’s body was released. His family got 900 thousand yuan ($140 
thousand) as compensation and, as a result, did not ask for further investigation of the cause of 
death any more. Later that year, Chen Zengxin the former Secretary of the Lufeng City Party 
Committee (June 2006 to Sept. 2011),35 was put under investigation and the threat of prosecution 
                                                
30 Peter Simpson, “Wukan forces Chinese officials to release three villagers; The rebellious Chinese fishing village 
of Wukan forced the ruling Communist Party to agree to the release of three villagers detained for protesting against 
corruption and land grabs on Wednesday,” The Telegraph, December 21, 2011, accessed July 7, 2015, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8969702/Wukan-forces-Chinese-officials-to-release-three-
villagers.html; Edward Wong, “Leaders end protest in China village,” The New York Times, December 22, 2011, 
accessed July 7, 2015, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F02E6DF163DF931A15751C1A9679D8B63; Andrew Jacobs, 
“Guangdong protests yield inquiry into land seizures; Officials promise a look into dealings, but hold hard line on 
local revolt,” The International Herald Tribune, December 16, 2011, accessed July 7, 2015, 
www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic. 
 
31 Hong Jiyu, Cai Wenhui and Xie Xicheng (ŗƳµ, 〕ĖĤ, ǰȞŪ), “Wukan cunmin huanying shenggongzuozu 
jincun (ĳŌŅȀƆÑ7ƪȃĳ) [Wukan Villagers Welcomed Provincial Working Team],” Nanfang Wang (
Gp) [Guangdong News], December 22, 2011, accessed July 7, 2015, 
http://news.southcn.com/dishi/shanwei/content/2011-12/22/content_35375766.htm 
 
32 This is an honorary title and does not denote that its holder is a lawyer.  
 
33 This was extremely rare. Usually, a secretary of the village-level party branch should be appointed by its upper 
level township-level party organization department. In this case, the provincial organization department skipped the 
prefecture-level, county-level, and township-level party institutions. 
 
34 “China’s Wukan continues to elect village leaders,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific-Political Supplied by BBC 
Worldwide Monitoring, March 4, 2012, accessed July 7, 2015, www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic. 
 
35 He was the No. 1 pivotal-figure of Lufeng city during the time of the disputes.  
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by the Party. His political life ended.  
“It is futile to talk about anything else, including democracy, without an economic 
foundation,” said party secretary and village chief Lin Zuluan.36 Right after they took the reins of 
power in Wukan, the new village committee started to fight for the return of lands that had been 
sold by the former village committee.  
However, this was not the end of Wukan’s story. In March 2014, several days before 
Wukan’s new election, Yang Semao, the former head of the WVTRC and later the deputy village 
chief was detained and accused of taking bribes associated with village public projects.37 About 
the same time, Lin was under fire for a lack of transparency in the committee’s proceedings, even 
though he denied these charges, saying he was trying not to anger the higher authorities, which 
would do more harm than good for the village. Meanwhile, a former deputy village chief was 
appointed by higher-level authorities in Donghai township to be the next deputy party secretary, 
while four of his associates would also be part of the nine-member Wukan village party 
committee.38 It seems that everything returned to the origin. 
 
II. The Questions Posted By The Wukan Event 
 
In some ways, the Wukan villagers were lucky. Except for unsubstantiated rumors about 
two schoolchildren’s deaths during the chaos, Xue Jinbo seems to have been the only victim.39 In 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
36 Lau Mimi, “Wukan finds democracy hard going; Guangdong villagers freely elected their leaders after months of 
protest, but running their own affairs and getting their land back is proving tough,” South China Morning Post, 
October 6, 2012, accessed July 7, 2015, www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic. 
 
37 Echo Hui, “Deputy Wukan Chief faces Bribery Claims; Yang Semao, who secured village post after leading 
historic protests against old leadership, has been criminally detained ahead of elections,” South China Morning Post, 
March 15, 2014, accessed July 7, 2015, www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic. 
 
38 Echo Hui, “Former cadres return to take reins in Wukan; Two years after rebellious Guangdong village held its 
historic election, the old guard has won back control, protest leaders say,” South China Morning Post, March 4, 
2014, accessed July 7, 2015, www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic. 
 
39 Chi-yuk Choi, “Rioting in model village attests to graft woes; Last month’s clash between villagers and police in 
Wukan over alleged secret land sales and corruption underscores public’s growing dissent,” South China Morning 
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other similar cases, the casualties are even larger. For example, in the newest conflict derived 
from a land dispute, which happened on Oct 16, 2014 in Yunnan Province, at least eight persons 
were killed and other eighteen were injured by “uniformed men.”40 One of the reasons for the 
Wukan Event’s peaceful ending is that Guangdong is famous for its liberal and progressive 
governance; the first series of Deng Xiaoping’s experiments in loosening the governance 
structure of China happened there.41 More than that, the first established special economic zones 
there symbolize the achievements of Deng’s Reform and Opening-Up. After Deng, each 
generation of new leaders went to Guangdong soon after they took over to cultivate their image 
of being reform-minded.42 Commentators also attribute the Wukan Event’s peaceful ending to 
Wukan’s special geographical location. It takes only four hours to drive from Hong Kong to 
Wukan, and many villagers have relatives in Hong Kong. Hundreds of news reports were 
released by Hong Kong or foreign media so that details were readily available to every 
concerned. Therefore, the Wukan Event provides a perfect example of China’s current land 
disputes.  
Most Wukan villagers make their living from fishing, various small, local businesses, or 
working in the highly developed Pearl River Delta. It is a comparatively rich village; a good 
                                                                                                                                                       
Post, October 7, 2011, accessed July 7, 2015, www.lexisnexis.com/hottopics/lnacademic.  
 
40 Tom Philips, “Chinese villagers vow to ‘fight to death’ after deadly land clashes; Police surround a rural village in 
southwest China after violence leaves at least eight dead and 18 injured,” The Telegraph, October 16, 2014, accessed 
July 7, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/11166569/Chinese-villagers-vow-to-fight-to-
death-after-deadly-land-clashes.html; Tang Didi, “Four construction workers burned to death by Chinese villagers 
over land development; Alarmed by such violence, the ruling Communist Party is expected to grant more 
independence to local courts in the hope of alleviating tensions,” The Independent, October 16, 2014, accessed July 
7, 2015, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/four-construction-workers-burned-to-death-by-chinese-
villagers-over-land-development-9799820.html; 
“8 killed, 18 injured in China land dispute,” Los Angeles Times, Oct 15, 2014, accessed July 7, 2015, 
http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-land-dispute-china-20141015-story.html. 
 
41 See Ezra F. Vogel, Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China, (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2011), 394-422.  
 
42 In contrast, every generation of new leaders also travel to Yan’an, Xibaipo or Jinggangshan which are all sacred 
places of Communist Revolution to show their worship to revolutionary heritages.  
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many have built multi-storied houses.43 No one can seriously think they wanted to maintain the 
disputed plot as a pig farm instead of profitable luxury housing and retail project as Country 
Garden proposed. The villagers are no longer “peasants” or “tillers” as in Peng Pai’s era; 
therefore, the slogans like “all lands belong to the peasants” and “land to the tiller” lose their 
attractiveness and ring hollow in this day. If there are some similarities between the Wukan 
Event and Peng Pai’s Soviet Regime, those must be in the pursuit of fairness and equalitarianism, 
whatever they really mean.  
During Peng Pai’s Soviet Regime, land belonging to “local bullies” and “evil gentry,” 
who were morally guilty, and of counterrevolutionaries should have been confiscated. Besides 
that, large and middle landlords, as well as the collective landlords of clan, temple, and similar 
holdings, were also to lose their land. No noncultivator of any kind was to retain more than 30 or 
50 mou (a mou is a measure of land that varied across time and Chinese geography and is 
roughly equal to 920 sq. yards or .20 acres; thus, 50 mou equals approximately 1 acre). Rent was 
to be a maximum of 30 percent of the total harvest, the actual figure to be fixed by the peasant. 
The county government would be responsible for redistributing confiscated land to tenants, 
landless laborers, and soldiers, with a standard 30 mou (slightly more than 0.5 acre) per 
household in the gift of local peasants.44 In any sense, those landlords were not comparable to 
Country Garden whose controller was once the richest person of China. The first question that 
must be asked about all this is what caused the Communist Party to change its policy, or to 
“betray” the peasants (villagers) who helped it come into power. 
Another interesting phenomenon worth comment is that almost every Wukan villager was 
involved in the series of protests and resistance against the governments. All villagers believed 
they hold some claims on the plot of the pig farm although most of them did not live on or enjoy 
                                                
43 Sally Wang, “20 years of anger.”  
 
44 Chang Tzu-ch’iang (åǅæ), Guangdong nongmin yundong (ÜOŌȁc) [The Peasant Movement in 
Guangdong], (Shanghai: Zhonghua Quanguo Jidujiao Xiejinhui (iE ƈĒjȃ1) [National Christian 
Council of China], 1927) ), 40-50. 
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anything from that plot. The only reasonable explanation for that is that the land was labeled as 
collective farmland. But what does that mean if a plot of land belongs to the village collective? 
How should the village have disposed of and managed this collectively owned property, and who 
should enjoy the profits from the disposition?  
The Wukan Event itself sheds some light on these questions. The first and foremost 
demand of the Wukan villagers was the transparency of their village committee. And the 
democratic election of a new village committee was celebrated as the victory of their ardent 
resistance. There is no doubt that the village committee plays an important role in the collective 
property arrangement. But is the village committee a capable or justified participant in rural land 
transactions? Is it free to make decisions if it is affected or controlled by the party committee or 
upper government instead of being elected through democratic procedures like those that 
prevailed in Wukan? 
Another intriguing phenomenon is the government’s deep involvement in the transaction. 
Assume the village committee is capable of negotiating with developers like Country Garden. 
Then, why did four levels of government, from the lowest Donghai township government to the 
Guangdong provincial government, become the antagonists of the protests? When the besieged 
villagers felt cheated by government officials’ empty promises, they required direct intervention 
from the highest central government. If lower-level local governments were responsible for the 
disputed land transaction, why did they not act before the situation escalated to massive violent 
protest? And why did the Wukan villagers think that officials’ corruption was related to their land 
transactions? 
These are the basic questions posed by the Wukan Event. The event also provides a vivid 
sample of China’s current landownership and land transaction system. Then further questions 
should be asked. What is the system? What is the purpose of this arrangement? Is this an efficient 
way of handling current land problems? Or maybe the most important question, as Peng Pai 
asked almost one century ago, what is the right landownership system? 
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III. The Natural Question Of China’s Landownership System: Commons Or Anticommons 
 
Logically, the first step of establishing a property system is the right allocation of 
valuable resources, which means the appropriate means of entitling ownership and of other rights 
to the right holders. Then the second step is regulating the transfers and exchanges of these rights 
under the established allocation. In this way, the natural question of China’s landownership 
system can be abstracted and rephrased as: Under a hypothetically fragmented real property 
rights system (first step), how to efficiently assemble and utilize these pieces of rights and 
distribute the profit from these assemblies (second step)?  
The classic economic theories tell us that under a comprehensively centralized authority’s 
control, rational individuals would choose to sacrifice the whole group’s long-term interest to be 
self-benefited. On the other hand, under an extreme fragmented property right system, which 
means numerous right holders have claims upon one piece of single resource, every participant 
could, in theory, prevent others from utilizing it. Due to the potential holdout problem, efficient 
coordination between participants would not occur. These two extremities, which are labeled as 
“the tragedy of the commons” and “the tragedy of the anticommons,” are the poles of the scale of 
property rights allocation. While, these “tragedies” implicate the hardship of efficiently utilizing 
property (second step) under two extremities (first step), this does not mean that secondary 
arrangements under these original right allocation cannot produce efficient results. 
After the prior period of Reform and Opening-up policy, China, once as a communist and 
unitary-government country, deviates from the extremity of the comprehensively centralized 
control that induced the tragedy of the commons by entitling land-use rights to rural residents to 
motivate agricultural producers. Along with the shrinkage of the central power’s control, all 
lands are legally divided into two groups: urban state-owned land and rural collectively owned 
land. I argue that even though this dual landownership system might contribute to the current 
flourishing of China by institutionally and temporarily putting down the cost of key factors of 
production under a market-oriented economy, the new arrangement of real property rights also 
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hampers efficient land use and circulation, as demonstrated in the Wukan case.  
While diverging from the centralism end, by extensively allocating land-use rights to 
individuals in rural area (first step), the dual system introduced new problems of fragmented real 
property rights, legally and physically. The new landownership system dramatically moved 
China’s real property rights condition towards the other end – the anticommons problem. How 
could property be efficiently assembled from these fragmented rights to cater to the current 
urbanization process and the modern market system? China’s solution is nationalizing rural 
collectives’ landownership through expropriating individuals’ land-use rights (as in the case of 
the Wukan villagers) with disproportionate compensation and then reselling the land (by 
government) to urban developers (like Country Garden). I argue that this mechanism causes 
massive inefficient assemblies and economic waste.45 Furthermore, although the state’s unbridled 
expropriation authority is able to grab land at low cost, the political and economic cost of 
stabilizing the social tensions caused by the expropriation might be latent but high. In the Wukan 
case, the governments’ reputation was at risk if they could not handle the protest properly. 
Moreover, government officials also act as self-interested participants. A mistake in this game 
could induce extreme losses for them (such as Chen Zengxin, the former Secretary of Lufeng 
City Party Committee). 
Besides the state’s expropriation power, rural land-use right holders also suffer from their 
collectives’ nominal ownerships’ interventions (as with the Wukan village committee), which 
entitled collectives to reallocate land-use rights among collective members and negotiate with 
outsiders. The effects of that means of dealing with the anticommons problem are also negative. 
Periodic reallocation of land’s use rights among right holders by the nominal owners (the village 
collectives) results in tenure insecurity, discourages plot-specific investments, and retards 
productivity growth.  
A critical question should be asked that if the expropriation system is so problematic, 
                                                
45 This is different from Wukan’s situation where the disputed plot was a pig farm. However, in other cases, upon 
the disputed land, villagers’ residents, cemeteries, other buildings or corps were built and planted.  
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why did these problems not occur at the very beginning of the Reform and Opening-up policy in 
the late 1970s? My argument is to begin by noting that the extensive allocating of land-use rights 
to individuals in rural area (the first step) does not produce inefficiency by itself. A well-tailored 
secondary transferring system could handle its intrinsic hold-out problem or anticommons 
problem. At the beginning, China’s new landownership arrangement did not have to confront 
massive land transfers. But by the late 1990s, when the land market started to expand 
dramatically, the expropriation system was put under huge pressures as a stabilizer of the initial 
extensive allocation arrangement. Only then did the downsides of the late 1970s land reform 
emerged.  
The solution to the current problems is to find an alternative institutional mechanism that 
is able to replace the arbitrary government actions to settle the anticommons problem from the 
fragmented land. Meanwhile, this mechanism will be constructed upon the nominal collective 
landownership system. However, collectives’ (the village committees’) reallocation and 
bargaining powers should be finely defined.  
In this paper, I introduced the Land Assembly District (LAD) system to China and argue 
for transferring the rural collective governance to a liberal community of self-governance under 
the LAD structure. That liberal community would be one governed by democratically elected 
administrators, in contrast to the older system, like the one that prevailed in Wukan, in which the 
village was tightly controlled by the upper-level government and its party branch. As a 
hypothetical mechanism, the LAD was intentionally constructed to handle potential holdout 
problems in land assembly situations. The basic idea of the LAD is to let land owners upon 
fragmented land, which are economically suitable for assembly, to collectively make decisions 
for the potential assembly of the disparate ownership claims. In other words, owners’ land can be 
compulsorily transferred by their neighborhood’s decision. This neighborhood intervention is 
difficult to justify in a highly privatized country. However, under China’s current dual 
landownership system, especially the aspect in which collectives act as legal owners of rural 
land, an LAD mechanism could be legally justified through realizing collectives’ nominal 
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ownerships. Also, as local self-governance organizations, LADs intensify individual right 
holders’ bargaining power to balance governments and developers’ unscrupulousness. 
Furthermore, by reconstructing collectives, collectives’ nominal ownerships are restricted to 
resist extrinsic intervention, and the intrinsic reallocation power will be denied.  
In my dissertation, I try to contribute to the understanding of commons and anticommons 
problems by putting them in a theoretical spectrum that is also the basic structure to comprehend 
and criticize China’s landownership system’s evolution and status quo. I also adopt the theory of 
entropy in property to support my theory that general property law can be divided into two 
groups or steps, rights allocation law and secondary rights transfer law. The theory of entropy in 
property addresses particularly the secondary area of property law. A secondary property transfer 
system that disobeys the entropy law cannot stabilize the primary allocation system. If this law is 
ignored, then systematic dysfunctions and overwhelming reallocation follow. 
In Chapter Two, I introduce the current landownership system and make a historical 
review on China’s concept of “city.” Then I make a law-and-economics analysis of China’s 
landownership system’s evolution in Chapter Three to set the foundation of later analysis. In 
Chapter Four, I identify the problems of commons and anticommons in the current Chinese 
property system and explain why these problems happened emerged in 1990s, but not earlier 
when this system was first settled. In Chapter Five, I consider several alternative solutions to 
those problems, and particularly stress the advantages of the LAD. I also discuss some 
amendments to the basic structure of the LAD in order to adapt that proposal to China’s 
situation. In Chapter Six I summarize, point out some further and future areas of study on the 
issues that I have identified, and conclude.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE CURRENT LANDOWNERSHIP SYSTEM OF CHINA AND THE CONCEPT OF “URBAN” 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Under a hypothetical laissez-faire condition, land is no different from other resources in 
the market, although every state sets up some kind of limits on landownership and not, typically, 
on other valuable resources. A transaction of land is still a transaction under the fundamental 
principle that the buyer who values the subject more than does the seller negotiates with the 
seller to expel his claims on the object. Then the object moves to where it can be used more 
efficiently. From this transaction, the legal but not necessarily physical movement creates 
surplus, and the buyer and seller divide the surplus or profit from the bargain. During this 
process, government does not directly participate. However, the prerequisite of this type of 
transaction is the explicitness of ownership, and the government can lower transaction costs by 
identifying and protecting these private rights.  
The fuse that sparked the Wukan Event of the previous chapter, the land transaction with 
Country Garden, would probably have been, under normal circumstances in a capitalist economy 
an unremarkable, routine transaction whose result could be simply success or failure. In one way, 
the government missed its role of declaring and affirming the rights on the land that the Wukan 
villagers thought they were the legal right holders while Country Garden also considered itself 
rightful enough to start to build. In another way, the government was so deeply intertwined with 
the transaction that the Wukan villagers turned their anger towards the claimed corrupted 
government officials. At least, they did not think Country Garden was reckless enough to act 
without governmental support. But for the disputes with Country Garden and the government, 
the election of the village committee would have been the focus of the event, and a new election 
would have been deemed as the happy ending of the event. Obviously, the real condition in 
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China is far more complicated than laissez-faire. An instruction of the background of China’s 
landownership system will be helpful in understanding the Wukan event and the problem of 
numerous similar cases.  
In this chapter section A briefs the current dual urban-rural landownership system. 
Section B reviews China’s historical concept of “city” and compares it with its western 
counterpart. Section C illustrates the historical concept’s effects on current landownership 
arrangements. Section C gives a short conclusion.  
 
II. Current Dual Urban-rural landownership system 
 
China’s institutional framework concerning land use and land development is set up on 
the basis of three important distinctions that are made according to the location, ownership, and 
use of the land.46 The most important distinction is between state- and collectively-owned lands. 
Land in cities and towns as well as industrial and mining sites are owned by the state, whereas 
land in the rural and suburban areas is owned collectively by rural residents.47 (Figure 2.1) In the 
case of Wukan, the village as a collective still held the disputed land’s ownership, or at least, the 
irritated villagers thought so. 
                                                
46 See Chengzhen Guoyou Tudi Shiyongquan Churang he Zhuanrang Zanxing Tiaoli (Ƞĩ8żTǣǼ
ǣĥǗĴ9) [Interim Regulations Concerning the Assignment and Transfer of the Right to the Use of the State-
owned Land in the Urban Areas] (promulgated by St. Council, May 19, 1990, effective May 19, 1990) art. 2, 
CLI.2.4691 Chinalawinfo (China). 
 
47 Tudi Guanli Fa (Ƣŷœ) [Land Administration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., June 25, 1986, effective January 1, 1987, revised August 29,1998, revised August 28, 2004) art. 8, CLI. 
1.54997 Chinalawinfo (China); XIANFA art. 10, §1; §2(1982) (China). 
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 (Figure 2.1) 
Another essential aspect of the system is the separation of landownership from land use 
rights. While urban land remains owned by the state, and cannot be appropriated, bought, sold 
or unlawfully transferred in other ways, its use rights are now allowed to be assigned and 
transferred.48 For example, although Country Garden is one of the biggest “land holders” of 
China, it is just a holder of the use rights on the lands. The landowner is still the state, and local 
governments are responsible for managing the ownership of the land within their boundaries. 
        (Figure 2.2) 
                                                
48 XIANFA art. 10, §3 (1982) (China). 
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A. Urban Land Management 
Within the boundary of an urban area, the land use rights transactions can be classified 
into two main markets: the primary market and the secondary market. In the primary market, 
land users get their rights directly from the state, and there are no other individual use right 
holders who have a claim on it. In the secondary market, only individuals and incorporations are 
the players of the market. They transfer their use rights without governments’ direct 
participations.  
 
a. Primary Market (yiji shichang) for land use rights 
In an urban area, land use rights are now assigned in two ways: state allocation (huabo) 
and conveyance (churang). Allocation’s purpose is to distribute land use rights to state-owned or 
non-profit users (U1) without time limits, 49 while conveyance is used to transfer land use rights 
to commercial users (U2) for a fixed period (40 years for commercial land, 50 years for 
industrial, and 70 years for residential land).50 (Figure 2.3) 
                                                
49 Chengshi Fangdichan Guanli Fa (Ôù&Ƣŷœ) [Urban Real Estate Administration Law]  (promulgated by 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 5, 1994, effective January 1, 1995, revised August 27,2007), art. 2, §2 
CLI.1.96792 Chinalawinfo (China); Land Administration Law, art. 54 (China). 
 
50 Urban Real Estate Administration Law, art. 2, §1 (China); Land Administration Law, art. 55; 56 (China); Interim 
Regulations Concerning the Assignment and Transfer of the Right to the Use of the State-owned Land in the Urban 
Areas, art. 12 (China).  
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                              (Figure 2.3) 
 
Country Garden is one of these commercial users whose purpose is to build and make 
profits from selling housing. Therefore, if it wants to get use rights directly from the primary 
market, it has to pay to the government, as the agent of the state, to get the use rights conveyed. 
The compensation (conveyance price) consists of three major components: (1) the expropriation 
cost of the land (zhengdi fei); (2) the cost of changing the ownership status of the land from the 
rural collective to the urban state-owned land; and (3) various stipulated land fees (tudi guifei), 
and a conveyance fee (churang jin).51 The main part of the cost, the conveyance fee, is more 
market determined by the result of “interested parties”52 negotiated (xieyi)53 or determined by 
“public tender (zhaobiao)” or “auction (paimai).”54  
In Wukan case, the Wukan village, as a collective, should be the “interested party” who 
was entitled to have a say on the disposal of the disputed land. During the period 1995-2002, 86 
                                                
51 Land Administration Law, art. 47 (China). 
 
52 Technically, the parties in this transaction are U2 and the state, but the price of conveyance fee that is paid to the 
original right holder is determined by the negotiation between new user and original holder.  
 
53 See Xieyi Churang Guoyou Tudi Shiyongquan Guiding (jǤTǣĩ8żıǞ¹) [Provisions on the 
Agreement-based Assignment of the Use State-Owned Land] (promulgated by Ministry of Land & Resources, June 
5,  2003, effective August 1, 2003), CLI.4.47081 Chinalawinfo (China).  
 
54 See Zhaobiao Paimai Guapai Churang Guoyou  Jiansheyong Di Shiyongquan Guiding (ăĽĂkąůTǣĩ
ãǩż8żıǞ¹) [Provisions on the Assignment of State-Owned Construction Land Use Right through Bid 
Invitation, Auction and Quotation] (promulgated by Ministry of Land & Resources, September 21,  2007, effective 
November 1, 2007), art. 2 CLI.4.47081 Chinalawinfo (China). 
 
 
23 
per cent of the cases were done through closed-door “negotiation” and only 14 per cent were 
transacted through two other more transparent ways.55 “Interested parties” often sold for a tiny 
fraction of market value, with certain city officials thereby enriched. Then, to avoid this type of 
potential corruption, a 2002 law banned negotiated sale by land bureaus, with the last date for 
any negotiated sales being August 31, 2004.56  
U1 users include schools, public hospitals, traffic and water projects, or some other 
public institutions managed or supervised by the state.57 They get land from state allocation by 
paying an “allocation price” or renamed “compensatory fee for the use of state-owned land” 
(guoyou tudi youchang shiyong fei). The price also consists of three main components: (1) the 
expropriation cost of the land (zhengdi fei); (2) various stipulated land fees (tudi guifei); and (3) 
a government-set allocation fee (huabo fei). Compared with the conveyance fee, because the 
price is not determined by the market, the allocation fee is much less.58 However, the state still 
reserves the power to requisition the land from these state units. 
 
b. Secondary Market (erji shichang) for land use rights: Circulation (liuzhuan) and 
Exchange (huhuan) 
After paying a higher conveyance fee, commercial land users can further circulate their 
land use rights, and the circulation also has to meet some legal provisions. Specifically, holders 
of the land use rights obtained through conveyance may transfer such rights to others 
                                                
55 Calculated from the data in Editorial Committee of China Land Yearbook (1996, 200-201; 1997, 174-175) and 
China Ministry of Land and Resources, Zhongguo guotu ziyuan nianjian (Almanac of China’s Land and Resources 
(1999, 682-83 and 704-705; 2001, 8240849, and 908-927; 2002, 862-887 and 938-957; 2003, 600-625 and 672-
691)), quoted in George C. S. Lin, Developing China; Land, politics and social conditions (New York: Routledge, 
2009), 91.   
 
56 That is pre-revised version of “Provisions on the Assignment of State-Owned Construction Land Use Right 
through Bid Invitation, Auction and Quotation,” named “Zhaobiao Paimai Guapai Churang Guoyou  Tudi 
Shiyongquan Guiding (ăĽĂkąůTǣĩãǩż8żıǞ¹) [Provisions on the Assignment of State-
Owned Construction Land Use Right through Bid Invitation, Auction and Quotation].” 
 
57 Land Administration Law, art. 54 (China). 
 
58 Namely, it includes the governments’ investments on the basic infrastructure of the land.  
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(zhuanrang), rent to others (chuzu), or use such rights as collateral (diya). At this level, a land 
market is established. 
While it is illegal for a state unit to sell its land to another state unit, the exchange 
(huhuan) of land between state units is permitted on the condition that the exchange is registered 
and the parties involved pay the stipulated fees and the land appreciation tax (tudi zengzhishui).59 
 
B. Rural Land Management 
As the main reform in rural areas, the state has sanctioned the Agricultural Production 
Responsibility System (APRS).60 Under this system, rural collectives (as the legal owner of land) 
would “contract” agricultural land to rural farm households, but the purpose of the land must be 
agricultural production (R1).61 Later, the rural collectives were given the power to allocate 
existing rural construction land within the rural collective sector (R2) for use as a public welfare 
undertaking (R2.1),62 township and village enterprises (TVEs) (R2.2),63 and housing sites for its 
members (R2.3).64 Furthermore, the rural collectives also hold the power to requisition unused 
land and make further allocation.65 Wukan village is the legal owner of the disputed land. The 
disputed land was a pig farm for its livestock firm that was a village enterprise (R2.2).  
                                                
59 If the exchanged land is of equal value, no tax is paid. But if the exchanged land is of unequal value, the party 
that receives additional cash compensation must pay a land appreciation tax on the cash component.  
 
60 At the very beginning of reform, APRS means after the contracted production quota has been met, farm 
households can retain the surplus output for their own consumption. As far as land is concerned, the new 
arrangement essentially resembles a tenant farming system in which the rural collective acted as the landlord and 
farm households as tenants. In exchange for the payment of “fees” to the collective, farm households have become 
the residual claimants on the income generated from contracted land.  
 
61 Wuquan Fa (Űıœ) [Property Law] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., March 16, 2007, effective October 
1, 2007), art. 128 CLI.1.89386 Chinalawinfo (China). 
 
62 Land Administration Law, art. 61 (China). 
 
63 Land Administration Law, art. 60 (China). 
 
64 Land Administration Law, art. 62 (China). 
 
65 Land Administration Law, art. 65 (China). 
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 (Figure 2.4) 
 
Rural collectives (village committees) hold the power to requisition these agricultural 
land or rural construction land and to reallocate them by voiding the contract between them and 
the villagers, although this power is strictly restricted now. TVEs and agricultural landholders 
also can exchange their land within their own collectives if the purposes of the exchanged lands 
are maintained. 
 
C. Conversion of Cultivated Land for Urban and Rural Construction 
Where does the state’s land come from to be allocated or conveyed? The answer is 
mainly from the rural area. Under China’s Constitution, the state has the power to expropriate 
collective-owned land if that is in the public interest. However, state expropriation was the only 
way to shift land from the rural collective to the urban state-owned one. That means that if a state 
unit or a commercial user wants to gain the use right of a piece of collective-owned land, the 
local government, on behalf of the state, must expropriate the land and either allocate to the state 
unit (U1) or convey to the commercial user (U2) for a fixed period.66 During the process of 
                                                
66 Interim Regulations Concerning the Assignment and Transfer of the Right to the Use of the State-owned Land in 
the Urban Areas, art. 8;43 (China) 
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current speedy urbanization, this conversion plays a fundamental role in China’s landownership 
system, and it is the main focus of this paper. In the Wukan case, whether Country Garden did 
negotiate with the villagers, the village committee or not, it could not legally hold the right to 
start constructing without local government’s approval of converting the land from collective-
owned land to state-owned land. This is another reason villagers thought local government was 
responsible for their problems. 
 (Figure 2.5) 
 
Typically, because the definition, arrangements and functions of the collective are 
ambiguous, and rural collectives were on the lowest level of the hierarchical bureaucratic system 
of local governments (although they are namely autonomous entities now), the negotiation 
between the collective and commercial users are affected by upper-level governments. Even the 
village committees cannot dominate the bargaining; villagers usually are short of official ways to 
express themselves. Thus, the Wukan villagers and villagers in other similar cases chose to 
protest.  
 
c. Incomplete Property and Other Illegal Transactions 
The means of land transaction illustrated above are all legal, while a noticeable illegal 
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land market, or black market, exists to balance the pressures from governments and the demands 
of land.   
 
1. The Black Market in Urban Areas 
Illegal activities in urban areas take two main forms. Firstly, state units or state-owned 
enterprises’ (U1) state-owned land that has been administratively allocated to them is sold, 
leased, or rented out directly to commercial users (U2) without paying back a conveyance fee to 
the state. Secondly, state units mutually exchange their allocated land without proper registration 
and approval. In this case, both stipulated fees and the land appreciation tax are avoided. 
 
 (Figure 2.6) 
 
2. The Black Market in Rural Areas 
Illegal activities have taken various forms. We can roughly divide these into two groups 
based on the types of right holders. For individual rural residents, from the most trivial way, they 
occupy collective-owned land when building or expanding their houses without applying to the 
collective. Although the individuals are not allowed to put the allocated residential plot into a 
market transaction, they may sell or lease out their houses along with the land of the residential 
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plot. Villagers exchange their contracted agricultural land without proper registration to avoid 
paying the stipulated fees.  
For township and village enterprises (TVEs), collective-owned land is sometimes 
illegally included into the sale of the TVEs undergoing privatization. TVEs mutually exchange 
their land without proper registration to avoid paying stipulated fees or illegally use the land not 
designated for industrial purposes in the utilization plan. Then they may sublease their rights to 
use the collective-owned land without the agreement of the collective. More than that, they also 
use the collective-owned land as collateral to obtain bank loans without going through the proper 
procedure of approval and paying the required stipulated fees.67 
 
 (Figure 2.7) 
 
3. Incomplete Property 
“Incomplete property” is collective-owned land that rural villagers or rural collectives 
lease or transfer the directly to urban commercial users without going through the required 
process of state expropriation so as to capture the appreciated value of their land. This type of 
                                                
67 Lin, Developing China, 94. 
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transactions usually happens in the form of building housing in suburban areas. Usually, the legal 
urban housing, such as that built by Country Garden, are so expensive that plenty of urban 
citizens, such as youth just graduated from college and migrant workers, cannot dream to buy, 
although they and many others have a robust demand for housing as part of the urbanization 
process. Collectives or individual villagers build apartments to meet this kind of demand. 
Because this type of transaction avoids paying fees and tax to the government, prices can be 
much more attractive, and the profits directly go into the collective or, possibly, to individual 
villagers. However, these properties cannot be legally registered as other real estate,68 so they 
meet various troubles when they decide to sell or use it as collateral to obtain bank loans. In this 
way, these apartments are called incomplete property. The situation varies across different areas, 
and it will be discussed in later chapters.  
Rural collectives also exchange land for shares in urban real estate companies (hezou 
fangdichan kaifa) or in industrial enterprises (yidi rugu) without first applying for and receiving 
approval from the county land bureau. 
Both of the two means of illegal transactions happen when the commercial users have a 
good relationship with either collectives or individual villagers. The commercial users would 
rather negotiate with them instead of persuading governments to expropriate the land.  
 
                                                
68 According to the new regulation on real estate registration, there is still no sign to legitimate incomplete property, 
or to let them registered properly. See Budongchan Dengji Zanxing Tiaoli (
c&ƂǥĥǗĴ9) (promulgated by 
St. Council, November 24, 2014, effective March 1, 2015), CLI.2.240136 Chinalawinfo (China). 
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 (Figure 2.8) 
 
d. The Differences between Eminent Domain and China’s Expropriation 
Land expropriation by the government is not irrational or a naked grab for resources but a 
common mechanism to handle land’s holdout problems under efficient land assembly situations. 
The main method for expropriation is the exercise of eminent domain. However, there are 
several essential differences between eminent domain as known in the West and China’s 
expropriation mechanism.  
Eminent domain is believed to be under the sovereign’s power to simply take property 
without the owner’s consent69 and transfer it to another private owner. Even though some 
scholars keep challenging whether the state has this power, or why it should have this power,70 or 
arguing the possibility of private takings,71 the government and only the government, in practice, 
                                                
69 The first case establishing the Federal Government’s eminent domain power was Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 
367, 372 (1875).  
 
70 See William Braude, “Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power,” Yale Law Journal, 122 (2013): 1785. 
 
71 See Abraham Bell, “Private Takings,” University of Chicago Law Review, 76 (2009): 517-85. 
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has been capable of wielding this power.72 The main current disputes about eminent domain in 
the United States  regard the real meaning of the “public goods” or “public use” for which land 
may be taken.73 However, the fact is, eminent domain rarely happened in the U.S. among the 
huge land transactions market.74 The two mechanisms’ significances in real economic lives are of 
no comparability.  
The conversion of rural land into urban land is one of the main parts of urbanization, 
particularly the in the process of urban sprawl.75 During this process in China, government’s 
expropriation plays a crucial role. This is different from the United State’s general experience 
with eminent domain. China’s expropriation system has its own traits and issues.  
 
4. The Origin of Power: Sovereignty vs. Ownership 
It is well established that eminent domain is an “inherent attribute of sovereignty,”76 
which means the actor of eminent domain is not the legitimate owner or can be turned into the 
                                                
72 See Rechard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard, 1985), 331; Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press 
of Harvard University Press, 2004), 124. 
 
73 The most famous one that recently attracts attention in the U.S. is Kelo v City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 
(2005). 
 
74 See Chang Yun-chien, “An Empirical Study of Court-Adjudicated Takings Compensation in New York City 1990-
2003,” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 8 (2011): 384-412. Chang collected 314,383 properties transactions 
whose real sale prices (in 2005 dollars) are more than $5,000 In New York City, and 402 cases which are about 
condemned properties, but only 26 cases in which a New York Supreme Court judge adjudicated the fair market 
value of a fee simple in New York City condemned.  
 
75 Urban sprawl is a term that has been used to describe a wide variety of undesirable aspects of urban growth, 
including excessively large cities, overly long commutes and traffic congestion, loss of open space, and failure to 
redevelop decayed inner city properties.  
See Jan K. Brueckner, “Urban sprawl: diagnosis and remedies,” International Regional Science Review 23 (2000): 
160–71; Thomas J. Nechyba, and Randall P. Walsh, “Urban sprawl,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 18 (2004): 
177–200. But here I use the term in a neutral way to describe the process of existing cities’ expanding, compared to 
new cities’ burgeon. 
 
76 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 518 (1883); Room Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406 (1878); 
County of San Mateo v. Coburn, 130 Cal. 631, 634, 63 Pac. 78, 79 (1900); Chestatee Pyrites Co. v. Cavenders Creek 
Gold Mining Co., 119 Ga. 354, 355, 46 S.E. 422, 423 (1904). 
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owner through its power. For example, if a city is experiencing sprawl in the U.S., or more 
specifically, if a municipal government decides to take a plot of land from a rural land owner, the 
land is immediately transferred to the urban developer after the process. The government itself 
can never be the legal owner. But in China, through expropriation, the state becomes the 
legitimate owner of the transferred urban land,77 and then the local government has the right to 
allocate or convey the land to the use right holder of urban state-owned land. The origin of 
China’s expropriation is from the constitutional ownership of urban land, not from the 
government’s sovereignty.  
 
5. Public Purpose vs. Universal Expropriation 
The boundary of eminent domain, in the sense of defining the circumstances in which or 
the purposes for which the government or the government’s designee may take private land, is 
clearly settled by the so-called “Public Use Clause,”78 although there is no definite meaning of 
the phrase “public use.”79 Whether public use really means any “public purpose” or not, eminent 
domain can never happen under a pure private bargaining circumstance without any public 
element. 80  However, because China’s governments’ expropriation power is based on its 
constitutional ownership of all urban land, legally, every inch of every city’s sprawling has to be 
transferred into the state. Therefore, the process of cities’ sprawling in China is the process of 
                                                
77 After the enactment of the new Constitution in 1982, all land in urban China (Including cities, designated towns, 
and suburban areas) has become state-owned. No private owned land maintained in China. XIANFA art. 10 (1982) 
(China) 
 
78 U.S. CONST. amend. V. (“Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation”). The 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the public use requirement against the states. See Chi. Burlington & Quincy 
R.R. Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 266 (1897). 
 
79 See Michael A. Heller and & James E. Krier, “Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of Takings,” Harvard Law 
Review 112 (1999): 997; “The Pubic Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem,” Yale Law Journal 
58 (1949): 599, 605-6. 
 
80 “Where the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court 
has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by Public Use Clause.” Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 
299, 241 (1984); “We can find no case in the last half century where a taking was squarely held to be for a private 
use,” Gamble v. Eau Claire County, 5 F. 3d 285, 287 (7th Cir. 1993).  
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governments’ expropriation.  
 
6. For free vs. Cutting profits 
During the expropriation and conveyance, commercial users (U2) and even state units 
(U1) pay conveyance price or allocation price to the state, and then the state pays expropriation 
fee to the rural collectives. A huge part of these compensation prices goes into governments’ 
pocket, especially local governments.81 In contrast, eminent domain does not entitle governments 
to any direct interests in the taken land.  
 
7. Short Summary 
Different from the typical notions of eminent domain in the West, China’s expropriation 
system transfers the title of rural land to the state. More than that, local governments are 
“legitimately forced to” or obligated to undertake this process in every rural-urban land 
conversion and take the interests from it. This mechanism definitely deviates from free market 
principles that governments’ interventions happen everywhere.  
 
III. A Historical Review of the Concept of “Urban” in China: The Boundaries Between 
Urban and Rural Areas 
 
After the review of current landownership system of China, two questions must be asked: 
Why are the legal differences between urban and rural so dramatic? And who draws the line 
between urban and rural at the very beginning to determine the destiny of the land? There is no 
simple answer to these questions; in large part, the answer involves the deep historical 
differences of the concept of “urban” or “city” between the western world and China. During the 
past 5000 years, China independently developed its cities in its own way. This tradition shaped 
                                                
81 According to the law, 30% of the land compensation fees shall be transferred to the central government, and the 
rest 70% be retained by local governments. Land Administration Law, art. 55 (China). 
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the current boundaries of cities. It also shaped the way of administrating cities and the Chinese 
people’s way of thinking about cities. And more importantly for this thesis, it can shed some light 
on the social background of China’s expropriation system. 
 
A. The Concept of “City” in Ancient China: Walled Area 
 
Walls have been so central to the Chinese idea of a city that the traditional words 
for city and wall are identical, the character cheng standing for both. In imperial times the 
great bulk of China’s urban population was concentrated in walled cities; an unwalled 
urban center was at least in some senses not a proper city.  —— Chang82 
 
How did ancient Chinese people build a “city”? The answer could be simple: They 
walled it. A walled area was defined as a city, or in the other way around, the basic conception of 
city stood for a walled area. As illustrated by Chang, the Chinese character  (cheng)’s 
etymological roots explain itself. This character was found in Chinese bronze inscriptions, which 
emerged from early Shang dynasty (from 1600 BC to 1046 BC).83 For  more than 3,000 years, its 
basic structure has not changed. And based on the second oldest Chinese character dictionary 
Shuowen Jiezi (literally “Explaining and Analyzing Characters”), which was written in the early 
2nd century AD, the meaning of it also does not change. “Cheng: the architectural complex used 
to contain people. Composed of tu (, clay, the material used to construct walls), and cheng (ö, 
accomplishment or achievement), cheng also denotes its pronunciation.”84 Furthermore, the 
                                                
82 Chang Sen-dou, “The Morphology of Walled Capitals,” in The City in Late Imperial China, ed. G. William 
Skinner (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977), 75-100. 
 
83 Qiu Xigui, “Chinese Writing,” in Early China Special Monograph Series No. 4, trans. Gilbert Mattos and Jerry 
Norman (Berkeley: The Society for the Study of Early China and the Institute of East Asian Studies, University of 
California, Berkeley, 2000), 62. 
 
84 Xu Shen (Ǧô), Shuowen Jiezi (vEt/) [Explaining and Analyzing Characters] Vol. 14; also see “Shuowen 
Jiezi / Cheng (ǭĖǟ±/),” accessed July 8, 2015, http://www.shuowen.org/view/9036. 
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chengö, which includes an image of a broadsword, indicates military conquest.  
However, in modern Chinese, people use a compound disyllable chengshi Ô, as the 
formal word for the conception of city. In addition, when people refer to a specific city, its 
government, or use it to express a geographic or administrative area, for example Shanwei or 
Lufeng, they use “shi” as a suffix after the name (Shanwei shi or Lufeng shi). On the other hand, 
Shanwei cheng or Lufeng cheng sounds more like the central part or downtown of it. The 
character shiÔ is also an ancient one that can be found in Shuowen Jiezi: “Shi, the market place 
where buying and selling are done. A market has walls, so is composed ofK and is the 
ancient writing of v ji, indicates the piled up commodities.”85 Therefore, differently from its 
military significance, shi emphasizes on the marketing function of the urban area.  
Nonetheless, from the etymological point of view, the defensive wall is the common 
feature of China’s conception of “city,” whatever the main function is.  
The etymology does tell us there are two origins of China’s conception of “city” and that 
wall is a significant feature of it. This tradition affects China’s modern urbanization process. So, 
K. W. Chan named his book on China’s post-1949 urbanization as “Cities with invisible walls,” 
But only stopping at the etymological explanation seems cursory and shallow. It is necessary to 
make a historical review about what was going on along China’s unique urbanization path. V.F.S. 
Sit divided China’s 5,000 years of urban evolution from the Late Neolithic to the mid Qing 
Dynasty (middle of the 19th century) into four stages: (1) Moated large tribal village, (2) 
Longshan city-state based on irrigation projects, (3) Feudal city based on early empires, and (4) 
administrative city of imperial China of centralized control.86 For the purpose of this paper, the 
timeline is extended to the late Qing Dynasty and the Republic of China (the early 20th century) 
to incorporate a modern conception of urbanization from western settlements in colonial 
                                                
85 Xu, Shuowen Jiezi Vol. 15; also See: “Shuowen Jiezi / Shi (ǭĖǟ±/Ô),” accessed July 8, 2015, 
http://www.shuowen.org/view/3308. 
 
86 Victor F. S. Sit, Chinese City and Urbanism: Evolution and Development (Singapore; Hackensack, NJ: World 
Scientific, 2010), 305. 
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concessions and treaty ports. The main discussion will be focused on the two main functions of 
cities and their evolutions, and the discussion will be further divided into four stages: (1) the 
classic period, from the prehistoric era to the Han Dynasty; (2) the emergence of market 
functions, from the Sui to the Song Dynasty; (3) the recurrence of the classic function, from the 
Yuan to the Middle Qing Dynasty; and (4) the confrontation with western urbanization, the late 
Qing Dynasty.  
 
a.  Defensive Walls and Magic Square: From prehistory era to Han Dynasty 
The prerequisite of developing a city is advanced cultivating skills that help humans turn 
from nomadism to sedentary living. In the Mid Neolithic (6,000-5,000BC), stone tools used for 
farming, such as hoes, stickles, and grinding tools for grains had become prevalent in China. The 
relics of so-called Yangshao culture (5000BC to 3000BC) were found extensively along the 
Yellow River in China. At this period, settlements could not be clearly divided into villages and 
cities. K.C. Chang argued for and summarized the features of the proto-type of China’s ancient 
cities as: a stamped earth wall; the existence of a large amount of weapons; large structures that 
are used as palaces, ancestral halls, and other monumental places; elite graves with signs of 
concentration of wealth and power in ritual wares; handicraft quarters; and the order and 
planning of the settlement that these elements demonstrated.87 Under this definition, cities did 
not emerge in the Yangshao age. And simply speaking, the early Yangshao settlements are found 
to have been surrounded by ditches, not walls.88  
More importantly, Chang believes that proto-cities are not the result of economic push or 
imperatives, but the means or tool of the new ruling class for extracting economic surplus and 
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sustaining political power in late Neolithic society.89 This explanation could be endorsed by the 
etymological “military conquest function origin” of cities that cities were used as a means of 
defense not only against outside enemies, but also against rebels from inside. However, in the 
early Yangshao age, because adult graves exhibit only minor variability in small numbers of 
utilitarian offerings, it is believed that very little social differentiation happened to create an elite 
class.90 Then it is unlikely to define the Yangshao culture such as early Jiangzhai, Dadiwan 
settlements as cities.91 
In the next 4000 years (till the foundation of the Han Dynasty in the 3rd century BC), with 
the increase of social differentiation, all elements of traditional China’s cities mentioned by 
Chang emerged, i.e., the Great Hall, the Holy Place, and the defensive walls. All of these 
elements merged and evolved into a stylized layout of ancient China’s city: the Magic Square.92 
At the same time, China developed a complete theory about the world, under which the layout of 
cities and the hierarchy between them originated. From this period, China independently started 
its urbanization.  
 
1. First Cities in Banpo Culture: The Great Hall and the Holy Place 
China’s urbanization begins at Banpo Culture (4,800-3,600 BC), which is associated with 
Yangshao Culture. Archaeological sites share similar features to the first phase at Banpo are 
considered to be part of the “Banpo phase” of the Yangshao culture.  Walls still had not occurred, 
although ditches were wider (16 to 20 ft) and are believed to be defensive moats.  
However, defensive walls are not the sole element to identify cities. Urbanization is 
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generally understood to be a process that begins with the development of some cultural elements 
that are not directly related to the food-producing activities of hunting, gathering of plants and 
fruits, herding and nomadism, and, finally, sedentary agriculture. With the appearance of 
permanent settlements, certain elements in the cultural context are no longer directly related to 
agricultural activities and food production. Then if certain social or spiritual institutions begin to 
create permanent structures, such as buildings or monuments, the first elements of urbanity begin 
to emerge.93 Besides walls, the so-called Great Hall and the Holy Place were elements in China’s 
early urbanization process. 
The Great Hall and the Holy Place were found in Banpo sites. Excavation on the Great 
Halls in those sites suggests that it might have been inhabited by both the oldest and the youngest 
members of the city and that it was a communal gathering place for events like weddings or 
harvest celebrations; so, the Great Hall was both a quasi-domestic and a public space, at that time.  
The Holy Place, called bo, was built to commemorate the ancestors. The reason why 
these constructions are remarkable is not only that they signify some non-agricultural functions, 
but also that they exhibit the origins of the traditional principles of Chinese urban planning.94 
Schinz argues that these principles reflect the rudiments of Chinese ancient mystical philosophy. 
For example, the connections with ancestors were believed to affect fertility. Man is considered 
concentrated Qi;95 when his bones are returned to the earth they become re-energized by Qi. The 
living descendants are affected by the Qi generated from the bones of their ancestors, “as a lute 
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string will pick of the vibration of another lute string near it.”96 In this theory, the world was an 
active matrix of Qi into which graves, houses, and cities must be carefully inserted by Feng Shui 
principals to maintain harmony.97 This mystical theory was also merged with Banpo culture’s 
Neolithic astronomy. In this way, the elite’s ruling or “conquest” was justified: The attack on or 
disrespect to the Great Hall or Holy Place offends natural power.  
 
2. First Cities in Longshan Culture: Defensive Walls 
Real walls occurred in Longshan culture that centered on the central and lower Yellow 
River and dated from about 3,000 BC to 2,000 BC.98 Taosi, a site of Longshan culture, was 
encircled by large rammed-earth walls (280 ha); its elite residences appear to have been 
separated from commoners by walled enclosures, and social hierarchy was clearly expressed in 
mortuary practice.99 Another Longshan settlement in Chengziya is a rectangle 400×500 m, about 
twenty hectares in size, and the walls and the terrace inside, about 4 to 5 m high, are still 
standing. The wall was constructed of so-called hang tu (pounded earth), which was built up in 
successive layers 12 to 14 cm thick, each layer being rammed hard before the next was laid over 
it. This technique was a new invention, and it has been in use until today, 4,000 years later.100  
Another example of the more advanced type of walled settlement was investigated in 
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Pingliangdai. The walled area covers a square only 185 m long on each side, but the wall is 13 m 
at its base and 8 to 10 m wide at the top. It sill stands about 3 m high. Another walled settlement 
was found in the area of south of Song Shan, the central holy mountain of China. The location is 
called Wangchenggang, which means “the king’s city hill.” The sides of the square are only 95m 
long.101 Outside of the defensive wall, there was also an encircling moat, a clear inheritance of 
the defensive moat of former moated settlements. 
It is generally accepted that Longshan society was a stratified society and was probably 
structured on a hierarchical order. In this hierarchical society, the upper strata, composed of 
powerful families and clans, developed a new lifestyle in connection with the ceremonial and 
ritual order; the display of their wealth and influence was related to the demonstration of social 
standing and position.102  
The main impacts take the form of the emergence of proto-cities that functioned as 
fortress of the elites and their dependent specialists, craftsman and appendages, including the 
new classes of professional and part-time soldiers and slaves. The proto cities in the Late 
Neolithic are invariably small in comparison to most large contemporary moated settlements, as 
they did not accommodate the whole tribe or tribal group – a marked feature that signifies a 
departure from the tribal society and the start of rural-urban disparity.103 From that time, walls 
were set to protect the upper strata, and powerful families and clans occupied the Great Hall and 
Holy Place to show their superiority.  
 
3. Erlitou culture (Xia Dynasty) to Zhou Dynasty: The Foundation of 
China’s Urbanism Tradition 
The later Erlitou culture, which is an Early Bronze Age urban society that existed in 
China from approximately 1900 to 1500 BC, may have evolved from the matrix of Longshan 
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culture. Chinese archaeologists generally identify it as the site of the Xia dynasty, which is the 
legendary first dynasty of China described in later ancient historical chronicles, such as the 
Bamboo Annals (published before 296 BC), Classic of History (complied by Confucius before 
479 BC), and Records of the Grand Historian (finished around 109 BC), but there is no firm 
evidence to substantiate such a linkage.104 However, there is no doubt among archeologists and 
historians that the Erlitou site is one of the earliest and most important historical urban 
settlements of Chinese civilization.  
We can see from Chang’s definition that “market function” does not matter for 
recognizing early cities or the start of ancient China’s urbanization. Perhaps this is because of the 
practical difficulties to identify market relics than military elements like walls, but it should be 
right to declare that the “military function origin” occurred much earlier than “market function 
origin” in ancient China. That is, “urban area” originally refers to “cheng” instead of “shi.” And 
the boundaries of cities were the walls built around the cheng areas.  
From this period till the third Zhou dynasty, the prior urban elements evolved and finally 
became the features of cites. At the same time, ancient Chinese people developed a theory to 
accommodate these cities into their worldview. Then before the end of this period, the ”market 
function” occurred, but it did not change the nature of ancient China’s cities. The market was 
still a secondary or supplementary function of ancient China’s cities.  
 
i. From the Holy Place to the Magic Square 
During one of the first three dynasties, whether it started from legendary Xia, or Shang, 
which is testified by oracles, or later Zhou, the Holy Place was finally occupied by an overlord, 
or in historical terms, the establishment of ruling families as dynasties. Then the old Holy Place 
and Great House transferred into the core of city, the “Magic Square.” 
The overlord not only incorporated in himself all of the sociopolitical institutions of the 
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society, but also took over the spiritual powers of the Holy Place and concentrated them in his 
person, thereby emerging as the Holy King, such as Yu the Great.105 Since the spiritual essence 
of the Holy Place and the natural forces embodied in it had descended upon the Holy King, he 
and his ancestors (not generally all ancestors of urban elites or all residents) were considered to 
be the associate of the natural forces and able to influence them for the benefit of his descendants 
and the people over whom they ruled.  
At the same time, the old Great House where people held celebrations for harvests, 
transferred into an altar, or sheji (literally soil and grain.) Then the Holy King also worked as the 
only High Priest; ordinary people were excluded from this worship ceremony. This transition 
was deeply influential in that the cities, especially the central city, transferred from being mainly 
defensive institutions to becoming political or religious centers, or as Schinz memorably called 
them, the Magic Squares.106 From then on, until the last dynasty in the early 20th century, holding 
ceremonies of worship, including the Heaven and the ancestors was one of the main jobs of all 
the emperors; they, by themselves, were the highest priests. Therefore, the cities, especially the 
capitals, worked as quasi-religious centers.107 
The Magic Square constituted a new form of the earlier Holy Place that was first found in 
Banpo Culture. In the Erlitou Culture or the Xia dynasty, it was occupied by the Holy King as 
the magic center of the human world order, in accordance with the natural world order. Having 
been bestowed upon the King by Heaven, the eternal spirit of the world order, and presented by 
sacred animals emerging from the rivers, the Magic Square was beyond doubt the diagram of the 
world order suited for enlightenment and for integration into the world order.108 This new 
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philosophy legitimized the right to rule through the concept of the Mandate of Heaven, which the 
king demonstrated through the observation of rituals and his daily acts as a working king in the 
care and concern of his people and welfare through divination, visits and tours, and sometimes 
through military expeditions.109 Therefore, the Holy City, where the Holy King lived and 
worked, should also be built according to the Mandate of Heaven. 
By applying this diagram to the layout of the Holy City, all of the elements of urban 
settlements thereafter developed could be combined in an orderly and abstract geometric form, 
which contained the powers of the natural forces. In this way the Magic Square became the 
magic tool for the benefit of the ruling dynasty and its people. To ensure the usefulness of this 
magic tool, the layout had to be executed as accurately as possible, and all of the measurements 
had to contain the magically relevant numbers, and norms of today are for ensuring the 
usefulness of the tools in modern industrial production.110 
Ancient Chinese people’s enthusiasm for and mysticism regarding numbers might surpass 
ancient Greek Pythagoreanism.111 The magic qualities of the geometric form and of the odd and 
even numbers, as applied to the layout of urban settlements, became an essential part of China’s 
urban development, not only in these beginning dynasties, where this method was invented, but 
also throughout the entire history of urbanization in imperial China up to the end of China’s last 
dynasty.  
 
ii. Urbanization under the Yu’s Worldview 
Whether Erlitou is the site of the legendary Xia dynasty or not, archeologists admit that in 
this period, the influence of ancient civilization exceeded the boundary of some specific 
settlements, and a tribal alliance shares common cultural elements and identity was established. 
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At the same time, their worldview also improved to accommodate the extended world. The Yu 
Gong or Tribute of Yu, a chapter of the Book of Xia section of the Book of Documents, 
describes Yu the Great, the legendary founder of the Xia dynasty.112 According to its description, 
Yu surveyed the rivers of its empire, and then divided the empire into nine provinces (zhou) 
based on his geographic knowledge113; then he ideally described five concentric domains of five 
hundred li (125 miles)114 each. Located in the center of this square is the Royal Domain, a small 
territory surrounds this square and comprises the Domain of the Nobles; the next zone of 500 li 
is the Peace-securing Domain; the following one is the Domain of Restraint, and the outermost 
zone is called the Wild Domain. The two inner zones surrounding the royal residence in the 
center contained the cities and lands of the high-ranking ministers and officers, the principalities 
of lower rank, and as an outer ring, the lands of the various princes. The third zone was the zone 
of education, protected by a military cordon. The two outer zones were inhabited by tribes and 
criminals; the farther from the center, the wilder the tribes were, and, in the case of criminals, the 
heavier the sentence of banishment.115  
However, because the Xia civilization did not exceed the central part of current China 
which was just a little bigger than Yu zhou (the central province in Yu’s nine provinces map), 
most modern scholars agree that the work is considerably later – that it was a product made 
during the Warring States period, the Qin dynasty, or the Early Han dynasty when China’s 
civilization conquered these areas described.116   
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(Figure 2.9) 
 
 
                                                                                                   (Figure 2.10) 
 
Nonetheless, these descriptions still shed some lights on ancient China’s understanding of 
urbanization. First of all, the world is like an enlarged city, the people who lived in the central 
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are more civilized than those in outer areas.117 This bias lasted till the Opium War of the 1840s, 
when western colonists defeated China, and also affected Chinese understanding of urbanization 
till that time.  
Secondly, explored or conquered areas should be included in a hierarchical administrative 
system under the central power. Thirdly and more importantly, an equal relationship with other 
civilizations that is the foundation of trade and commercial activities was not established. Yu’s 
structure is a political structure, but this was used to control the whole world.   
 
iii. The Consolidation of Cities’ Hierarchy 
With the improved philosophy of the world, the power of overlord enhances and a sharp 
distinction between the nobles and the villagers increased. The nobles, as the vassals of the 
overlord, lived a life entirely occupied by court ceremonies or war, but not by work. They 
expressed their contempt for “the people of the field, the clownish people.” Since the nobles 
were living “according to the rites,” which “do not descend to the common people,”118 the latter 
were excluded from public life, which was “the meat-eaters’ business” only.119 Consequently, 
the cities were filled with the activities of these nobles, whereas the villages remained outside of 
this process. In this way, the rural area and villagers were degraded. The walls delineated not 
only the land, but also the people. 
More definite central government and vassal states in the form of rights and 
responsibilities were established in the late Shang dynasty (from 1600 BC to 1046 BC) when the 
bronze ware and bones and tortoise with Chinese inscriptions (oracles) were made. The Holy 
King did not directly rule all the territories he had but delegated land and control outside the 
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Royal Domain to other lords. In their own territories, or kingdoms, the lords had their own altars, 
or sheji (soil and grain) to manifest their sovereignties.  During this period, the patriarchal 
system of succession was also put into practice and further improved so that the descendants of 
these lords succeeded to the lordships if they continued to pledge loyalty to the Holy King. Then 
these lords divided their territories among their aristocrats, just as was done during the medieval 
period in Europe.120  
Under these circumstances, cities were categorized into several levels. The city (cheng) 
where the king lived was called du (capital Ȗ), under which there were two levels of 
settlements: yi (city Ȑ), and ju (village ƽ). However, this kind of organized hierarchy of 
settlements was already found in Chengziya, one site of Longshan culture (about 1000 years 
earlier than the foundation of the Shang dynasty). Chengziya is at the center of a cluster of more 
than 40 sites. These sites come in three size classes: sites covering from a few thousand up to 
10,000 square meters are thought to belong to the ju. Larger sites up to 50,000 square meters are 
believed to be yi, and finally Chengziya itself has been identified as a du. Based on thick 
deposits found at the site, the population of the Chengziya has been estimated to be in the tens of 
thousands.121 In some ways, this archeological evidence backs up the theory of Yu’s legends, and 
the traditions of Chinese urbanism seem to have been settled into common practices long before 
the known ancient writings were made. If this is the case, the characters cheng and shi are more 
likely being shaped by ancient people’s understanding of urbanism, and it is not the other way 
around.  
 
iv. The Origin of Market Function 
In the later Zhou dynasty (1046-256 BC), with the emergence of the new economy of 
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industries and commerce, the new market function of cities arose, and major cities grew into new 
industrial and commercial centers. Many cities of the middle Eastern Zhou (770-256 BC) had 
constructed multiple markets that became nuclei for urban industries. To accommodate this new 
development, the layout of cities changed, but the solution was easy: to build an outer wall. The 
walled “outer cities” were called ȕ guo, which was first mentioned in Zuo Zhuan (Chronicle of 
Zuo) in 648 BC. The left half of that character, ', is believed to stand for “watchtower,” and the 
right half ȥ indicates Ȑ yi (city). Ignoring its military implication, a “genuine” urban 
community emerged in the outer city, with diversity in non-agricultural activities, including 
popular education, culture and entertainment. There was also a developed neighborhood 
structure and an urban residents management based on the oldest household registration.122 
Based on these, a new concept regarding the role of the city had also appeared, “to contain 
people,” as the character  cheng was explained in Shuowen Jiezi.  
 
(Figure 2.11) 
 
However, the layout of the city, its quasi-religious and administrative functions, and its 
central role in serving the surrounding countryside had not been lost or even impaired. This was 
evident in the cities of the Warring States period (475 BC to 221 BC) as well as proven to persist 
in cities of later dynasties.123 Military strongholds emerged along lines of defensive walls on the 
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border of major states (these walls were later jointed together to form the Great Wall).  
 
4. Centralized Administrative Units: Qin and Han Dynasty 
In the next short Qin dynasty (221 to 206 BC) and the later 400 years of the Han dynasty 
(206 BC to 220 AD), China went into the age of empire. The new administrative hierarchy was 
made up of four tiers – namely, the central government or capital, commanderies (jun, provincial 
level, ȓ), counties (xian,u) and townships (xiang,).124 Different from the original du, ju and 
yi hierarchy, the new tiers stand for geographical administrative areas, not just different 
settlements. And the original settlements were called the seats of some administrative area. For 
example, a city could be labeled as a seat of a county, but it was not “the county.” A villager 
could also introduce himself to a stranger by saying that he was from A commandery’s B county, 
even if he did not live in any “city.” In this way, the original cities lost their old identities and 
merged themselves with the rural areas they administratively controlled.  
 
 
(Figure 2.12) 
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The new system did more than just add one more administrative tier. China started its age 
of unitarianism. Centralization had been the core policy of the new Qin Dynasty as a means to 
integrate the diverse and newly conquered states (developed from the feudalism lordships from 
the late Zhou dynasty) into a new nationhood. After eradicating all other states of the Warring 
States period, the age of feudalism was ended. The heads of commanderies and counties did not 
own their territories; rather, they were officials nominated by the central government or by the 
emperor personally.125 They often did not live or even had not been to their new posts before 
their commissions, and they could be easily replaced, at least during peacetime. All prior 
lordships and altars (sheji), which had been, in some way, the sites of sovereignties, were 
destroyed so that only the emperor’s altar in the capital or the sole Magic Square maintained.126  
 
(Figure 2.13) 
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This formed the backbone of the national urban hierarchy. Being the seat of government 
was the predominant function of most urban settlements (cheng) of traditional China. Schinz 
summarized the features of cities in this period as: “City development is basically 
administratively-led. The city hierarchy corresponds with the administrative hierarchy in size and 
rank order according to administrative functions and centrality. Commercial activities form an 
important part of the city, yet are of secondary importance; those commercial activities are also 
highly regulated by the government.”127 Therefore, the functions of cities did not change much 
compared with before, but a more tight hierarchical urban system was created.  
 
b. The Emergence of Southern Cities and Market Function: From Sui to Song Dynasty 
After an almost 400 years period of chaos, China came to a long and comparatively 
peaceful age, the Sui dynasty (581-618 AD) and the Tang dynasty (619-907AD). The most 
significant geographic change in China’s economy during that time was that the center of its 
economy slowly but irreversibly moved south, from the Yellow River basin to the Yangtze River 
basin, mainly because of the damages from the lengthy invasions from the northern nomads.128 
While the political center did not move – the capital and many older big cities still existed in the 
north, the economy of the northern part was not enough to support its political functions. The 
solution was found in building canals, the Grand Canal in particular, to solve the problem of the 
mismatch of population and grain production between the north and south. This change of the 
structure of the economy influenced the development of the layouts of southern cities (cheng), 
like Yangzhou, the most important city (cheng) and once southern end of the Grand Canal.129  
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Before this period, the function of cities was mainly military, quasi-religious, and 
administrative. The market function was secondary in that the market area was limited to the 
outer city (guo). Compared to that, the layout of these new port cities (cheng) in the southeast 
was based entirely on practical and functional considerations, since no connection with the 
imperial court or the residence of the emperor was necessary, which, had that been an important 
consideration, would have influenced the layout with some of its sanctified principles. During 
this period, Yangzhou became a center of transshipment within the network of overseas and 
inland trade and very soon grew into one of the most important harbor cities on the southeastern 
coast. In 891 AD, after the rebellion of Huang Chao had been subdued in 884 AD, the walls of 
Yangzhou were reconstructed to include the northern and southern suburbs.130  
The innovations did not just occur in the southern cities (cheng). Reflecting the new 
dynamics of openness to foreign cultures and improved trade with outside countries, some Tang 
cities had markets predominated by foreign traders. Religious buildings, including those devoted 
to Daoism, Buddhism and Western religions, were common features in such cities (cheng) as 
Changan, Panyu and Guangling. The prosperity of these cities brought cultural diversities. 
However, the layout of most traditional cities (cheng) did not change, while the urban 
planning was done more delicately. The use of urban space demonstrates the planning principles 
of order, uniformity and rank, the presence of the central axis in the form of the main street that 
cuts through the whole city underlying the formality and centrality principles. Places are put 
together into one quarter, forming the central core, which is distinctly separated from the rest of 
the city. This forms for the first time a separate place within the city (like the forbidden city in 
Beijing), marking the supremacy of imperial rule. 
After another short period of chaos, the Song dynasty (960-1279 AD) followed. The 
emperors learned from the chaos caused by military warlords of the late Tang dynasty; so, local 
officers’ military powers were curtailed; in turn, the status of civilian officials rose. 
Confucianism revived at the cost of military weakness. Although the Song lost much of the 
                                                
130 Sit, Chinese City and Urbanism, 146. 
 
53 
Tang’s northern territory, the Song’s civilization was the summit of ancient China in many ways. 
Naito and other prominent scholars recognized the Tang-Song transition as an important 
watershed. Social, political, demographic, and economic changes that occured between the mid-
Tang Dynasty and early Song Dynasty represented the transition between the medieval and early 
modern periods of Chinese history, rather than occurring, as is often said, in the Opium War 
nearly 800 years later during the late Qing dynasty.131  
Specifically in urbanization, residential wards were dissolved and replaced by open 
streets. Rigid regulation of the movement and activity of urban residents gave way to increasing 
citizen freedom. Confined urban markets that opened for a half-day disappeared, and shopping 
streets emerged with some shops open 24 hours. Both residential and commercial land uses took 
on a more practical linear pattern. clustered along main streets, canals, and river courses, instead 
of being confined to a particular area in a rigid square shape. A new “urban household” emerged, 
with rights and responsibilities different from those accorded the rural population, and the 
concept of urbanities first appeared. The appearance and application of firearms changed the 
design of the city wall such that walls were made of stone, rather than wood, or lined with bricks, 
with buttresses, archery towers, and deep moats.132  
However, in spite of the above changes, the palace city remained as the focus of Kaifeng 
and Linan (capitals of the Song dynasty in different periods), and the administrative quarter 
served as the center of lesser cities. Even though Linan (the capital of the South Song dynasty, 
now Hangzhou) grew up and maintained a metropolitan center of the worldwide trade in Yuan 
dynasty, whose cultured life-style astonished Marco Polo (who called it “Kin-Sai,” which means 
the “emperor’s temporary residence,” which must derive from the Song dynasty).133  
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At the same time, the biggest city (cheng) in the north, Yuan’s capital Dadu (now 
Beijing), or Kanbalu, as it was called by Marco Polo, was under Kublai-Khan’s rigid 
administration.134 Marco Polo witnessed its foundation as the last imperial capital to be planned 
and constructed completely anew in 1266.  
 
c. Recurrence of Defensive and Administrative Function: From Yuan to the Middle Qing 
Dynasty 
The later Ming dynasty (1368-1644 AD) enjoyed another long-term peace and the spread 
of commercial farming, especially of cotton. Commentators also witnessed other commercial 
changes, such as the increased volume of trade and private enterprises in manufacturing. All 
these had boosted urban growth and the formation of new commercial and industrial cities.135 
Nevertheless, the increase in the commercial economy did not surpass the heights it had achieved 
during the Song dynasty, and Chinese civilization turned conservative from that time.  
The most influential policy change, Haijin (literally “Sea ban”), shut down China’s 
gateway to foreign trade.136 The government sternly controlled the trade and failed to turn itself 
into a modern capitalism government that could have been established under the Song’s 
development.137 Under this environment, the major centers of trade and manufacture were 
usually seats of local or district administration, or even seats of border military commanderies as 
well. This, combined with the political style of the Ming – autocratic centralism, had brought the 
principles of centralism, formality, and the fulfillment of dynastic roles in China’s tradition of 
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Confucian city planning to a new height.138 This did not change, but even got worse until the late 
Qing dynasty (1644-1912), when the Opium War (1839-42) occurred.  
After 2,000 years’ evolution, the original administrative “commandery and county” 
hierarchy met its ultimate shape. Basically, there were three tiers in this hierarchy: sheng 
(province Ɔ), fu (prefecture Þ), and xian (county u).139 Later, a circuit institution, dao (ȍ), 
was put between province and prefecture, as a formal level of government.140 More than that, at 
the same level as the prefecture, there were two different units: direct-governed department (zhili 
zhou ƅȮÏ and direct-governed sub-prefecture (zhili tingƅȮq) (without lower county-level 
unit). Besides the normal county government, there were two other county-level units: 
department and sub-prefecture (san ting ēq) under prefecture (san zhou ēÏ) (not other two 
prefectural-level units).141 Under this hierarchy, every city or walled area could find itself as a 
seat of one of these units.  
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                                                                    (Figure 2.14) 
 
d. Confrontation with Western Urbanization: Taking Shanghai as an example 
The Opium War (1839-1842) literally opened China’s gate by forcing the empire to open 
coastal treaty ports to trade with the western powers. As one commentator wrote,  
 
It is undeniable that these cities were a new system of settlements superimposed 
onto the Chinese traditional urban hierarchy. They had created a new dualism in China’s 
urban scene and in its urbanization process. The Treaty Ports thus are a dynamic of a 
maritime and hostile origin that had affected the nature of the city and the spatial priority 
of China’s urbanization process, especially in the era of the People’s Republic after 1949.                
—— Chang 142 
 
5. Shanghai in Ancient China 
Shanghai, now the biggest city of China and probably the biggest one of the world by 
population, was a good example to illustrate this new path of urbanization. Since the time of the 
North Song dynasty, it had retained the status of an open port and engaged in both domestic and 
foreign trade, taking advantage of its geographic location as the meeting point of the Yangzi 
River and the Chinese Pacific coastline. At that time, a market street developed along the inner 
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shore of the bend of the Huangpu River, where ships were not exposed to the fast current of the 
River. This market street was called Shanghai Shi (not cheng), the Market above the Waters.143 
Its main function was to be the transshipment center for the great city of Suzhou, about 70 km 
west of it. About two hundred years later an imperial customs office (Shibosi) was established at 
the northern end of the Market Street, and again two hundred years later, a county office was 
built nearby under Huating fu (prefecture).  
Partly due to the Sea Ban Policy, Shanghai suffered a lapse since Mid Ming. But after the 
Qing dynasty reopened Shanghai as one of the open ports for foreign trade in 1684 AD, both 
local and foreign trade boomed. Light defense works were replaced by strong walls, enclosing 
the administration within a circular walled area covering about 2km2, a rather large area for a 
county seat. It had obviously been enlarged because of the presence of three imperial officers, 
the county magistrate, the customs official of Jianghai Guan (Jianghai customs), and the Daotai 
(a circuit intendant, higher than a prefect). The original market street was left unprotected outside 
the walled area and consequently remained a suburb.144 Even after it was closed to foreign trade 
again in 1757 AD, domestic trade remained vigorous, and its administrative level did not degrade. 
It was already one of the leading ports of the world, with a volume of shipping equal to or greater 
than London in the 1830s.  
 
6. The Categories of Foreign Settlements in China after the Opium War 
Shanghai’s was a typical path of the development of a Chinese city. A market was born 
under the Song’s free and modern atmosphere, merged into the official administrative hierarchy, 
and then slowly climbed up the hierarchy ladder even though its market function decreased 
instead of increasing. But this path was blocked by China’s defeat in the Opium War, after which 
Shanghai was surrendered to Britain as one of the five treaty ports created by the Treaty of 
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Nanking.145 From then on, China lost control of much of its territories, especially on the east 
coastal area.  
Westerners entered these places in three different ways: 
• Direct Control or Concessions: This group comprises the four ceded territories, such 
as Hong Kong (to Britain), and cities in the Northeast after 1895 (when the first Sino-
Japanese War ended) that were directly controlled by foreign powers (by Russia and 
then by Japan); the six leased territories, such as Lüshunkou (to Russia, then Japan, 
then the Soviet Union), Dalian (to Russia then to Japan) and Qingdao (to Germany); 
the seven railway cities controlled by foreign railway companies along the coast, and 
the three territories occupied by France and Germany. 
• Treaty Ports with foreign settlements: this is a group of 12 port cities with 26 foreign 
settlements. The largest foreign settlement was found in Shanghai (46km2), followed 
by Tianjin (15km2), and Hankou (2 km2) 
• Other Treaty Ports that numbered 70, located along China’s coastline and major 
rivers. 
As a treaty port city with foreign settlement, Shanghai met the requirements of 
developing into a western city from that time. Firstly, Shanghai was entitled to more autonomous 
liberty than were the concessions. The businessmen who cared more about their own local 
benefits than their home countries had more powers than concessions’ governors and other 
officials. It is true that during most of the time, British influences dominated Shanghai (and were 
later replaced by Japan), but even the typical free cities in medieval Italy were under heavy 
influences from the Holy Roman Empire, the Papal State, or other powerful kingdoms in 
different periods. 
On the other hand, within the legal settlement, these businessmen also took advantages of 
avoiding interferences from China’s governments. More than that, the Shanghai settlement was 
far enough from political centers to avoid most political or military turbulences that were 
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common during that time. For example, Hankou settlement was located in Wuhan, the biggest 
city and administrative center in central China; Tianjin is just 130 km away from Beijing, and it 
is the first stop for invaders coming from the sea and bound for Beijing. Therefore, Shanghai was 
the perfect place for Chinese to cultivate a western city.  
 
7. Shanghai Municipal Council: Switched to the Western Path  
 
The Treaty Ports represented a new and exclusively urban phenomenon following 
the Western model, whereas the rest of China remained not only predominantly rural but 
characterized by cities of a fundamentally different sort, bearing a close symbiotic 
relationship with their rural hinterlands. The sharpness of the legal lines around the 
Treaty Ports was paralleled in almost all other respects … [N]one of the Treaty Ports ever 
had any administrative and political role outside their own concession areas … This 
further distinguished them from the colonial ports in the rest of Asia as well as from 
traditional Chinese cities. It helps to explain their separateness from the Chinese city 
system as a whole and accounts in part for the failure of ’the model to spread.’  
—— Murphey 146 
 
By 1844 there were some ninety-five commercial agencies represented in the treaty ports, 
including British, American, and other European firms, together with 19 Parsi firms from 
India.147 The British Consul laid out the first foreign settlement in Shanghai (not within the 
walled area, but near it), which was to rapidly become the central focus for China trade, at a time 
when the Bund (¦Ũ waitan) was being built, with large parts of the designated area still subject 
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to tidal infiltration.148 The mortality rate was extremely heavy, however, with a number of the 
early consuls either dying of fever or being invalided elsewhere.149 These difficulties did not stop 
them or other businessmen.150 At the beginning, the consuls were vested with necessary powers, 
the chief of which was to smooth the path of trade, such as dealing with ship’s papers, customs, 
examination of goods, and enforcement of port limits.151 But more than that, consuls were the 
highest governors of their land who were also charged with the power of urban planning. The 
somewhat uneasy alliance between Chinese and foreign communities was reflected in new 
patterns of urbanization for the foreign settlements.152 The British settlement initially drew on 
Victorian-Indian colonial structures, modified by the more hybrid cultural types associated with 
the established Portuguese port of Macau (a treaty port initiated in the Ming dynasty), familiar to 
many early traders. 153 
What must have astonished their Chinese counterparts, however was the fact that these 
“governors’” powers were diluted by their “subjects,” these western businessmen. On 11 July 
1854 a committee of western businessmen met and held the first annual meeting of the Shanghai 
Municipal Council (the Council for the Foreign Settlement North of Yang-king-pang), ignoring 
protests of consular officials, and laid down the Land Regulations that established the principles 
of self-government. They reached this momentous result even though the stated aims of this first 
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Council were simply to assist in the formation of roads, refuse collection, and taxation across the 
disparate leased territories.154 This attempt reflected the established western urban administrative 
fashion, which was lacking in China,155 and also had practical reasons. Following Britain 
colonials, the Americans and the French got their own settlements in Shanghai, which would 
result in sometimes absurd administrative outcomes, such as needing three drivers’ licenses to 
travel through the city.  
To accommodate this development, the American settlement officially joined the British 
Settlement in 1863 to become the Shanghai International Settlement, while the French settlement 
remained independent and the Chinese retained control over the original walled city and the area 
surrounding the foreign enclaves.156 Although the so-called “international settlement” legally 
belonged to Britain and America, other countries were gradually included and became part of the 
management of the settlement.  
After 1870, the council consisted of nine members, mainly British. Americans usually 
occupied one or two seats, and one seat was reserved for a German during the 1873-1914 period. 
After the outbreak of WWI, the German seat was transferred to Japan (and later increased to two 
seats.)157 Although the British dominated the SMC and its subsidiaries, such as the police, the 
power station, and public works, Britain itself had no authority over the council. However, this 
separation of institutions was hard for Chinese to understand at that time; people thought Britain 
should be blamed for the SMC’s disrespectful attitude and cruelty toward the Chinese.158  
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On one hand, this was because of the nationalism or patriotism on both sides of the 
relationship; on the other hand, it might have been because Chinese people were not familiar 
with this kind of urban administrative fashion, a self-governing or autonomous municipal 
government.159 In some way, they did not believe a city could be arranged without an over-
arching governing power. The separation, they may have felt, was just a pretext. 
The SMC’s response to this criticism was to admit three Chinese businessmen into the 
SMC in 1928, and then to increase the number of seats reserved for Chinese businessmen to five 
in 1930. The change of the settlement’s attitudes towards the Chinese government and the 
Chinese people was interesting. At the beginning, without a visible sign of separation like walls, 
the settlement areas were privileged foreign enclaves, exempt from Chinese authority, and with 
the ability to act as virtually autonomous political bodies. Those Chinese who lived in the foreign 
settlement areas were likewise exempt from imperial authority.160 The refugees from the Taiping 
Rebellion (1851-1864) rushed into Shanghai, although the settlement disallowed non-foreigners 
to live inside its boundaries; nonetheless but as a result, the Chinese population of Shanghai 
massively grew. After the 1860s, Shanghai’s urban design tended to develop in two distinct but 
not incompatible ways – a consolidation of the old city with its organizational priorities of 
temples, gardens, and government buildings, but with an increasingly functional relationship 
with its adjoining mercantile city, and the foreign districts where architectural and landscape 
expression followed the fanciful rules and formal street layouts of contemporary British and 
French cityscapes.  
During this process, the role of the Chinese compradors played a significant role in 
treaty-port development. Essentially these men served as commercial intermediaries, assisting 
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Sino-Western trading interaction and diffusing actual or potential conflicts.161 A number of 
compradors invested in land, particularly in and near the International Settlement in Shanghai, 
and built houses for rent, thereby accelerating the urbanization process. They also built some of 
the larger mansions in the city that reflected a hybrid amalgam of western forms with Chinese 
details, interior fittings, and gardens.162  
By these and other actions, the compradors were an instrument of gradual Westernization 
up until the 1920s, relating to both business practices and urban design and generating the 
beginning of a new cosmopolitan class in the cities with a increased interweaving of Chinese and 
Western cultural values.  
At the same time there was an unambiguous division of habitation between the Chinese 
and foreign communities, although Chinese property in the International Settlement was 
estimated to be around the same value as European property. After this time, compradors mainly 
became independent businessmen and industrialists, particularly investing in shipping and the 
import-export businesses.163 And finally, as we have already seen, they were incorporated into 
the SMC in the late 1920s.  
We can decipher the development of Shanghai as dragging the city down from the Qing 
dynasty’s hierarchical ladder, but that was not the whole story. The residents there, especially the 
businessmen, seemed to avoid the influences from both the Qing dynasty, the British Empire, 
and other Chinese rebellious powers, like the Small Swords Society,164 the Taiping Rebellion,165 
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and the Boxer Rebellion.166 Shanghai’s fate and development were different from those of Hong 
Kong or the other formal concession ports where China lost its sovereignty, and western empires 
took it. Shanghai, as a combination of several leased territories, tried to establish itself as a city 
like those free imperial cities in the Holy Roman Empire, or the Italian city-states between the 9th 
and 15th centuries, where the modern (Western) concept of cities originated. This attempt added 
another dimension, autonomy, to the military and market concepts of China’s urbanization.167  
 
B. The Classic Concept of “Urban” in Western Civilization 
 
In China, true cities never came into being, since the urban community that was 
their necessary pre-requisites never existed.                                                 —— Rowe. 168 
 
If the treaty ports brought a new dimension to the idea of a city from western civilization, 
in what way is it western? And what the differences, if any, are there between China’s cheng or 
shi and the Western idea of the “city”? 
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In the contemporary urban geography of the West, the city is believed to hold three main 
characteristics, which are also used to define the concept of a city. First of all, the urban residents 
mainly work in non-agricultural occupations. Secondly, the population density of the area is 
high. Thirdly, its high-density buildings and their architecture form a cityscape distinctly 
different from the physical look of rural settlements.169 Behind such a visible “city” concept is 
the assumption of the duality of “urban” and “rural” that originated from the ancient Greek idea 
of the “polis” or city-state.  
The polis is described in Homer, and had evolved over three thousand years, but it only 
acquired its full meaning as an economic, political, and communal unit about 700 BC, a result of 
rural population growth, pressure on rural land, and the development of the commercial economy 
based on money.170 Nonetheless, the original polis, as Aristotle describes it, was based not on 
trade but on a self-sufficient and self-governing group of villages, 171 in a narrow and closed 
region lying around an urban center, bordered by mountains and sea and the territories of 
neighboring poleis.172  
 
e. Independent City-State vs. the Magic Square of the World 
The polis thrived in Greek around the 5th century BC.173 In ancient Greek, the polis had a 
lot of special meanings. First of all, the city-state should be self-ruled; there was no Great Yu 
who took all Greek cities under a centralized overlord. Then, if we ask a question that seems 
obvious to us – why did Athens not take over Greece and become the capital of a unified state? 
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The answer is that Athenians, like other Greeks, preferred the polis: as Kitto put it, “if the Greek 
was not within a day’s walk of his political center, then his life was something less than the life 
of a real man.”174 The polis was originally the result of geography: small, independent states, 
each with its own local character, resulted from valleys divided by mountains, uplands with little 
outside access, islands that were largely self-sufficient and self-contained, all of which hampered 
any larger political unity. Athens remained a polis long after it had become the core of a great 
trading empire; so, the system was the product not only of geography but also of culture. 
Therefore, a hierarchical administrative system could not be found in ancient Greece.  
 
f. Democratic Participation vs. Quasi-Religious Control 
Secondly, polis residents and members participated in communal life, including politics, 
economics, culture, morals, religion, sports, and art, such that the city represented a type of 
living with a high degree of public participation, which was lacking in ancient China. Then, the 
polis was much more than a city; it embraced the surrounding agricultural land, and it included 
access to the sea. It contained farmers, craftsmen, and sailors, and many would combine two or 
even three of these roles.  
The polis was never simply an economic unit. It had a double nature; it was a territory, 
but, much more significantly, it was a group of citizens.175 As Thucydides put it: “It is the men 
that are the polis.”176 The Athenian state was neither “the republic of Athens” nor “Attica”, but 
“the Athenians”: the citizens were the state, which was embodied in the person and idea of 
demos, the people.  
On the other hand, although “cheng” in China was meant to include people, the main 
purpose of that concept was to manage these people according to orders from superior powers, 
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whether they were the emperors, the ancestors, or Heaven.  
In this way, living in Greek cities, even not controlling them as officials, was still an 
honor or privilege. The polis itself was a state in the sense that it legislated, went to war, levied 
taxes, spent public money, had frontiers, and so on. There are no contrasting meanings for city 
and state; they are one and the same.  
In contrast, after the Qin dynasty, when all other sheji (soil and grain altar) were 
destroyed, China united as one state, including all cities, and all rural areas. 
In addition, the polis’ people did not think of the polis as a definite territory. Many of 
those who lived in it were not citizens (women and slaves); though only citizens could own 
property, non-citizens (metics) and slaves took part in trade and crafts just like citizens, often on 
the same footing. The Greeks thought the polis the natural and right unit for human society and 
of any state: To quote again Aristotle’s famous words, “[The polis]  comes into existence for the 
sake of mere life, but exists for the sake of the good life.” He echoed Pericles in his funeral 
speech, who praised a whole way of life that the polis represented, the “school of Hellas.”177 To 
live outside such a framework, someone must, as Aristotle said, be “either a god or a beast.”178  
The conception of an urban area was very different among the Chinese. Although ancient 
Chinese people also despised remote people, cities, as seats of several specific areas, were more 
a territorial concept. Therefore, they “despised” remote people since they were under more direct 
control of the central government or near the orders from Heaven, not because they 
democratically participated in the urban management.  
 
g. The Market as a Main Function or Not 
The polis or city then was thus a community of a portion of its residents, and in that 
sense, urbanism and urban culture were logically dissimilar to the situation of the surrounding 
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rural settlements. The city was therefore higher and more important than the countryside. Based 
on that view, in Latin, the two words: city and civilization, share the same root.179 It is therefore 
generally assumed by some scholars in the West that civilization only exists in cities under 
certain conditions. Some radical scholars argue that cities that possess these conditions are thus 
“true” cities; those that do not, including many in Asia, are not “true” cities. 
 
Urbanity, I shall argue, is a typically Western species of the genus economic and 
civic culture … comparable to and closely related with the Protestant ethic. In fact, both 
urbanity and the Protestant ethic stood at the cradle of Western capitalism and beyond 
that of Western modernity … Urbanity is in origin and nature a Western phenomenon. … 
Not the ties of family and religion, nor the possession and long-time habitation of a piece 
of land, nor the belonging by birth, caste or race, but the very rational economic interests 
in autonomy vis-à-vis the ruling feudal forces drove these city dwellers together.  
—— Zijderveld.180 
 
These arguments have an equation that “city” equals oikos plus market. In Greek, oikos 
means “house.” It represents the place of authority and public participation in politics, religion, 
art and social affairs.181 Putting oikos and market together reemphasized the values and system of 
commercialism. Post-WWII urbanization in many developing countries is also hence labeled as a 
new subset of urbanization, like “pseudo-urbanization” or “subsistent urbanization,” distinct 
from the urbanization of the West, and is regarded as something negative and needs to be stopped 
or avoided through government efforts and policies.182 
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Recall that we have summarized the concept of ancient China’s city that cheng equals 
defensive walls plus an administrative or quasi-religious center, and the commercial function of 
the city, as discussed above, was only a secondary concern until very recently. 
 
IV. The Heritages That the Ancient Tradition Left to the People’s Republic of China 
 
The Chinese path of urbanization can be summarized as this: When the Chinese world 
concept emerged from the legends of antiquity in the last centuries BC, the Magic Square 
concept provided the pattern for systematizing the imagined eternal world order. In principle it 
was a static and finite concept, since it covered everything known to man, leaving nothing 
outside. Changes were considered to be only periodic variations within the permanent framework 
of universal and eternal conditions and laws. Therefore, the distribution and hierarchy were 
established to express this world order; the defensive walls and other military elements were 
built to protect this world order, and the market function was secondary to it.  
The changes in economic development in the Sui-Tang dynasties and especially in the 
later Song dynasty, which created China’s “modern” urban culture, could have modified the 
traditional world view, but intellectual development was gravely restricted by the alien rulers of 
later dynasties (the Mongol Kublai Khan’s Yuan Dynasty). The old concept (Confucius), 
although outdated and misused, was intentionally kept alive for the purpose of legitimizing 
power until the late Qing dynasty, when western colonials brought the new concept of city by 
developing treaty ports. Then China had another chance to modernize its urbanization process. 
But this process stopped again after 1949 because Chairman Mao had a different arrangement in 
mind for his new China.  
 
A. Mao’s Blueprint for Cites: Eradiate All Western Effects and Start from the Beginning 
By the new (in 1949) Chinese government’s definition, all the treaties between the Qing 
Dynasty or the Nationalist Government and western colonials were “unequal treaties” that should 
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be terminated, and all the privileges granted to foreigners should be ended,183 although most of 
these works had been done by Nationalist diplomats during or right after WWII.184  
More specifically in Shanghai, the reorganized National Government of the Republic of 
China was really controlled by the Japanese occupation army. That army had retrieved all the 
leased territories of Japan and all Western settlements after the Pacific war. It had also closed the 
SMC in 1943, while the original International Settlement area was still the core area of 
Shanghai.185 Therefore, the Communist Party took all cities from the Nationalist government 
with no direct contact or conflict with the SMC or other western governments. The Soviet Union 
returned Lushunkou in 1955, and the issues about control of Hong Kong and Macau were 
intentionally suspended. The ephemeral tradition of China’s free city ended, and then Shanghai 
existed as a pure industrial and commercial center instead of an international port and financial 
center. 
At the beginning of the new government, Mao put a great deal of emphasis on balance 
and egalitarianism. What had long been prevailing in the coastal port cities corresponded with 
Mao’s thought that the cities were predominantly “consumptive” or exploitative. The new 
government should turn cities into “productive” entities, or focus on their industrial function. 
Even as an industrial center, Shanghai and other past coastal concessions and leased-territories 
were deemed to be a kind of spatial “illness” from the past.  
In 1956, Mao declared a plan that the “undue concentration” of modern sectors in coastal 
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Treaty Ports should be modified by a better spread of industrial cities in “rational locations” 
close to resources in interior provinces, 186 which would also cut down the national security risk. 
Major state investments were put into interior and non-urban locations in the so-called Third 
Front areas, 187 vividly, “in hills, of dispersed mode and within caves.”  
Accompanying this spatial strategy, under the radical strategy of “purifying the values of 
urbanities” and to let them learn the “virtues of rural folks,” large scale and officially sponsored 
urban-rural migration of educated youth and government officers took place, which involved an 
estimated total of 30-35 million urban residents. This ambitious program, called the “Down to 
the Countryside Movement,” lasted almost twenty years and peaked in late 1960s.188 
The main philosophy of these arrangements can be summarized as that cities should help 
eradicate the “three main contradictions”: the contradictions between town and country; manual 
and mental labor; and agriculture and industry.189 Culturally and politically, cities should be the 
places of socialism and nationalism where western effects, including self-governing, should be 
terminated. The arrangements of cities, like all other things, were controlled by the central 
government.  
 
B. Cities as Basic Administrative Units: From Cheng to Shi 
However, in no way was the purpose of these arrangements to achieve egalitarianism 
through physically destroying cities. The new China government tried to put everything under its 
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new administrative hierarchy system. Under this system, the importance of cities was stressed, in 
a “western way,” at least not in an ancient way.  
In 1955, the State Council passed a decision on the definitions of cities (shi) and 
townships (zhen) as basic administrative units, and the administrative process by which they 
should be set up.190 It set forth a clear administrative relationship between incorporated urban 
places and the central government, on which basis central planning was to be launched in space. 
Thus, for the first time in Chinese history, the city (shi) was seen as a distinct and separable 
spatial unit, with its own economic and political role alienated from the surrounding rural 
territory (cheng’s neighborhoods (the walled area)). From that date on, a cities’ industrial or 
economic function was stressed (not its market function, because the new Chinese government 
did not prefer the market as the methods to allocate commodities), although, at the same time, a 
cities’ administrative function was also stressed because administrative priority was important in 
a centralized planning economy. For example, mining and other industrial areas could set up 
cities or townships even though their populations were not qualified as these units. In this way, 
being labeled as a city (shi) meant political significance whether it was from administrative 
power or economic advantage.  
This new fashion was clearly different from what it had been in the past. In accordance 
with the past imperial administration’s basic principles of centrality and unity, the seat of the 
local administration (the walled area) was located in the center of the county and was a party of 
this unit. Consequently, the urban settlement (peoples in the walled area) around the office of the 
magistrate was only a part of the local administrative unit and not a separate community. The 
magistrate was both the “mayor” of the urban place and the magistrate of the whole county. For 
this reason the urban settlement had no name of its own, but carried the name of the local unit 
with the suffix cheng, indicating the walled area of the local unit (cheng=wall). For example, 
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Chicago (suppose that it is a walled metropolitan area) is the seat of Cook County. In ancient 
China’s way, there should be no “mayor” of the “Chicago City,” but just a magistrate of the 
county. Then there will be no such name as Chicago that people should call the metropolitan 
area. Rather, they would refer to “Cook city” to distinguish it from the suburban area. While, the 
Prefect or “Mayor” of Chicago is the supervisor of Cook County, and maybe including other near 
counties, and the seat of “Chicago Prefecture” is Cook County. The metropolitan area does not 
have a special official for urban management.  
Furthermore, in cities (the walled areas) that were multi-level administrative entities, the 
different names of the different levels of administrative units could be applied, exemplified here 
by the city of Guangzhou in Guangdong province. The name Guangzhou referred to the second 
level of administration, whereas the two local units (county-level), whose magistrates resided 
behind the walls, were called Panyu and Nanhai. The city as such had no name. In popular 
speech only the people called the city Yangcheng, the city of the rams.191 Actually, the city area 
belonged to the two magistrates, each with his own office in his own part of the walled area. So, 
administratively speaking, the inhabitants were not the citizens of Guangzhou but of either the 
county of Panyu or the county of Nanhai. The prefect of Guangzhou192 and the governor of 
Guangdong province resided in Nanhai, whereas the prefectural Confucius Temple and the 
provincial examination hall were located in Panyu. Nonetheless, the center of learning, the 
academy, was called Yangcheng library.193  
Taking Chicago again as the example, because it is the largest city in the Midwest, 
“Chicago” should be the seat of Illinois or a higher unit that might include more than one state. 
Then “Chicago” itself should be a prefecture unit including several counties and county-level 
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districts; their seats are in Chicago’s metropolitan area. Then Chicago’s prefect should control all 
these counties’ officers, and he or she, with other prefects or circuit intendants who are in charge 
with several other counties, is responsible to the governor. However, the prefect does not directly 
control any affairs of the metropolitan area. These routine duties belong to the Cook County 
magistrate. In other words, the higher in the hierarchical ladder, the farther the officials are from 
practical affairs. More importantly than that, because the metropolitan area is not a distinct and 
spatial area, concerted urban planning is hard to achieve. But this was not a problem for ancient 
China’s cities. Because cities meant the walled area, there was no problem as to urban sprawl.  
 
(Figure 2.15) 
Ancient China left the new government more than 2,500 walled cities in which every city 
larger than a county seat was included. The biggest ones, with perimeters longer than 25 km, 
were Beijing (literally North Capital, the capital of the Ming Dynasty), Nanjing (literally South 
Capital, the capital of the Ming during the first two emperors’ terms), and Fengyang (the Ming’s 
Emperors’ hometown). To construct Mao’s blueprint, almost all walls were destroyed during the 
1950s and 1960s. This process laid foundations for introducing the new fashion of urban 
planning and development. After that, cities became real administrative units, not just dependent 
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walled areas on their administrative jurisdictions. 194  For example, Guangzhou Cheng or 
Yangcheng became Guangzhou City (Shi).  
 
 
(Figure 2.16) 
 
C. New Relationship between Cities and Rural Areas 
As illustrated above, in traditional China, industrial-commercial functions were of 
secondary or complementary significance in city formation, designation, and its sustenance. 
Besides military usage, the main role of the city is to pass onto its rural hinterland the blessing of 
Heaven, i.e. regular rain and shine and a stable and orderly society through the means of 
Confucian ideology and its education. We can call this the city’s quasi-religious function. At the 
same time it was the platform for all sorts of central place functions required by a rural economy 
and society. Therefore, the relationship between cities and the rural area nearby was that the 
cities served the rural area, not the other way around. The officials in walled areas were, in fact, 
more concerned about their rural agricultural people than about urban citizens. However, this 
relationship reversed when new China started to stress cities’ industrial function. 
Since 1958, the city-region was created as an administrative means to bridge town and 
country, to achieve local self-sufficiency in food and vegetable supply as well as a means to help 
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to reduce the “three contradictions” of major urban places in the new China.195 By extending the 
administrative boundaries of most “Bigger Cities” or Major Cities of over 1 million population to 
include a number of rural counties, the big cities were put into a better position to secure grain, 
non-staple food, and water supplies than negotiating for planned allocation from various central 
ministries.196 Besides, they needed space for dispersing industries from overcrowded inner city 
areas, and needed to secure a market for some urban produce such as machinery and chemical 
fertilizers, and even a means for the good utilization of urban “night-soil.”197 In this way, China 
restarted its urbanization process that was hampered by various wars. 
During this process, the urban area regained its superiority against the rural area. 
However, the motive of this process was not urbanization but industrialization. Then, it was not 
dominated by businessmen’s entrepreneurship, but the government officials’ ambitions. 
Therefore, China’s new urbanization intertwined with the reforms of government’s 
administrative hierarchy. A city’s position on the administrative ladder determined how many 
resources it would get, and how big that city can finally get.  
 
D. The Administrative Hierarchy of China’s Cities 
In the Wukan Event, officials of two cities, Shanwei and Lufeng were involved. But it 
seems inconsistent with common sense that Wukan, as a village, would be subordinated to cities? 
Is not a village an antonym of a city? Even if not, why were two cities thought responsible for an 
event in a village? What does “city” mean in current China? Whatever the answers, the concept 
“city,” whether it is cheng or shi, has lost its original meaning. Now, although it retains its 
market function origin, the city does not have to have a military function. More importantly, 
“city” now refers to a special place in China’s administrative hierarchy. But unfortunately, the 
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place cannot be accurately deciphered from its name.  
 
a. What is a city (shi) in current China? 
As mentioned above, the differences between city and other administrative units matter in 
many different ways. Then how is one to decide whether one settlement should be a city or not, 
or whether a county or other rural areas has developed enough to have evolved into a city? 
Because China’s “natural” urbanization process stopped, or never occurred, it is hard to imagine 
that businessmen, guilds, or other citizens could set up a municipal council without central 
government’s endorsement, as the Shanghai Municipal Council did. The central government 
decides the category a settlement belongs to. This is not to say the government arbitrarily makes 
decisions. There are some guidelines, although they are flexible. 
In the 1955 decision, for a settlement to be designated as a city, it had to have a 
population of at least 10,000. Those whose populations were less than 10,000 had to command 
special administrative, strategic, or economic importance to qualify for city designation. For 
settlements whose populations were more than 20,000, the urban areas were qualified to 
incorporate “districts” (shixiaqu).198 This method continued till 1982, when the new Constitution, 
which claims the state owns all urban land, was passed. That change was made in order for China 
to reclassify its administrative units to accommodate population growth.199 
The town designations were even more complicated. The criteria used in the 1982 
Census, which are considered reasonable by many analysts, accepted either a settlement with a 
population of more than 3,000, of whom more than 70 per cent are ‘non-agricultural,’ or a 
settlement with a population of 2,500-3,000, of whom more than 85 per cent are ‘non-
agricultural’ with ‘non-agricultural’ classification being based on household registration. 
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When the boundaries of urban administrative areas are defined according to the above 
1982 criteria – that is, the administrative boundaries of all urban districts and towns – they 
roughly coincide with the boundaries of areas of urban activity (for example, built-up areas at an 
urban density and factories); in the urbanist’s parlance, the urban administrative areas are neither 
overbounded nor underbounded.200 Then the original boundaries of cities were settled, and that 
were also the basic boundaries between state-owned and collective-owned lands. From that date 
on, “legalized” expropriation started with urban sprawl, although before that, during Mao’s era, 
this kind of conversion must have happened without legal justification, but only with political 
justification.  
 
b. The Main Hierarchy of Cities 
According to the guidelines above, urban areas are separated with rural areas. But the 
cities are never equal units, not only economically, but also administratively or politically.  
Generally speaking, there are three different levels of units that can be called city. Four 
cities directly under the central administration (zhixiashi), Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and 
Chongqing are provincial-level units, holding the highest positions in the urban hierarchy. Next 
down are prefectural-level cities (dijishi), which are under provincial administration.201 One 
special feature of direct-controlled cities and prefectural-level cities is that their urban areas are 
divided into urban “districts” (shiqu or shixiaqu). Both direct-controlled and prefectural-level 
cities’ districts and counties are county-level administrative units; however, the governments’ 
levels of units under direct-controlled districts and counties are promoted to prefectural-level. In 
other words, the district chief and other officials are at the same bureaucratic level with other 
prefectural-level units, although their jurisdictions are lower county-level units.  
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Such division is not found in the lowest echelon of the city hierarchy (county-level city). 
There is no further subdivision of the urban areas into districts within these smallest cities. By 
2013, there were 286 prefectural-level cities (among 333 regions at prefectural-level units), 368 
county-level cities(among 2853 county-level units, including 872 county-level urban districts).202  
 
 
(Figure 2.17) 
As shown in the figure above, most county-level units are put under prefectural-level 
cities (286 cities in 333 units). This reform started in 1983.203 Before that, based on the 1982 
Constitution, there were only three levels of administrative units under the central government, 
the provincial, county, and township.204 At that time, several counties and county-level districts 
had already been put under some major cities’ jurisdictions (such as the seats of provincial 
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governments), but others were still under the provincial governments. The number of county-
level units (including counties and provincial-controlled cities)205 of each province was usually 
more than one hundred; therefore, several administrative-regions (or prefectures) were 
established, under provinces, to administrate several counties. Legally, these units were not an 
independent level but resident agencies of the provincial governments.  
The most significant feature of this structure was that no legislative assembly or people’s 
congress was set on this level. Rather, a work council under the Provincial People’s Congress 
was sent to every prefecture, which was called the standing committee of “A” provincial 
people’s congress’s work council at “B” prefecture. After 1983, these administrative regions 
were gradually turned into prefecture-level cities. More than that, these original administrative 
regions were divided to set more prefecture-level cities. In these cities, complete independent 
governmental organizations (such as their own people’s congress and more departments under 
local governments) were set up that, namely, they are not provincial agencies any more. 
Administratively, they are at the same level with the cities where the provincial governments’ 
seats are located. Therefore, prefectural-level cities became independent administrative level 
units, although this seems inconsistent with the Constitution.  
Along with the same process, more counties turned into so-called “county-level cities.” 
The requirements of this change were flexible, but the local economy and ratio of non-
agricultural residents were the main concerns, as in 1955.  
To see this governance structure in action, take the Wukan case from the previous chapter 
as an example. Lufeng, where Wukan village is located, was a county, and it was under Huiyang 
administrative-region’s jurisdiction until 1988.206 Then Shanwei City was setup as a prefectural-
level city on the territories of Lufeng County and Haifeng County, which also belonged to 
                                                
205 The so-called province-controlled cities, at that time, included two different levels of cities. The first kind 
included prefectural-level cities and a small number of county-level cities without lower district units. Most of  these 
units were industrial areas. 
 
206 At the same year, Huiyang administrative-region was terminated, and its jurisdiction were distributed to four 
prefectural-level cities. 
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Huiyang. Before that, “Shanwei” was a town under Haifeng County, and with the establishment 
of the new city, the original town was turned into the seat and the solely “urban district” (county-
level) of Shanwei City. At the same time, a plot of Lufeng’s territory was separated to setup 
Luhe County.207 Then in 1995, Lufeng County was turned into Lufeng County-level City.208 
From that date on, two counties (Haifeng, Luhe), one county-level city (Lufeng), and one 
county-level district constitute Shanwei City. Shanwei City, with other 18 prefectural-level cities, 
and two sub-provincial level cities, embrace 119 county-level units. The administrative region as 
a unit disappeared in Guodong province.  
 
c. Advanced Adjustments about the Three-level Hierarchy of Cities 
As mentioned, other than the 19 prefectural-level cities, Guangdong has two other special 
units called “sub-provincial level cities” (Fushengji Shi). Besides this, there are two other special 
kinds of units – “major cities” (Jiaoda de Shi) and  “separately-listed cities” (Jihua Danlie Shi) to 
distinguish some units from the normal prefectural-level cities. In different ways, these labels 
express some cities’ special priorities.  
 
1. “Major cities”: Legislative Priority 
The term “Major City” firstly occurred in 1982.209 By legislation of 2000, “Major City,” 
                                                
207 Guowuyuan guanyu Guangdongsheng Tiaozheng Bufen Xingzhengquhua de Pifu (bȬI!ÜƆǯĕȔU
ǗđgWƃý¥) [Approval on Adjusting Sectional Administrative Zoning of Guangdong Province] (promulgated 
by St. Council, January 7, 1988, effective January 7, 1988) St. Council Gaz., March 25, 191-2 (China). 
 
208 Guanyu Guangdongsheng Chexiao Lufeng Xian Sheli Lufeng Shi de Pifu (I!ÜƆčȜȩuǩƛȩÔ
ƃý¥) [Approval on Revoking the County of Lufeng and Establishing the City of Lufeng in Guangdong Province] 
(promulgated by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, January 19, 1995, effective January 19, 1995) St. Council Gaz., 
February. 24, 1995, 95-6 (China). 
 
209 Difang Geji Remin Daibiao Dahui he Difang Geji Remin Zhengfu Zuzhi Fa (2004 Xiuzheng) (ĚƧ*Ō+
ǘ§1ĚƧ*ŌđÞƪƬœ) [Organic Law of the Local People’s Congresses and Local People’s 
Governments (2004 Amendment)] (promulgated by the Standing Com. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1979, effective 
January 1, 1980, revised December 10, 1982; December 2, 1986; February 28, 1995, and October 27, 2004) art. 27; 
35 CLI. 1.55744 (China). 
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as a special legal term, refers to a city where the People’s Government of the province or 
autonomous region is seated, the city where a special economic zone is located, and any other 
major city approved by the State Council.210 According to the legislation, these cities hold 
legislative priorities that other prefectural-level cities do not have. The People’s Congress and its 
Standing Committee in these cities may enact local decrees, provided that they shall not 
contravene any provision of upper level laws, and such local decrees shall be implemented after 
they are reviewed and approved by the Standing Committee of the People’s Congress of the 
province or autonomous region where they located.211  Nonetheless, they are at the same 
administrative level with other prefectural-level cities. Even in 1982, when there were only a few 
cities that were permitted to be divided into districts (which meant they were prefectural-level), 
only a few of them were ratified to be put into this category. 
According to these definitions, there are currently 49 major cities, including all seats of 
provinces and provincial-level autonomous regions, all five separately-listed cities, and 15 sub-
provincial level cities.  
 
2. “Separately-listed cities”: Fiscal Priority 
The name “separately-listed” means that these cities are not listed with other prefectural-
level cities on the fiscal system. Normally, local governments’ fiscal revenues should be turned 
in to their provincial-level governments and spent according to unified planning. To avoid too 
many financial resources being concentrated on the provincial-level, which might deprive some 
economically more developed cities’ local benefits, these cities have, since 1983, been gradually 
put into the central government’s fiscal list so that they do not contribute to the provincial 
governments. 
In 1989, the last three cities were separately listed; there were 14 cities in this category;212 
                                                
210 Lifa Fa (ƛœœ) [The Law on Legislation] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., March 15, 2000, effective 
July 1, 2000) art. 63 §1; 2 CLI. 1.26942 (China). 
 
211 The Law on Legislation art. 63 §4 (China). 
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six of them were not seats of their provinces. Therefore, among 27 cities where their provincial 
government were located, only eight of them were entitled of this priority. In some ways, these 
cities were politically promoted, but “separately-listed” indicated fiscal priority originally.  
Currently, there are only five separately-listed cities. All provincial seat separately-listed 
cities have dropped out of this category since 1994, when all the 14 separately listed cities were 
turned into “sub-provincial level cities.”213 And then, one of the six non-provincial seat cities, 
Chongqing, the first established separately-listed city, was further promoted to one of the four 
provincial-level direct-controlled cities in 1997. In an administrative way, the eight provincial 
seat separately-listed cities were promoted by this arrangement; they lost their fiscal priority. 
However, the provincial-level governments invest a lot on their own seat cities that these cities 
do not actually lose from this arrangement.214   
As a result, there are five separately-listed cities, none of them is a provincial seat, and all 
of them are sub-provincial level cities at the same time.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
212 Besides the 14 cities, Hainan was also separately listed before it was promoted into an independent province in 
1988. Cities were brought into the category “separately listed” gradually. During this process, some cities were 
separately listed earlier, and some later. 1989 was the last year for the central government to grant separately listed 
city status. After that, the central government stopped enlarging this category.  
  
213 Zhongyang Jigou Bianzhi Weiyuanhui guanyu Chongqing, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Harbin, Shenyang, Chengdu, 
Nanjing, Xi’an,  Changchun, Jinan, Hangzhou, Dalian, Qingdao, Shenzhen, Xiamen, Ningbo Gong 16 Shi 
Xingzheng Jibie Dingwei Fushengji de Tongzhi (ªİĸƴZ®1I!șÝÜÏŉōÅŧŐȧ
öȖl(ǚ¶ȡĢĶÏ§ȆȯÌştȢ³ŔH 16ÔǗđƧY¹]ƆƧƃȊƉ) 
[Central Institutional Organization Commission’s Circular on Promoting Chongqing, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Harbin, 
Shenyang, Chengdu, Nanjing, Xi’an, Changchun, Jinan, Hangzhou, Dalian, Qingdao, Shenzhen, Xiamen, Ningbo 16 
cities’ Administrative Level to Sub-provincial] (promulgated by Cent. Inst. Org. Comm’n’s, February 25, 1994, 
effective February 25, 1994), http://wenku.baidu.com/view/ded3d3e49b89680203d82548.html (China). 
 
214 To clarify, the original purpose of the “separately listed” category was to prevent these cities from engaging in 
revenue siphoning from provincial-level governments. Usually, provincial-level governments spend the revenue that 
would have been siphoned to invest in their seats or other very undeveloped areas. This hurts higher-developed 
cities, if they are not seats or separately listed cities. However, because, during the process, “separately listed status” 
was granted to provincial seats (the eight seats that are SLC), even if they lost “SLC’s” fiscal priority by being 
promoted to direct-controlled cities in 1997, they did not, at least not significantly, lose revenues to the provincial 
governments. Provincial governments consistently do not want to be siphoned from them. 
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3. “Sub-provincial level cities”: Officials’ Administrative Priority 
In 1994, with the 14 separately-listed cities, two more cities (both were provincial seats) 
were promoted to “sub-provincial level cities.”215 These cities are still “province-controlled” 
cities. Specifically, they should obey provincial party committees and provincial governments’ 
leadership that they should approve these cities’ “reform proposals” before their being 
implemented.216 However, these cities are entitled to more economic management powers. More 
significantly, their party branches and governmental institutions’ hierarchy levels are a half-level 
higher than other prefectural-level units. For example, the party secretary and the mayor of sub-
provincial level cities are at the same level with vice-governors. In practice, the party secretaries 
of this kind of cities are even higher than many vice-governors.  
(Figure 2.18) 
 
4. Other Levels: “Sub-prefectural Cities” and Experimental “Township-   
          Level Cities” 
Like the Central Institutional Organization Commission (CIOC), whose functions include 
                                                
215 Central Institutional Organization Commission’s Circular on Chongqing (China). 
 
216 Ibid, Issue 1. 
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making policy on administrative reform, central reorganization plans, personnel establishments, 
quotas, wages, and administrative regulations for State institutions, every provincial-level unit 
has its own IOC. After 1991 when it was formed, CIOC has been taking charge of the ratification 
of separately-listed cities and sub-provincial level cities’ establishment. In the same way, 
provincial IOCs have the power to promote normal county-level cities to so-called “sub-
prefectural cities” (most of which were not subject to any prefectural-level units but were direct-
controlled by provincial-level governments). These cities have more administrative powers than 
normal county-level cities. And the cadres’  administrative levels are half-level higher. 
One other type of city, “township-level cities,” first occurred in the “Twelfth Five-Year 
Plan for National Economic and Social Development” period (2011-2015).217  After more than 
30 years’ development, many towns on the more developed east coastal area have blossomed. 
Take Humen, a township near Guangzhou for example. It has more than 600,000 residents and 
produced 38 billion yuan (more than 6 billion dollars) GPD in 2013, which is more than many 
county-level units.218 During the past few years, an experimental innovation started by promoting 
some of these more developed townships to “cities.” Until recently, four provinces have 
proposed their own reform planning for this promotion, but a universal definition of “township-
level city” has not been made. The common features of these plans are that these towns will have 
more economic administrative powers, and their administrative levels, or part of their 
government institutions, will be promoted to “sub-county level,” which is a half-level higher 
than that of other towns.219   
                                                
217 As was done by the Soviet Union and other former socialist countries, China’s central government keeps making 
“five-year plans” for its development. Usually, the texts of these plans are vague, and they are much less important 
than during the planned economy period, but they are still useful guidelines to help understand the short-term goals 
of China’s reforms.  
 
218 Humen Zhen Renmin Zhengfu (ǕȢȠ*ŌđÞ) [Humen Township Government], Gaikuang (S) 
[Introduction], accessed October 10, 2014, 
http://www.humen.gov.cn/html/gaikuang/humenjianjie/humenmiaoshu/20120620/400.html. 
 
219 See Hefei Shi Shier Wu Guihua Gangyao (Xiuding) (ǀÔh "ǞWƩǛ(@ǡ)) [The Schema of Hefei 
City’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan for Development (Revised)] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. People’s Cong. 
Hefei City, effective March 1, 2011) Chap. 4 Sec.1, accessed July 10, 2015, 
http://www.ahpc.gov.cn/upload/xxnr/1002320133284260.pdf (China); Zhonggong Zhejiang Shengwei Bangong 
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d. State-level New Area (Sub-provincial Area): Binhai and Pudong 
Begining from 1992, China started to setup some “new area” in direct-controlled cities 
for urban management reform. 220  Normally, districts of the direct-controlled cities are 
administratively on the same level as prefectural-level cities; the party heads and government 
chiefs are on sub-provincial level. Now, there are only two official sub-provincial areas: Binhai, 
a new area in Tianjin city, and Pudong, a new area in Shanghai city.  
 
e. Short Summary 
To sum up, including the experimental township-level cities, there are six levels of cities 
in China: direct-controlled (provincial-level) cities, sub-provincial level cities (including all five 
separately-listed cities), prefectural-level cities (including all other major cities), sub-prefectural 
cities, county-level cities (including directly-controlled by provincial level units or controlled by 
prefectural-level units), and township-level cities. Therefore, even though the Constitution 
provides only three levels of government – provincial-level, county-level, and township-level – 
the actual situation is much more complicated.   
                                                                                                                                                       
Ting Zhejiangsheng Renmin Zhengfu Bangong Ting Guanyu Jinyibu Jiakuai Zhongxin Zhen Fazhan he Gaige de 
Ruogan Yijian (HŚŏƆ®_GqŚŏƆ*ŌđÞ_GqI!ȃňaíìȠxÊďȱƃǊÙóǜ) 
[General Office of CPC Zhejiang Provincial Committee and General Office of Zhejiang Provincial People’s 
Government’s Suggestions about Further Accelerating Central Townships’ Developments and Reforms] (Issued by 
General Office of CPC Zhejiang Provincial Committee, October 11, 2010) Chap. 3, accessed July 10, 2015, 
http://wenku.baidu.com/view/97f4221a964bcf84b9d57bb9.html (China); Guanyu Guanche Qingfa (2012) 6 hao 
Wenjian Cujin Xiaochengshi Peiyu Shidian Gongzuo Ruogan Zhengce Cuoshi de Tongzhi.(I!ǵéȯx2013
6Ė/<ȃÄÔǁǬŭÑ7ƃǊÙđƠĊě) [The Notice about Implementing Qingdao City Issued (2013) 
No.6 Document Facilitating Experimental Small Cities’ Works’ Several Political Measures], (Issued by General 
Office of Qingdao City Government, August 12, 2013) Chap. 1, accessed July 10, 2015, 
http://govinfo.nlc.gov.cn/sdsqdfz/zfgb/947015a/201310/t20131009_3995827.shtml?classid=416 (China). 
 
220 Guowuyuan guanyu Shanghai Shi Sheli Pudong Xinqu de Pifu (bȬI!ŝÔǩƛśęgƃý¥) 
[Approval in Reply by the State Council on Establishing the New District of Pudong in Shanghai] (promulgated by 
St. Council, October 11, 1992, effective October 11, 1999) St. Council Gaz., February 1, 1993, at 1389 (China); 
Guowuyuan guanyu Tongyi Tianjin Shi Tiaozheng Bufen Xingzheng Quhua de Pifu (bȬI!ó¨ŖÔǯĕ
ȔUǗđgWƃý¥) [Approval in Reply by the State Council on Readjusting Tianjin’s Part of Administrative 
Regions] (promulgated by St. Council, October 21, 2009, effective October 21, 2009), accessed july 10, 2015, 
http://www.360doc.com/content/10/0425/12/1134293_24787225.shtml (China). 
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(Figure 2.19) 
When a city’s level is set, that means all governmental institutions’ levels are set 
accordingly. Mainly, these institutions include “four major teams”: the Communist Party 
Committee (CPC), the People’s Congress (PC), the People’s Government, and Chinese People’s 
Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC). The heads of the four institutions’ administrative 
levels are at the same of their city’s level. However, the secretary of the city’s CPC is the “team 
leader,” and he or she sometimes holds a concurrent post as the chairman of the standing 
committee of local PC. And the mayors are almost certainly the (first) deputy party secretary, 
which makes them the No. 2 posts within their local party branches.  
Besides the secretary and the mayor, another full-time deputy party secretary and about 
10 members constitute the standing committee of the local CPC. This is the center of local 
political power, although the deputy party secretaries and members of the standing committee’s 
administrative level are a half-level lower than the head of the local PC and CPPCC.221 
Sometimes, the chairman of the PC is not the local party secretary, and the heads of the PC and 
the CPPCC were not members of the standing committee of the local CPC. However, almost all 
of the heads worked several years as members of the standing committee or usually even the full-
time party secretary deputies, before they became the chairmen of the PC. For example, Zhu 
                                                
221 Because of the mayor’s position, the first deputy party secretary’s administrative level is at the same with the 
party secretary. 
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Mingguo was the full-time deputy secretary of Guangdong Province during the Wukan event, 
and then he resigned from that position and became the chairman of the CPPCC. In one way, he 
was promoted up the administrative hierarchy, but he was also put away from the power center.  
But in practice, some head officials’ levels are higher than their institutions. For example, 
a prefectural-level city’s party secretary could be set at sub-provincial level. Although most 
provincial seats are just prefectural-level, their party secretaries hold concurrent posts as 
members of the Standing Committee of their provincial CPC. In this case, their levels are higher 
than most vice-governors (usually just one or two of seven to eight vice-governors are members 
of the Provincial Standing Committee). Even so, the levels of their institutions remain the same 
as all other officials under maintain.   
Currently, the party secretaries of all sub-provincial level cities and sub-provincial area 
hold posts in upper level CPC’s standing committee, which makes them near the upper level’s 
power centers.  
The arrangement of township-level cities’ institutions has not been set. Currently, the 
township-level CPCs do not have their own full-time standing committees, and township-level 
units do not set CPPCC institutions. It is still unclear whether these units will set up these 
institutions when they are promoted to the sub-county level.  
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Shanghai’s “four major teams”    (Figure 2.20) 
 
E. Why Bother to Set up such Complicated Levels: The Level is Power 
Recall that during the Wukan event, when villages’ requests were not fulfilled, villagers 
kept asking for intervention by higher levels – from the county-level Lufeng City, to the 
prefectural-level Shanwei City – until they finally asked for the central government’s direct 
investigation. The villagers’ intuitions were that upper-level officials, instead of judicial power, 
were more capable of handling corrupted or biased local officials who were more closed to them. 
Unfortunately, their intuitions were probably right.  
 
f. Hierarchy Levels vs. Separation of Powers 
On October 30, 2010, a villager in Jinyuan District (county-level), Taiyuan city was 
murdered, and his house was also destroyed overnight. The reason for this tragedy was that his 
house was located in the middle of a road construction site, and he refused to cooperate by 
moving out of the way. It is believed that several security officials of the company responsible 
for the demolition violently broke in and killed the villager. Various kinds of assaults and 
menaces during demolition and construction have become so common that only the most 
shocking stories can get the public’s attentions. For example, consider the “AIDS demolition 
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team” case, in which workers tasked with demolishing homes for a new development threatened 
to infect residents with AIDS if they did not move out.222 The reason that this case came to the 
public’s view was that Meng Jianwei, the son of the dead villager, was a Ph.D. candidate at one 
of the most famous Chinese universities, Fudan University in Shanghai, and posted his family’s 
suffering on the web that soon drew people’s sympathies.223  
On January 31, 2011, the Taiyuan Intermediate People’s Court (the trial court)224 
sentenced one of the accused to death, and 16 others of the accused were spared the death 
penalty in favor of several years of imprisonment.225 In April, 24th 2013, the case was reversed 
and remanded by the Shanxi High People’s Court. The issue of the case was the  “mastermind” 
Wu Ruijun’s sentence. Wu was the leader of his security company, which contracted with the 
Planning Bureau of the Jinyuan District to implement the demolition. It was found that he 
summoned the other accused persons and organized the breaking and forceful demolition.  
In the second trial, Wu’s sentence was commuted from death to a life sentence. Then on 
August 19, 2014, his sentence was further commuted to 13 years’ imprisonment by the High 
Court after appealing. What made this commutation suspicious was Wu’s background. Besides 
                                                
222 Ben Blanchard, “Chinese City Probes ‘AIDS Demolition Team’ Threatening Residents,” Reuters, December 24, 
2014, accessed July 11, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/12/24/us-china-aids-
idUSKBN0K20B120141224. 
 
223 Yu Wan, Xiao Chunfei and Wang Chengcheng (>Ǐ, ƿĢȷ, ŴłŪ), “Fudan Boshisheng Wangluo Riji Jilu 
Baoli Chanqian An Chuzhi Quan Guocheng, (¥ĝm£ŻƵưĜǥǥèĦ^āǾŀ¤ƶEǿƗ) [Fudan Ph.D. 
Candidate’s Blog Records the Process of Resolving the Violent Demolition Case],” Xinhua Wang (Fp) [Xinhua 
News Agency], December 1, 2010, accessed July 11 2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2010-
12/01/c_12836207.htm. 
 
224 Unlike the U.S., where district courts almost always hold trials, China’s upper-level courts hold trials for some 
“important” or “significant” cases. This arrangement implies a perception that upper-level courts are more capable 
of finding the truth and being impartial. Based on China’s criminal procedure law, if the accused was sentenced to 
death, the trial court should be the intermediate court instead of the lower court as the trial court. Xinshi Susong Fa 
(VǫǨœ) [Criminal Procedure Law] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1979, effective August 1, 
1980, revised March 17, 1996; March 14, 2012), art. 20, §2 CLI.1.169667 Chinalawinfo (China).  
 
225 It gives the death row inmate a two-year suspended sentence of the execution. The convinced person will be 
executed if found to intentionally commit further crimes during the two years following the sentence in prison. The 
sentence is automatically reduced to life imprisonment or, if the person is found to have performed deeds of merit 
during the years, fixed-term imprisonment. 
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running his own security company, he also held a position as the sergeant of a special force unit 
in a state-owned corporation, Taiyuan City Security Service Company, Jinyuan Branch. In China, 
these state-owned security companies have deep government connection, and they were even 
directly managed by local public security (police) bureaus before January, 2010.226 Other private 
security companies, like Wu’s company, voluntarily or involuntarily affiliated themselves with 
these “official” big companies. In practice, local governments prefer to contract with these 
companies, and the staffs can easily change their identities to suit different circumstances. 
The different opinions between judges are common, but in this case the acts of the 
Jinyuan District Government made the commutations suspicious. Before the high court’s 
reversion and remand decision and the intermediate court’s retrial, Jinyuan District Government 
separately sent two official letters to the courts to request the commutations.227 Actually, a 
deputy district chief, Ji Jianzhong, was dismissed from the post and put under the party’s 
investigation after the case was published. According to Meng’s blog, Ji was the real organizer 
of this violent event. Then the “mastermind” Wu’s relatives felt that he was being treated 
unjustly and went to Beijing for petitioning.228 Other district government officials must feel 
pressures from that, so they begged for leniency for the “scapegoat.” It is hard to say whether the 
official letters worked.  
There are several other factors that were important in this matter.  
Firstly, even though China does not admit the principles of separation of powers,229 
                                                
226 Baoan Fuwu Guanli Tiaoli (=¶ĪbƢŷĴ9) [Regulation on the Administration of Security and Guarding 
Services] (promulgated by St. Council, September 28, 2009, effective Jan 1, 2010), CLI.2.122243 Chinalawinfo 
(China). 
 
227 Yu, “Fudan Ph.D. Candidate’s Blog.”  
 
228 Petitioning, or literally letters and calls, correspondence and reception, Xinfang or Shangfang, is the 
administrative system for hearing complaints and grievances from individuals. It is not a formal judicial system, but 
it is believed that the petitioning can provide the last chance of justice. 
  
229 See Wu Bangguo (ȑ), Shiyi Jie Quanguo Renda Sici Huiyi shang zuo de Changweihui Gongzuo Baogao 
(ČƂ) (hÉE*§ń1Ǥ7ƃØ®1Ñ7ÿ(ČƂ)) [The NPC Standing Committee’s Work Report 
to the 11th National People’s Congress’ 4th Conference (Brief)], accessed July 11, 2015, 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/syxw/2011-03/11/content_1641626.htm. 
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courts should “exercise judicial power independently, in accordance with the provisions of law, 
and are not subject to interference by any administrative organ, public organization of 
individual.”230 The Jinyuan District Government, as an administrative organ, violated the court’s 
independent judicial power.  
Secondly, the Taiyuan Intermediate People Court’s hierarchy level is higher than the 
Jinyuan District Government. Although, based on the “judges law,” judges’ levels are separately 
graded,231 these grades, in practice, are consistent with administrative officials’ levels. The chief 
justice of the Taiyuan intermediate court is at the same level as the deputy mayor of Taiyuan 
prefectural-level city, which is a half-level higher than a district chief, and the chief justice of the 
provincial high court is even higher. If the trial court were held on Jinyuan District People’s 
Court, the district government would exert more direct pressure on the court. 
Thirdly, the district court’s official letters were probably a strategic movement. Although 
the district government knew the letters could not affect the higher-level courts’ decisions, it still 
took the risk of being blamed for interfering with the judiciary. Just because these letters were 
official documents, which were open to the public, they lost their legitimacy and actual functions 
as soon as they were made. Effective bargains between administrative powers and judiciary 
power cannot be publicized; so, if the district government really wanted to manipulate the courts’ 
decisions, official letters were the worst option. Therefore, the real purpose of these official 
letters is probably to divert Wu’s anger. The district government was “crying” because of its 
“helplessness.” 
To sum up, ostensibly, the district government’s official letters are hard evidence for 
administrative interference, which fit the people’s intuitions about the government’s misfeasance 
or corruption. However, it is hard to say the commutations are caused by the published 
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documents. During this process, the arrangement of hierarchy level worked as the separation of 
powers, in a sense. But this function cannot be overestimated. About one month after the event, 
Taiyuan’s deputy party secretary, Li Yonglin, and the secretary of political and legal affairs 
commission (standing committee member Liu Suiji) went to Meng’s home and expressed their 
determination to punish the murderers. They were capable of saying that the political and legal 
affairs commission oversees all legal enforcement authorities, and that the Chief Justice, 
Attorney General, and Police Chief are members of this commission, under the secretary. 
Therefore, all of these dramas still happened under the hierarchy circumstances that the people’s 
intuitions about powers are natural.  
 
g. Hierarchy Level and Officials’ Nomination 
Besides the powers indicated from the hierarchy, a more significant feature is that 
officials on the same level are interchangeable.    
In 2011’s Chicago mayoral election, Rahm Emanuel resigned as White House Chief of 
Staff to run for mayor.232 The “Chinese way” to understand this event should be firstly 
identifying the “levels” of the two positions. If the White House Chief of Staff’s counterpart in 
China were the Director of the General Office of the Central Committee of the CPC (this 
comparison itself is far from accurate), his level should be sub-national because, in China, the 
director of a General Office must be a member of the Politburo and a Secretary of the Secretariat 
of CPC. At this level, he is higher than all governors and direct-controlled mayors, and at the 
same level as the party secretaries of a few most important provincial units. However, although 
Chicago is the third largest city, it is a city under Illinois State’s jurisdiction, or even worse, 
under Cook County. Therefore, in no way, this is a promotion, but a definite degradation.  
More shocking than that, Rahm Emanuel was nearly removed from the ballot by the 
Illinois First District Appellate Court, although saved by a decision of the Illinois Supreme 
                                                
232 Jake Tapper and Sunlen Miller, “Rahm Emanuel Likely to Leave White House This Week,”  abc News, 
September 27, 2010, accessed July 10, 2015, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/rahm-emanuel-leave-white-
house/story?id=11740794. 
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Court.233 If that was not shocking enough for the Chinese people, the reason for the removal was 
not some corruptions or scandal, but the issue of whether Mr. Emanuel’s residency in the city 
qualified him to run for mayor.  
In China’s circumstances, mayors or governors are elected by the People’s Congress (PC) 
of their administrative units, not directly by the people.234 And because most of the local PCs are 
convened just once a year, the Standing Committees of the PCs approve the nominations of vice-
mayors or vice-governors and of acting mayors or acting governors.235 Usually, the later PCs will 
elect the acting officials to be the real ones. There is no requirement for their residency in the 
jurisdiction to which they might be appointed, and these high administrative officials more than 
often have no relationship with the areas of their new posts. The party secretaries, who are more 
powerful than government heads, are often appointed by upper level party committee’s (CPC) 
organization department without proper election.236  Therefore, it is more than often that the 
highest party and government officials have no relationship with their ruling areas. The party 
decides their nominations and elections and controlled local PCs. In this way, all officers at the 
same level are interchangeable. 
This does not mean the interchangeability only happens between party cadres and 
government officials. All executives of state-owned enterprises and social organizations have 
corresponding administrative levels. For another inaccurate example, the President of the 
University of Chicago should be a sub-provincial level position, which is not lower than the 
Mayor of Chicago.  Under this circumstance, it is easier to understand why administrative levels 
are so important. A big city, in which there are more and more important enterprises and social 
                                                
233 Maksym v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of Chicago, 950 N.E.2d 1051 (Ill. 2011) 
 
234 XIANFA art. 101 (1982) (China). 
 
235 Organic Law, art. 44, § 9 (China). 
 
236 In most provinces, the party secretary hold concurrent posts as directors of local people’s congress, and these 
posts must be elected.  
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organizations, has more high-level officials or quasi-officials that the head of government or 
party branch must hold higher or at least equal level to make the urban management run 
smoothly. If these enterprises or organizations have land disputes with villagers, a lower-level 
government official’s situation would be very awkward, because the chiefs of these units might 
be his or her superior.   
 
h. Hierarchy and Institutions’ Land Priority 
A kind of power more related to this thesis is the power of converting rural land into 
urban land by local governments. The urbanization process naturally converts suburban areas 
into constructed urban land. Under the landownership system illustrated in part A of this chapter, 
local governments play critical roles in this kind of conversion. Under a hypothetical laissez-faire 
condition, the process of this conversion should follow the free market transaction. But 
urbanization or industrialization is not the sole goal of the government, food safety is also a main 
concern. In some ways, this concern justified government participation. 
A 1986 government circular complained that in some provinces the annual decline in 
farmland was equivalent to the cultivated area of a mid-size county and that in many suburbs 
villagers had almost no land to cultivate.237 Another government circular reported that between 
1985 and 1988 China lost roughly 12.5 million mu of cultivated land to construction, of which 
about one-third was lost to housing construction in rural areas.238 The reaction of the central state 
was initially to introduce new approval procedures for the land development projects that 
required land – especially, cultivated land. While the national annual land utilization plan set the 
                                                
237 Zhonggong Zhongyang Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiaqiang Tudi Guanli Zhizhi Luanzhan Gengdi de Tongzhi (H
ªbȬI!aæƢŷZņnƼƃȊƉ) [State Council circular concerning the strengthening of 
land administration to prevent the disorderly occupation of cultivated land] (Issued by CPC and St. Council, March 
21,1986), accessed July 10, 2015, http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66701/4495392.html (China). 
 
238 Guojia Tudi Guanliju Guanyu Jiaqiang Nongcun Zhaijidi Guanli Gongzuo de Qingshi (¿ƢŷÈI!a
æOĳ´ ƢŷÑ7ƃǮƋ) [State Land Administration Bureau request for advice on the strengthening of the 
management of rural residential land] (Issued by State Land Administration Bureau, December 15, 1989), accessed 
July 10, 2015, http://www.chinabaike.com/law/zy/xz/gwy/1332621.html (China). 
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overall limits, actual control was left to the hierarchical administrative system consisting of state 
agencies at various administrative levels to review requests for conversion.239  
Prior to 1982, decisions to use agricultural land for construction were made at the 
commune (later township) level. In 1982, such decisions were transferred to a higher level of 
government, presumably to put some distance between the user of land and the regulator. From 
1982 to 1986, the power to approve conversion of agricultural land to non-agricultural uses was 
shifted to the Agricultural Bureau at the county-level. After the adoption of the Land 
Administration Law in 1986, which created the Land Administration Bureau, state construction 
projects using up to 3 mu (0.2 ha) of farmland (or up to 10 mu, 0.67 ha, of non agricultural land) 
required approval of the Land Bureau at the county level; those using between 3 mu and 10 mu 
(0.2 ha to 0.67 ha) of farmland (or between 10 mu and 20 mu, 0.67 ha to 1.33 ha, of non-
agricultural land) required approval at the prefectural-level; and those using between 10 mu and 
1,000 mu of farmland (or between 20 mu and 2,000 mu of non-agricultural land) required 
approval at the provincial level. State construction projects that used more than 1,000 mu of 
farmland (or 2,000 mu of non-agricultural land) must be approved by the State Council.240 The 
state also required villagers and individual enterprises needing land for construction to submit a 
land use application to the village committee or the township economic entity for examination 
and to the county government for approval.241 
In the later 1990s, because the previous hierarchical review and approval system was 
usually circumvented and manipulated by officials at various administrative levels, the central 
state abandoned it and replaced it with a new one in which the power was significantly shifted 
                                                
239 Lin, Developing China, 83-84. 
 
240 Tudi Guanli Fa Shishi Tiaoli (Ƣŷœ»ěĴ9) [Implementation Regulations for the Law of Land 
Administration] (promulgated by St. Council, January 4, 1991, effective February 1, 1991, expired January 1, 1999), 
art. 13 CLI.2.4936 Chinalawinfo (China). There were still regional variations. In different province, hierarchical 
review and approval procedures were relaxed in different degrees. The new revision of regulations loosed the 
control of usage, but the hierarchy is still intact.   
 
241 However, if the land is part of an existing residential site or an empty space within the village, the township 
government has the authority to approve the land use application.  
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upward to the provincial level.242 All expropriation of agricultural land and most conversions of 
land from agricultural use for urban development now require state approval at the provincial 
level. Specifically, the expropriation of any basic farmland, cultivated land other than basic 
farmland in excess of 35 ha, and other land of lower quality in excess of 70 ha, requires the 
approval of the State Council.243  
However, higher-level cities’ priority remains. The sub-provincial level cities and other 
big cities still have more power to persuade their provincial governments and the State Council, 
or their provincial governments directly authorize them to exercise this power. And in turn, small 
cities’ urbanization process slows down. New urban areas concentrate on the vicinities of bigger 
cities. Cities’ administrative levels become more important than before. To handle this problem, 
local governments share this power again. In the proposals of the new experimental township-
level cities, more land powers are to be given to these new lower administrative units.244  
 
F. Short Conclusion 
As shown, the hierarchy system of cities incorporates China’s urbanization process into 
the centralized administrative system. Most high-level cities (direct-controlled cities and sub-
provincial level cities) were affected by western settlements and rapidly developed during the 
past 100 years after the Opium War.245 Although Mao’s blueprint of state-created industrial cities 
in “hills and caves” did not develop, these old western cities are finally indigenized and adapt to 
China’s urban management tradition. Original Western cities found their own spaces and paths to 
develop, but in China the spaces and paths are decided by the central government.  
 
                                                
242 Lin, Developing China, 84-85. 
 
243 Land Administration Law, art. 45 (2004) (China). 
 
244 The Schema of Hefei City’s Twelfth Five-Year Plan; Suggestions about Further Accelerating Central Townships’ 
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V. Conclusion of this Chapter 
In the current landownership system of China, the governments’ regulations and direct 
participations are so significant that laissez-faire condition is not a proper assumption to be based 
on to start further analysis. In its unique discourse system, “city” or “urban” is the core 
conception, not geographically, but legally. Furthermore, because of China’s independent 
urbanization path, this conception differs from the Western polis in that it lacks the implication of 
autonomy. Therefore, it is inaccurate and arbitrary to translate Chinese cheng (walled area) as 
“city,” and then compare it with polis. From the very beginning, China lacked autonomous urban 
communities; yet Chinese cities worked as administrative and quasi-religious centers for a long 
time. The defensive function was the most significant feature of cheng, and in turn, cheng (the 
walled area) indicates the boundaries of cities. Even though the market function emerged in a 
later period, it was still secondary and soon merged with the fundamental administrative purpose 
of the Chinese city. The developing of southern cities, like ancient Shanghai, exemplified this 
path: a market-originated city climbed on the hierarchical ladder as its economy flourished.  
Western settlements on the east coastal area brought western urban managements, but this 
nearly 100-year enlightenment experience expired right after the new China’s foundation. All 
cities returned to centralized controlled units. However, from the 1980s on, the administrative 
function (cheng) or the administrative hierarchy was adjusted to accommodate the market 
function (shi), or more precisely, to accommodate the modern urbanization under a non-
autonomous circumstance. 
From the historical review and the introduction of current cities’ hierarchy, we can find 
some connections between China’s cheng tradition and the current landownership system.  
 
A. City’s Jurisdiction and Superiority 
Ancient Chinese cities were never independent entities or communities. They lacked 
mature urban management institutions. The officials there had two roles: the director of the 
walled area, and the manager of the whole jurisdiction inside and outside the wall. In an 
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agricultural civilization, the outside area was more important to the officials, while in a 
commercial civilization, the market function within cities should be their focus. Therefore, the 
villagers and rural areas have been under control of the inside-the-walls officials for a long time 
before the new China. The walls were obvious boundaries between urban and rural area, but this 
distinction did not mean two complete different life-styles or organizations as in the modern 
Western world. 
The evolution of the meaning of shi (city as market) illustrates this phenomenon. At the 
very beginning, shi was just an area where people traded irregularly, and it was not necessarily in 
cheng (the walled area.) And gradually, the original walled area was called shi instead of cheng. 
Now, shi or different levels of cities are used to refer to different administrative scopes, which 
may include the original rural area. In a subtle way, the superiority of “cheng” was inherited by 
shi, or in other words, rural areas are responsible for the development of shi. This becomes the 
historical root and justification of the dual landownership system and the government’s 
expropriation power.  
 
B. City’s Ambiguity 
If the word city means polis, but in China’s circumstances, city never happened after 
1949. If city is used to distinguish urban areas from rural areas, it fails, because now most rural 
areas are under some kind of cities’ jurisdictions. If city is used to identify a specific 
administrative level, it also fails, because there are six different levels of suffix for the concept of 
“city,” and one area can belong to multiple cities. Therefore, the many usages of “city” in China 
only expresses the urbanization process that is happening there, and more importantly, in the 
people’s and officials’ minds. The legal conception, the administrative methods, and the popular 
minds overuse this word, during which they adjust themselves to accommodate this process. 
When the villagers realize their local chief official is called “the mayor” shi zhang (the leader of 
the city), and he or she calls the people under his or her jurisdiction “citizens” shi min (the 
people who live in cities), which they do not think they belong to, this change must affect their 
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social psychology. For legal scholars, they should ignore these conceptual ambiguities, and 
carefully focus on the changes of rights behind this “magic word.” 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE SETTING OF ANTICOMMONS ANALYSIS: A REAL LAND MARKET 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
As illustrated in Chapter Two part 1, rural residents enjoy various land use rights 
allocated by their collectives and, in part 2, the urban area has stronger legal rights than does the 
rural area where those areas touch. Does that mean urban or rural citizens can simply change 
their identities to enjoy other entitled priorities? Or in the Coase Theorem’s words, if the 
transaction costs of changing identities is low, would bargaining costlessly lead to an efficient 
outcome regardless of the initial allocation of land use rights?246 If this were the case, Country 
Garden or the buyers of its apartments could have negotiated with Wukan village to join the 
collective, which would have easily circumvented the dual landownership system. This is not the 
case, however; China has a so-called Hukou (household registration) system to entrench the 
urban-rural social strata, and this arrangement is often regarded as a caste system of China.247  
This means, of course, that identities cannot be freely altered. And, as a result, transaction 
costs are not low. Moreover, there are multiple parties involved in the potential exchange – 
villagers in the rural sector, urban individuals and business entities, and the provincial 
government. All three parties are “self-interested,” and those interests might clash. If the 
exchange from rural land use rights for urban citizenships is profitable, rural citizens will not 
disapprove it, or at least not fight against it seriously. The problem is that local governments 
implement this exchange only in a “self-interested” way, not necessarily in a socially beneficial 
way. They select and dictate the exchange (land expropriated for urban priority or benefits) when 
                                                
246 Ronald H. Coase, “The Problem of Social Cost,” Journal of Law & Economics 3 (1960): 1. 
  
247 Wang Feiling, “Conflict, Resistance and the Transformation of the Hukou System” in Chinese Society: Change, 
Conflict and Resistance, ed. Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden (New York: Routledge, 2000), 90. 
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it is profitable for themselves; that this kind of exchange only happens when the land use rights’ 
value is higher than the service that the government provides. 
For example, if a village’s land value is low (because, say, it is remote), the villagers 
would prefer to lose their lands for urban citizenships and the benefits of those citizenships. But 
the government does not make that calculation and would never do this.  
In the Wukan case, and other expropriation cases, villagers could have cashed their rural 
land rights for much higher-value urban citizenships (if they had been allowed to do so). If the 
identity exchanges had been permitted to be done voluntarily, rural citizens would have bypassed 
local governments’ “exploitation.”  
A normative conclusion from the Coase Theorem is that government should create 
institutions that minimize transaction costs, so as to allow misallocations of resources to be 
corrected as cheaply as possible. However, according to James Meade’s criticism, Coasean 
bargaining is always inefficient in reality, or transaction costs are rarely low enough to allow for 
efficient bargaining.248 Steven N. S. Cheung goes even further when he argues that the existence 
of private rights implies that transaction costs are non-zero. If transaction costs are really zero, 
any property rights system will result in identical and efficient resource allocation, and the 
assumption of private property rights is not necessary. Therefore, zero transaction costs and 
private property rights cannot logically coexist.249  
Applying these arguments to China’s situation, the dual landownership system and the 
Hukou system dramatically increase the transaction costs of the negotiations of lands between 
urban and rural residents. According to the Coase Theorem, this arrangement hinders efficient 
land allocation and results in waste.  
But Meade implies that these two systems work together to save transaction costs or to 
conquer negative social externalities, which cannot be avoided in a private rights system.  
                                                
248 J. E. Meade, “External Economies and Diseconomies in a Competitive Situation,” The Economic Journal 62 
(1952): 54-67; David B. Johnson, “Meade, Bees and Externalities,” The Journal of Law & Economics, 16 (1973): 
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249 Steven N. S. Cheung, “The Myth of Social Cost,” in Economic Explanation: Selected Papers of Steven N.S. 
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These two arguments cannot both be true because they predict two opposite results from 
the same premises. I believe that the dual landownership system and the Hukou system increase 
transaction costs. That is the central conclusion of this dissertation, and I shall propose a method 
of reducing those transaction costs.  
It seems like this controversy is settled in China’s situation because China’s result is at 
least not as negative as the Coase Theorem predicts. China’s economic boom during the past 
more than thirty years seems to have testified that the current anti-market arrangements work and 
do not impose significant economic waste. Or in other words, China's economic performance 
seems to endorse Meade’s “inefficient free bargain” theory. If I can show, however, that China’s 
positive result is not necessarily related to Meade's theory, then I can resurrect the Coase 
Theorem discussion (about how to reduce transaction cost through a device like a Land 
Assembly District).  
China labels its recent land reform a “market-oriented reform,”250 which introduced 
competition and economic liberalism as a panacea for some ills in this post-socialist country; in 
the field of land use, as one of the key factors of production, complete marketization has never 
been the goal of reform. In this chapter, a theory called “low human rights theory” will be 
introduced to explain China’s economic boom and coexistent anti-market arrangements. 
Furthermore, China recognizes the costs of its economic strategy, including the political costs as 
seen in the Wukan event. Therefore, even if the current two systems actually caused the rapid 
economic growth during the past, China has gradually started to change its strategy. 
 
II. Not Just Landownership: A Dual Social System 
Nearly all social struggles in history are “essentially for the ownership and use of 
                                                
250 This term was first firmly posted in the Circular of the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 
ten or more years after the reform and openness policy. Jiang Zemin (ŏŕŌ), “Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shisi 
Ci Quanguo Daibiao Dahui shang de Baogao (H&DƞhńE+ǘ§1ƞÿ) [The Circular of the 
14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China]” (paper presented at the 14th Nat’l Cong. Communist 
Party of China, Beijing, October 12-18, 1992). 
 
 
104 
land.”251 This is true because the landownership system has never been an isolated mechanism 
that can be separately analyzed. This is also true in China: Land and its distribution has been 
central to any understanding of the country’s complex relationship between power, politics, and 
economics.252 The ancient Chinese rural society consisted of numerous clans.253 The members of 
a clan were usually residentially concentrated in a certain village from generation to generation 
and a permanent settlement resulted. A rural settlement was not a government organ under the 
official administrative structure, but a community managed by local elites.254 Blood relationship 
was the bond that firmly united the members of a clan and strengthened their sense of identity 
and responsibility. “Ci Tang” (Ə¡ancestral hall), where the spirit tablets of the clan’s 
ancestors were placed, was the symbol of a clan and the place to solve rural daily affairs.255 More 
than that, most urban citizens also belonged to clans in rural areas; they would return to their 
rural communities or ancestral halls after they died. 
The formal government’s administrative power had never permeated to these clans, and 
the government officials’ range of activity was behind cities’ walls. This did not change during 
the Republic of China period (1912-1949). Even after the revolutionary and authoritarian 
Kuomintang of China (Chinese Nationalist Party) became dominant, its partisan branches mainly 
                                                
251 Max Weber, The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations, trans. R. I. Frank (New York: Verso, 1988), 31.  
 
252 See: Loren Brandt and Barbara Sands, “Six Land Concentration and Income Distribution in Republican China,” 
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China: Confucianism and Taoism (New York: The Free Press, 1951), 86. 
 
254 William J. Goode, The Family (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1964), 62; Zhao Xiuling (ǸƑŶ), Zhongguo Xiangli 
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worked on the county-level. 
From 1953 onwards, Mao initiated the “land collectivization program” and more 
advanced “communization program” that reversed private landownership and reinforced the 
command economy and so-called Party micro-management. 256  During that process, the 
communist party’s grassroots cadres took the reins of rural settlements and destroyed the ancient 
power structure of clans. To support this change, the ancient family register system257 was 
reinforced and turned into the current Hukou system in 1958.258 Under this system, people were 
divided into urban citizens and rural citizens (and also into solders and prisoners).259 From that 
time on, rural citizens could not migrate to urban areas without proper registration.260 In this way, 
rural citizens had to live and work under rural party cadres’ administrative and economic orders. 
This is different from the ancient family register system, which was more like a census for 
taxation and conscription purposes. The ancient system could not efficiently limit people’s 
migration or career changes.  
In the narrowest way, the transaction costs of land exchanges were terminated after this 
process because, under Cheung’s theory, no “transaction” or private property existed. However, 
under collective management, there was lack of economic incentives and motivation for the 
masses as well as for the local bureaucrats, who had no resources to improve agricultural 
efficiency.261 Free-riding and public goods problems hurt Mao’s Utopian plan. Or in other words, 
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negative social costs did not disappear with the private property. 
Then in the late 1970s after Mao’s death, Deng started the Market-Oriented reform, 
which aimed to shrink the overreaching of the state and the party’s bureaucrats. The initial 
purpose of this reform was to create incentives to agricultural production and to release the 
pressure of national food insufficiency. That time was also the nascence of landownership 
reform, but, in the field of land, the Household Contract Responsibility System (HCRS) and the 
Agricultural Production Responsibility System (APRS) are far less than a complete privatization 
or marketization reform. The bedrock of the HCRS and the APRS is the Hukou system. Only 
rural citizens are relevant to this dramatic land system change. After the establishment of the 
1982 Constitution, the government was the monopoly of urban land and enterprises. Large 
private enterprises like Country Garden nearly did not exist before that date. But under the new 
constitution, they became legally able to get land ownership and use rights cheaper and easier 
through the new system than through a fair land market. 
At the same time, under the unchanged Hukou system, rural residents were still tied to 
their contracted land, which legally belonged to rural collectives. That meant that the only 
chance for them, as rural residents, to participate in urbanization was to become migrant rural 
workers or to get enough compensations from land expropriation to start their new adventures. 
Rural citizens who lost their land to expropriation could not enjoy urban citizenship’s benefit.262 
They are neither able to transform into the owners of the land because it has been expropriated 
and transferred into urban land, nor able to keep the land distributed by the APRS at the 
beginning of the reform. From this development, big enterprises enjoyed lower costs of land 
from government-expropriated land, and lower costs of labor from migrant rural workers who 
                                                
262 The Hukou system has been described as the major impediment to migration, by preventing rural migrants from 
accessing benefits associated with urban residence in cities. Another widely described obstacle to migration relies on 
the extent of labor market segmentation and discrimination against rural migrants, some of which may also be traced 
back to Hukou system. See John Whalley and  Zhang Shunming, “A numerical simulation analysis of (Hukou) 
labour mobility restrictions in China,” Journal of Development Economics 83 (2006): 392-410; Lu Zhigang and 
Song Shunfeng, “Rural–urban migration and wage determination: The case of Tianjin,” China Economic Review 
17(2006): 337–45.  
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were under massive economic pressure due to the lack of social security.263  
At the same time, governments save money from having to provide fewer social benefits, 
and also enjoy the profits from land expropriation.  
In other words, the rural-urban dual landownership system and the Hukou system are the 
material foundation of the rural-urban dual society system. The two systems work together to 
decrease the transaction costs of land exchanges, which did not even exist in Mao’s period. 
Ironically, the method for decreasing the transaction costs is still limiting private landownerships 
and the development of a land market. Therefore, it is hard to say that Deng’s reform is a market-
oriented reform, especially in the land area. The government does not follow the Coase 
Theorem’s normative conclusion that it should create institutions to encourage bargaining in a 
“market” to efficiently allocate resources. However, this system does not necessarily lead to the 
failure of the government or to a sluggish economy. On the contrary, China’s economy tells 
another story. 
 
III. Economic Miracle Under the Dual Social System: Four Types of Interpretations about 
China’s Economy 
 
If the key factor of production, land, is not marketized, why did the incomplete “market-
oriented reform” of Deng Xiao-ping induce more than 30 years of economic flourishing? That 
happened not just in manufacturing and foreign trade, but also in the  agricultural area, the main 
locus of the HCRS and the APRS. Does this suggest that China’s land expropriation system was 
more efficient than a free land market would have been at lowering transaction costs? Did those 
anti-market policies hamper China’s economic growth, or did they propel the current growth, 
even if not in the long-term? Scholars are not certain and have advanced alternative 
interpretations about China’s economic success to avoid the oversimplified marketization cliché. 
                                                
263 As a result of land expropriation, roughly 88 million rural residents became landless between 1990 and 2008, 
with another 50 million expected to join them by 2030. See Sally Sargeson, “Violence as development: land 
expropriation and China’s urbanization,” Journal of Peasant Studies 40 (2013): 1063-85. 
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These arguments could be categorized into four types. 
 
A. Comparative Advantages (the advantage of backwardness) Determinism 
The main argument of this theory is that the most important determinant of long-term 
economic growth is continuous technological innovation. In modern China, especially after 
World War II, China, as a less-developed economy, could have utilized this force to learn the 
mature technologies from developed countries, which could have enabled China to upgrade its 
technology at a lower cost and at a lower risk. However, the planned economy strategy, which 
was adopted during Mao’s era, led China to a heavy industries-oriented development strategy 
that defied China’s comparative advantages. The reintroduction of marketization in 1979 
regained these comparative advantages, and so miraculous economic growth followed.264  
This explanation does not directly relate to the landownership system, and an anti-market 
land exchange system seems not to propel or hamper new technology’s adoption. If this were 
true, a more free land market at least would not harm China’s economy and might even lead to 
higher or more sustained growth.  
 
B. Government Determinism (The theory of compulsory institutional change) 
The classic theory of induced institutional change implies that good institutions evolve in 
response to a growing scarcity of factor resources in an attempt to minimize losses by boosting 
economic efficiency.265 However, in transition economy countries, the theory of compulsory 
institutional change indicates that the occurrences of economic flourishing are not passive or 
responsive but are triggered by the authoritarianism of government-issued orders and policies. 
                                                
264 Lin Justin Yifu, Cai Fang and Li Zhou, “The lessons of China’s transition to a market economy,” Cato Journal 
16 (1996): 201–31; Lin Justin Yifu, Cai Fang and Li Zhou, The China Miracle: Development Strategy and 
Economic Reform Revised Ed., (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2003), 103-36; Lin Justin Yifu, 
“Development strategy, viability and economic convergence,” Economic Development and Cultural Change 53 
(2003): 277–308.  
 
265 See Douglass C. North, and Robert Paul Thomas, The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 132-56; Douglass C. North, “Economic performance through 
time,” American Economic Review 84 (1994): 359–68. 
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According to that, China’s economic miracle is the fruit of a series of institutional reforms,266 
which includes the instruction of Chinese-style fiscal federalism that has simulated the 
economy.267  
This theory is also not directly related to the nature of the landownership system. 
However, the so-called “Chinese-style fiscal federalism” (and its system of redistribution tax 
revenues from the local areas to the center, which caused financial tensions for local 
governments) explains local governments’ enthusiasm for land expropriation. This will be 
analyzed in a later part.  
 
C. Initial Conditions Determinism 
This theory focuses on the political and economic structural reasons for China’s 
distinguished economic success compared to other transition regions. The reason is that the 
prior-reform organization structures of both Eastern Europe and the former USSR were of a 
unitary form based on the functional and specialization principles (the ‘U-form’ economy); in 
contrast, the Chinese hierarchy has been of a multi-layer-multi-regional form based on a 
geographic principle that emerged in 1958 (the ‘M-form’ economy). This explanation argues that 
this political and fiscal decentralization played an important part in China’s economic reform. 
With less gain in bargaining within the hierarchy, local government officials paid less attention to 
bargaining with the authorities above them. With more chances to earn money in the market, 
more attention is given to community enterprises and other non-state enterprises.268  
This theory is more related to the landownership system. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
                                                
266 See Wu Jinglian, Wu Jinglian : voice of reform in China; Selected Essays  and Talks, 1980-2012 (MA: MIT 
Press, 2013), 11-94. 
 
267 See Qian Yingyi and Barry R. Weingast, “Federalism as a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives,” 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 11 (1997): 83-92; Jin Hehui, Qian Yingyi and Barry R. Weingast, “Regional 
decentralization and fiscal incentives: Federalism,” Journal of Public Economics 89 (2005): 1719-42. 
 
268 See Qian Yingyi and Xu Chenggang, “The M-form hierarchy and China’s economic reform,” European 
Economic Review 37 (1993): 541-48; Qian Yingyi and Xu Chenggang, “Why China’s economic reforms differ: M-
form hierarchy and entry/expansion of the non-state sector,” Economics of Transition 1 (1993): 135-70.  
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although the central government restricts the quota of land expropriation, especially for the 
agricultural lands, local governments can readily circumvent these limitations. However, 
although local governments’ attentions are drawn to non-state enterprises, their participation in 
land expropriations is not typical government services in a free market country.  
Even if this explanation is true, it describes the relations between central and local 
governments instead of between governments and individuals. Therefore, it does not negate the 
advantages of a marketized land exchange system.  
 
D. Political Competition Determinism 
The fourth theory argues that the driving force behind reform was not pressures from 
above or initiatives of autonomous local officials. Rather, the theory suggests that these growth-
enhancing policies emerged from political competition between pro-market and conservative 
factions in Beijing.269 Local officials were linked to these factions and sought to impress higher-
ups with suggestions and sometimes spontaneous, even illegal, initiatives. If this had been the 
case, conservative factions might have terminated any economic liberalist reform. Note that this 
theory itself is not related to the correlations between current dual landownership system and 
economic growth.  
 
E. Summary 
All four  theories above stress the importance of government’s active role instead of its 
retreat from a freer land market. An implication of these theories is that China is still a 
government-dominated economy although it abandoned the party micro-management strategy. 
Although China is far from a free market economy, it is widely believed that the new strategy or 
main theme of China’s reform is to choose national mercantilism or export-oriented 
industrialization to replace the past import-substituting industrialization. Although some scholars 
                                                
269 See Cai Hongbin and Daniel Treisman, “Did government decentralization cause China’s economic miracle?” 
World Politics 58 (2006): 505-35. 
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still think “the idea that China is an export-led economy” is a myth,270 empirical studies support 
that the proposition that exports have generally been more significant for China than for other 
countries. Thus, it is likely that the export-driven growth strategy of China has successfully 
contributed to China’s development.271 And among all export products, labor-intensive products 
constitute the main part.272  
If China’s economic growth of the past 30 years was mainly driven by exports, especially 
labor-intensive-product exports, then using the normative conclusion of the Coase Theorem (that 
one of government’s principal roles in fostering growth should be to reduce transaction costs) to 
criticize China’s economic strategy would be problematic. Therefore, a series of question must 
be answered: whether the current landownership system and Hukou system function to further 
export-driven growth? If it does, is that a long-term economic growth strategy? If it is not, what 
are the costs and benefits of this strategy?  
 
IV. Not Just Transaction Costs: The Other Advantages and Costs of Non-Privatization 
What makes China’s export products so competitive in the global market? One 
interpretation is that besides utilizing the traditional advantages of low wages and low social 
benefits, China’s government utilizes new policies, and more importantly, continues old policies 
that contribute to “push[ing] down the costs of the four key factors of production: labor, land, 
capital, and non-renewable resources”273 to make products competitive in the world market.  
The implications of this theory can be read in two ways. One is Meade’s way – that 
because transaction costs cannot be avoided in “reality” or more precisely in the market, China 
                                                
270 See Jonathan Anderson, “Solving China’s rebalancing puzzle: market forces will do the trick ‘naturally,’” 
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chose to use none-marketization ways to allocate these key resources. However, based on the 
Coase Theorem, transaction costs matter because they hamper participants in the market from 
sharing and enjoying the difference between seller and buyer’s expected value.  Without a market 
and privatization system, it is impossible to know and compare right holders’ expected values 
and whether a potential transaction or reallocation of resources is beneficial. Therefore, the 
danger of a non-privatization system is that it might sacrifice the original right holders’ interests; 
or in other words, China might implement mercantilism by hurting internal labor and resources 
owners’ benefits. This is the second explanation.  
Under the second type of explanation, the unique rural-urban dual society system,274 
especially the rural-urban Dual Landownership System (Or Dual Land Tenure System), and the 
Hukou System (Household Registration system), legally justifies and guarantees China’s 
comparative advantages.275  
Scholars call this advantage “low human rights advantages.” This terminology refers to 
the fact that individuals have been denied many of the interests or benefits that they would have 
enjoyed under a free market condition, including fulfilling their properties’ expected value during 
transaction, but are deprived of by institutional mechanisms that governments purposely set up to 
hamper the distribution of the free market benefits among individuals  and such factors as labor 
and other resources.276 
Based on this theory, China’s anti-market interventions could be used to propel economic 
growth. Then the next question is, based on this anti-market mechanism, how long would the 
growth last, is it sustainable, and what is the cost of this type of growth? The answer is 
                                                
274 It is different from the typical Dual-sector model by Sir William Arthur Lewis. See William Arthur Lewis, 
“Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour,” The Manchester School 22 (1954): 139-91. 
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pessimistic.  
 
A. The Apparent Cost: International Market Dependence 
China’s growth is hugely dependent on exports. Despite the high import content of 
exports, one-third of the growth of income in China in the years before the global crisis of 2008 
is estimated to have been due to exports, which grew phenomenally, by some 25 percent per 
annum. This figure goes up to 50 percent if spillovers to domestic consumption and investment 
are accounted for. 277 The internal-external imbalance represented by a huge trade surplus has 
given rise to enormous foreign exchange reserves, pressure for renminbi (RMB) appreciation, 
asset bubbles, a deteriorating environment, and other problems. This model of unbalanced 
growth will be hard to sustain.278  
The high degree of dependence on growth of exports and foreign investment is the 
outcome of under consumption. Therefore, the central government’s logic solution of internal-
external imbalance is expanding domestic demand,279 especially after the 2008 economic crisis, 
which slowed China’s growth rate to under 8 percent. As stated in the report on the work of the 
government, China has begun to recognize the shortcomings of the current economy strategy and 
has begun to stress growth in internal consumption.  
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We should unswervingly take expanding domestic demand as our long-term 
strategy for economic development and make full use of the basic function of 
consumption and the key role of investment. The difficulty in and key to expanding 
domestic demand lies in consumption, and that is also where the potential lies. To expand 
individual consumption, we should enhance people’s ability to consume, keep their 
consumption expectations stable, boost their desire to consume, improve the consumption 
environment and make economic growth more consumption-driven.    ——Wen Jiabao280 
 
One reason for current under-consumption is the low share of household income and 
relatively high share of corporate profits in GDP. Much of household income consists of wages. 
Investment income is very small. The shares of wages and household income in GDP have been 
falling since the late 1990s, and these are mirrored by the declining share of private consumption 
in GDP.281  
However, a more important reason is that people prefer high precautionary savings 
because of inadequate public provision of basic needs, such as health care, education and 
housing.282 Those basic needs are not being met by the outmoded “low human right” policies. 
The social profits of the urbanization process are not being shared across all rural and urban 
people. For example, the Hukou system prohibits rural citizens from enjoying many social 
securities and benefits. Nearly the only source of stability and saving left to them is the land. 
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Growth pushes up rural residents’ expected values on land, although the rural people almost 
never realize those values in the compensation (direct or indirect) that they receive when their 
land is expropriated. Rather, these disappointed expected values lead, increasingly, to civil 
disorder, as in the Wukan Case.  
 
B. The Latent Cost: Political Instability 
The low human rights advantage does not come for free. The governments have to handle 
the civil disorder triggered by these mechanisms. In China, incidents of civil disorder are called 
Quntixing Shijian (mass incidents), which are broadly defined as “planned or impromptu 
gathering that form because of internal contradictions” and can include public speeches or 
demonstrations, physical clashes, public airings of grievances, and other group behaviors that are 
seen as threatening social stability.283 Whereas 8,700 mass incidents were reported in 1993, the 
figure for 2011 reached 180,000, or nearly 500 every day.284 Incidents triggered by land 
expropriation account for 65 percent of all rural mass incidents.285 
The policemen and other government officials in the Wukan event did not come free. 
Extra costs, which include setting up a nationwide system of “social management offices” at the 
county, township, and county-level district governments, were incurred in handling these 
incidents.286 In 2010, China spent 533.5 billion yuan (US$85billion) on the military, but public 
security funding increased by 15.6 percent to hit 548.6 billion yuan (US$87 billion) compared to 
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2009. The fiscal cost is relatively easy to measure. However, the harm to the state’s authority is 
immeasurable and dangerous.  
Therefore, even from the perspective of an authoritarian state, these latent costs cannot be 
ignored. The government might be able to implement an anti-market mechanism to limit or 
terminate transaction costs in the market, but it cannot control people’s expected values on their 
property.  
 
V. “Low Human Rights Advantages” in Other Jurisdictions 
 
Does the “low human rights advantage” or anti-marketization policy really contribute to 
productivity and China’s economic growth? If it does, are there any similar examples to support 
this theory? Some necessary comparative research should be made to address this issue.  
 
A. An Extreme “low human right but efficient” Model: American Negro Slavery 
In his well-known research, Nobel Laureate Robert W. Fogel proved that “slave 
agriculture was not inefficient compared with free agriculture.” “Economies of large-scale 
operation, effective management, and intensive utilization of labor and capital made southern 
slave agriculture 35 percent more efficient than the northern system of family farming.”287 Far 
from stagnating, the economy of the antebellum south grew quite rapidly. Between 1840 and 
1860, per capita income increased more rapidly in the South than in the rest of the nation. By 
1860 the South attained a level of per capita income, that was high by the standards of the time. 
Indeed, a country as advanced as Italy did not achieve the same level of per capita income until 
the eve of World War II.288 
And slaves were not valuable just in agriculture: “slaves employed in industry compared 
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favorably with free workers in diligence and efficiency.” And as a testament to the long-run 
sustainability of the system, “Far from declining, the demand for slaves was actually increasing 
more rapidly in urban areas than in countryside.”289  
The purpose of this comparison with American slavery is not to derogate China’s rural 
residents and migrant rural workers’ living standard or legal status. However, both  China’s 
current and recent rural residents and the 19th century American slaves suffer from the same 
limits of free migration, the lack of legal protection as holders of key production resources, and 
the disability as market players to negotiate or bargain with the governments or other huge 
players. These deprivations were used by the managers to push down the cost of production, and 
under an economic integration circumstance, they are huge advantages against other competitors. 
Also the same for the two groups (Chinese rural residents and 19th century American slaves), the 
cost to fight against slaves’ revolts might be trivial, but the bad reputation of the south and cost 
of prohibiting slaves’ escape were the cost of this type of advantages. 
In 19th century America, economic integration within the country (as between an 
industrialized Northeast and an agricultural South) and between the U.S. and other countries was 
a central goal of the South, leading to its intense commercial intercourses with north and Europe. 
Similarly, China’s cheap exports today capture the world’s market. It is reasonable to assume that 
if the demand for the South’s production had dramatically shrunk or if the South had been totally 
isolated, the only practical strategy for continued growth would have been to increase domestic 
consumption. If that happened, the emancipation progress would have been initiated by the 
South itself. A more bold alternative would have been if there was international economic 
integration and if the Civil War had not happened, then the South’s more efficient economic 
model would have attracted the North’s investment to propel its industrialization (probably 
because slaves, the advantageous assets, were not able or willing (till much later) to migrant to 
the North). The South might have turned into the “world factory” in that its cheap products 
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would have “invaded” the North.290  
 
B. Another transition economy example: Vietnam 
Twenty-eight years after the introduction of the Doi Moi reform process, it is believed 
that market institutions are firmly established in Vietnam.291 Since 1990, Vietnam’s exports have 
increased even faster than China’s; it is ramping up its exports of everything “from shrimps to 
ships to shoes.”292 Its annual economic growth rate in the first decades of the 21st century 
averaged over 7.5 percent. Does Vietnam share similar “low human right advantages” for its 
economic boom? The answer is probably positive. 
First, Vietnam has almost the same Household registration system (Ho khau) as does 
China. During its communist past, Vietname supplied standardized social and economic 
knowledge about the population, which authorities then used to redistribute the population, shape 
communities, and distribute rights.293 Nowadays, because of the Ho khau system of household 
registration, many rural migrants to urban areas face ongoing legal and social obstacles in big 
cities like Hanoi. Under policies of rural agricultural collectivization and the establishment of 
urban work units, ho khau status determined people’s access to the most basic necessities of life: 
food; shelter; and social welfare, just as in China. For example, permanent registration status is 
still necessary to register a car or motorbike, obtain loans from the bank, buy land or build a 
house, enroll children in public schools, gain legal access to water and electricity or to participate 
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in programs for poverty reduction.294 More than that, migrants also have to face widespread 
anxieties about the “floating population” threatening to overwhelm the city.295  
Secondly, Vietnam’s landownership system is also far from well established. There is still 
an ambiguity between the right of landownership and the right of land use. According to the 
Constitution of Vietnam, land cannot be privately owned since it is the collective property of the 
people and is representatively owned and administered by the State.296 As is the case in China’s 
state landownership system, the Vietnamese government wants to maintain the supreme right of 
ownership. The so-called “land use rights” introduced through the Land Law in 1993 can be 
traded using the Land-Use-Right Certificate (LURC) as an instrument.297  All land-related 
activities between the State and land users, such as compensation, acquisition, allocation, 
renting, taxing, etc., are based on a Land-Price Framework (LPF), which was originally issued 
by the State with the purpose of regulating the market price of land. The land price in the LPF, 
however, is set too low and does not follow market principles. This leads to disagreements 
between the State and land users.298  
Meanwhile, transactions between developers and buyers follow market principles, and 
are not based on the LPF as expected by the State.  
“The Vietnam people have a strong desire to perfect the entire system of land rights but 
have failed due to the mechanism of policy. Local governments are given by law the right of 
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management but not tied down to duties. This is the key point leading to haphazard decisions 
regardless of public opinion, causing severe conflicts between the people and the governments 
during the recent times.”299 Just as in China, the dual landownership system causes inefficient 
land transactions and huge political and social costs.300 
As showed above, Vietnam probably takes the same “low human rights advantages” to 
develop its economy as China does. And just as in China, Vietnam’s export-driven economy was 
so heavily hurt since the 2008 crisis that it, like China, is now in a position for the state to 
reconsider its economy strategy.  
 
C. A non-post-socialism developing country: Bangladesh 
Are “low human rights advantages” unique to post-socialist countries? Do they arise 
because the government could utilize the socialist period’s mechanisms, such as state ownership 
or migration control power? What about other non-post-socialist countries that have or are 
transitioning to economic liberalization? Bangladesh might be a good example. 
From its pre-independence East Pakistan-era till the late 1970s, Bangladesh adapted a 
self-sufficiency strategy as China did. During that period, export earnings were limited. Then the 
new military government of General Ziaur Rahman ("Zia") quickly replaced this with a market-
oriented development model (1976-1982). The pace of trade liberalization accelerated in the 
1980s, under General H.M. Ershad's government (1982-1990), with the introduction of IMF-
                                                
299 See Nguyen Tan Phat, “Administrative reforms of rural land in transition economies: An example in China and 
Vietnam,” Sociology Mind 3 (2013): 52-5. 
 
300 For in-depth descriptions of land policies in Vietnam, See Klaus Deininger and Jin Songqing, “Land sales and 
rental markets in transition: Evidence from rural Vietnam,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 70 (2008): 
67–101; Do Quy Toan and Lakshmi Iyer, “Land titling and rural transition in Vietnam Economic Development and 
Cultural Change,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 56 (2008): 531–579; Prabhu Pingali and Xuan Vo 
Tong, “Vietnam: Decollectivization and rice productivity growth,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 40 
(1992): 697–718; Martin Ravallion and Dominique Van der Walle, “Breaking up the collective farms: Welfare 
outcomes of Vietnams massive land privatization,” Economics of Transition, 12 (2004): 201–36; Martin Ravallion 
and Dominique Van der Walle, “Land reallocation in an agrarian transition,” Economic Journal, 116 (2006): 924–
942. 
 
 
121 
supported structural adjustment programs.301 The offshore garment industry, initiated in General 
Ershad’s New Industrialization Policy, boomed, transforming export production from agricultural 
commodities to manufacturing goods and displacing agriculture as a central focus of investment. 
More than three-quarters of Bangladesh’s export earnings came from the garment industry in 
2005.302 Empirical study of the Bangladeshi economy shows that the liberalization policy 
improved export of the country and that that export growth eventually led to higher economic 
growth for the entire nation after the 1990s.303 
After the commencement of the offshore garment industry boom, land expropriation 
occurred on the periphery of urban areas of Bangladesh cities and towns, where agriculture land 
was being seized for lucrative housing developments and industrial sites, and removing it from 
agricultural production. Differently from China and Vietnam’s institutional expropriation, these 
land grabs were made by elites who engaged gangs, corrupted public servants and the military, 
and were often “accompanied by violence, corruption and government laxity, gangs hired by 
elite encroachers, who use violence to appropriate land illegally.”304  
The reason for the growth of urban land grabs is believed to be the expansion of 
industrial production that created an enormous demand for new laborers in both Dhaka and 
Chittagong, the two largest cities in the country. This demand created new opportunities to 
extract profits from ground rent as land was transformed from agricultural to industrial uses.305 
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Those able to take control of this increasingly valuable land included the city’s elite as well as 
members of the bureaucratic state.306 
As a common law country, Bangladesh does not have ideological preparation or 
institutional mechanisms to rationalize and implement legal land expropriation. However, the 
progress was carried out in a latent and illegal way. The price advantage of Bangladesh’s 
garment industry in world markets comes at least partly from this type of land expropriations, 
which fall into the “low human rights advantages” category. As in China and 19th century 
America, the profits from these competitive advantages are not enjoyed by the original 
landowners in the way of fulfilling their expected values on their lands. It is reasonable to 
assume that similar protest cases like the Wukan event happened in Bangladesh, although the 
opponents of the landowners in Bangladesh were hired gangs, who did not have to obey any 
constraints that might have applied to governmental peacekeepers. As in China and elsewhere, if 
the Bangladeshi government was not on the landowners’ side, it implemented the “low human 
right advantages” strategy. 
 
D. Democratization and Low Human Right Advantages: Apartheid in South Africa 
The so-called apartheid system of South Africa as an institution was gradually legitimized 
in the late 19th century and early 20th centuries. A series of acts (principally, the Native Laws 
Amendment Act, 1952307) were passed that, just as with China and Vietnam’s registration 
systems, gave residents “temporary residence permits”; limited the category of blacks who had 
the right to permanent residence in urban areas; and required all black African men in cities and 
towns to carry around permits called “passes” at all times.308 Anyone found without a pass would 
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307 Natives Laws Amendment Act 54 of 1952 (S. Afr.), (subsequently renamed the Bantu Laws Amendment Act, 
1952 and the Black Laws Amendment Act, 1952). 
 
308 “The most important provision of the Act stated that Africans could no longer buy, lease, or in any other manner 
acquire land outside a scheduled area, except by acquiring that land from another African, and Europeans were 
prohibited from buying or leasing land from an African. Only Africans could buy land within the scheduled areas.” 
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be arrested immediately and sent to a rural area. Under Section 10 of this Act, “neither African 
men nor women could remain in an urban area for longer than 72 hours without a special permit 
stating they were legally employed.”309 What was more extreme than anything in China, 
Vietnam, or Bangladesh was the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act, 1970,310 a denaturalization 
law passed during the apartheid era of South Africa that changed the status of the inhabitants of 
the Bantustans (black homelands) so that they were no longer citizens of South Africa. The aim 
was to ensure that white South Africans came to make up the majority of the de jure population, 
but cheap labors were also maintained for the market.  
Similarly to the Chinese and Vietnamese mechanisms of dealing with rural-urban 
populations, the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act of 1951311 authorized the forcible removal of 
squatting communities. It allowed eviction and even destruction of homes of squatters by local 
authorities and government officials. A number of scholarly writers propounded the “Cheap 
Labor Thesis “in the 1970s and 1980s for the whole apartheid idea. Lacey, for example, 
suggested that the policy of racial segregation “was designed as a coercive labor system geared 
to ensure capitalist profitability.”312 
The effects of apartheid were not all tragic. South Africa once created another economic 
miracle in Africa. Between the early 1930s and early 1970s, the South African economy grew 
approximately ten-fold in real terms. And the miracle is not because of the expansion of the gold 
mining industry, as had been believed before. The share of GDP accounted for by industry, 
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including construction and electricity as well as manufacturing, overtook the combined share of 
agriculture and mining in the 1950s, and reached 30 percent by the mid-1960s.313 South Africa 
saw a steady growth in its economy as foreign investors, attracted by the clean and cozy urban 
areas, returned to the country, eager for the astounding profit that repression earned. Relying on 
extremely low wages, firms operating in South Africa earned profits that grew at an annual 
average of nearly 25 percent through the early 1980s.  
But all of this wealth came at the expense of South Africans who were not part of the 
community. Despite the overall increase in the economy, African wages did not rise. The real 
value of African mine wages was less in 1971 than it had been in 1911.314 Therefore, when 
exports went down, South Africa’s economy stagnated. In 1985, South Africa’s share of global 
manufactured exports fell to less than 0.3 percent, and its share of developing country 
manufactured exports fell to less than 2 percent.315 Then the miracle ended. 
Contrasted to the economic flourishing during apartheid, freedom and human rights are 
costly. The main problem is unemployment. More than 20 percent of the potential labor force 
was already unemployed in 1970, and this figure rose to almost 40 percent in 1995 after the 
abolition of apartheid. Unemployment in South Africa is mostly structural rather than cyclical, 
which means there is an overall inability of the economy to provide employment for the total (or 
potential) labor force, even at the peak of its business cycle.316 Another problem is the lack of 
administration in urban areas, as a result of which cities became jumbled.317 South Africa chose 
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to address these problems not by turning to an external-driven strategy but rather by turning to an 
internal consumption-driven economy.  
The point is that even if the apartheid mechanism was motivated by racist ideology of 
Social Darwinism and segregationism,318 racism is not the only reason why the mechanism was 
evil. The Hukou system and rural-urban dual landownership work together as a self-segregation 
mechanism within a mono-ethnic state, China. South Africa’s circumstances were different, but 
they still adopted the same “low human rights advantage” mechanism. The termination of 
apartheid and the rise of democratization demolished the government’s ability to push the cost of 
land and labor, and in turn lost its low human rights advantages; then South Africa had to change 
its economy model.  
 
E. Why Not Other Transition Economies?: A Presumptive Answer 
What about other transition economies, such as other former Communist bloc countries 
in Eastern Europe? Did they also adopt polices of “low human rights advantage” as part of their 
transition and growth policies? The answer is probably no. Taking “low human rights advantage” 
requires two prerequisites: (1) economic growth is highly dependent on export, and (2) the 
government is tough enough to repress the people’s resistance to being ill-used, as in China and 
Vietnam. A close alternative to (2) might be (2a) the civil society is too weak to make a valid 
fight against the government, as was the case in Bangladesh.  
In a comparatively highly democratized country, the government or private elite does not 
have the power to force down the cost of labor and land through expropriative polices. Instead, 
officials have to provide various social benefits to win the people’s support for change. Because 
of those social benefits, internal demands consume a big part of social products, and in turn, the 
economy’s growth will not be highly dependent on export. Therefore, a well-organized civil 
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mechanism to balance government’s power is necessary to enhance internal consumption and get 
rid of the “low human rights advantages.”  
 
VI. Concerns Regarding the Paternalist Purpose of the System 
Are China’s rural-urban dual landownership system and expropriation mechanism,s in 
some way, designed for a paternalist purpose? Or in other words, for the benefits of rural 
residents or even the whole nation? Or are those policies part of the mercantilism strategy that 
has been successful and may be a long-lasting strategic choice?  
Most scholars highly doubt the efficiency of paternalism unless applied to specific groups 
of people, such as minors and the mentally disabled. Even scholars who support legal 
paternalism under some circumstances assume that efficiency and paternalism are alternative and 
distinct justifications for legal intervention.319 However, under Zamir’s law-and-economics 
analysis, the theory of human well-being underlying standard economic analysis is closer to an 
ideal preferences theory than to an actual preferences one. Therefore, paternalistic intervention in 
irrational or partly-rational choices can be efficient under certain circumstances. It implies that 
legal paternalism need not be restricted to the prevention of severe or permanent harms, but 
could efficiently extend to a broader field.320 Is China’s rural-urban dual landownership system 
in this field? Is the current arrangement an efficient paternalistic intervention?  
 
A. Ideal Paternalism Protection of Rural Residents? 
Usually paternalism means the interference of a state or an individual with another person, 
against their will, and defended or motivated by a claim that the person interfered with will be 
better off or protected from harm.321 At the theoretical level, the paternalistic issue raises 
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questions of how persons should be treated when they are less than fully rational. In China, the 
central government and the Communist Party, which are the real policymakers, are entitled to be 
the paternalist principal. Admittedly, rural residents might have a lack of the capacity of leading 
the nation into a modern society by themselves; nonetheless, they are able to make rational or 
partly-rational choices in their own interests. So, if the central government makes good decisions 
for them and these arrangements are beneficial instead of harmful to rural residents, this system 
could be justified on a paternalistic basis. 
The reason why paternalism is controversial is that its end is benevolent, but its means 
coercive.322 The dual society system might work this way. The main argument to maintain the 
arrangements of that system are that they work as a benevolent coercive social security.323 
China’s prohibition against free exchange of rural residents’ real rights might be a good example 
of a policy motivated by paternalistic concern. In a country that lacks of universal monetary 
social security, this prohibition might be necessary for rural residents’ own benefit, and seems an 
indispensable mechanism for social stabilization and social welfare.324 The two types of rights – 
the Right to Use Housing Sites (RUHS), which entitles the holder to build and maintain his 
housing upon a piece of land owned by collective, and the Right to the Contracted Management 
of Land (RCML), which entitles the holder to earn a living from agricultural production – avoid 
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rural collective members from homelessness and unemployment.325 At least, the government 
assumes this innovative system still works well; so, the government’s official statistics only 
report unemployment of urban residents and assume that all rural residents are employed.326 
Therefore, rural residents’ RCMLs work not only as social security; they also guarantee 
mandatory jobs, even if they choose, rationally or partly-rationally, to migrate to cities trying to 
find decent jobs or just trying to change their life style. If they fail in the cities, they are in worse 
shape: They are unacquainted with the area, and there are no guarantees of housing and jobs. Just 
a few years ago, unemployed rural residents who were unemployed in the cities were compelled 
to be repatriated back to their rural hometowns.327 Now, although the compelling repatriation 
mechanism is not implemented anymore, rural residents who go to the cities still cannot enjoy 
any social benefits on the same terms as registered urban residents. To enjoy this special 
paternalism, they must stay in or return to their rural real estates. They do not have rights to free 
migration and equal social security.  
Reducing the social and economic disparities of urban and rural has long been deemed a 
main goal of the communist party.328 During the modernization process, a dualistic system was 
claimed to be a short-term expedient for society’s stabilization when the state’s main concern 
was speedy industrialization. A realistic solution was letting rural residents earn their lives on 
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agricultural income, when the state was impotent to provide universal monetary social security. 
However, this dual society system was never considered a better mechanism for rural residents 
but a process designed for a transitional period.  
 
B. The Balance of Social Security and Fundamental Freedom Violations 
Even if the original purpose was not for the rural residents’ welfare, and the current 
reform tendency is eliminating the beneficial discrepancy between rural and urban residents, this 
system might still have some practical functions that actually benefit rural residents. However, 
after balancing the claimed social security functions and the actual violations of rural residents’ 
fundamental rights, my conclusion is that the costs of the sytem exceed its benefits.  
Every rural resident is entitled the RUHS on a piece of land. By holding this type of right, 
rural residents seem to have avoided the risk of being homeless, because all voluntary or 
involuntary exchanges of RUHS are forbidden. However, the only thing provided is the right to 
construct a domicile, not the right to an actual apartment or other kind of housing. It is hard to 
assume a bankrupt or nearly bankrupt rural resident is capable of constructing a refuge on his or 
her reserved site. A more meaningful right might be the provision of a real roof, not a nominal 
right that the receiver cannot alienate for a financial purpose.  
Similar dysfunction happens with regard to the right to the contracted management of 
land (RCML). RCMLs are assumed to be reserved as the last way for rural residents to earn a 
living. However, they cannot get any substantial income or revenue if they do not practically 
engage in agricultural activities. It is more like an involuntary servitude for bankrupt or very 
poor rural residents rather than a kind of social security in disguise. In fact, every year, hundreds 
of millions of rural residents leave their domicile and contracted land and migrate to cities where 
they can earn more money and take part in modern life.329  
In order to receive these “social securities,” rural residents are forced to give up 
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fundamental rights and benefits.  
The most grievous part of this type of social security is that these arrangements fetter 
rural residents. If they try to hunt for jobs in urban areas but fail, they cannot enjoy any real 
social security there, which means they have to bear the risk of being helpless in cities. No 
training or information is supplied to them, while the urban unemployed can enjoy these 
priorities as registered unemployed. The rural migrants have to work at the most dangerous and 
unskilled positions, or worse, leave cities and resume life as rural peasants. More than that, their 
kids are not allowed to study in cities where the parents work because the elementary schools 
enroll students based on parents’ registration status. If the parents are not registered as urban 
residents in this area, local schools can legally refuse these children. In some areas, almost all 
labor migrates to urban areas, leaving their villages fulfilled with children and elders.330 Young 
rural laborers work in cities; however, they are forbidden to settle down there. They might 
endure the hardness of work, but because their senior parents and children are unprivileged in 
urban areas, they are still tied to the rural area. Besides that, because rural residents cannot use 
their land or domicile as a way of financing, the only thing they can invest in is their labor.  
To sum up, even if the two mechanisms were implement from paternalist concerns, they 
cost too much, and they do not work.  
 
C. A Broader Perspective: Paternalistic Concerns for the Whole Country 
Based on the “low human rights advantage” theory, China’s rural-urban dual 
landownership system and expropriation mechanism work together to push down the cost of 
labor and land, and those lower costs have propelled China’s economic growth during the last 
several decades. These arrangements can be understood as efficient paternalist orders even if 
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rural residents’ benefits, as a part of the nation’s entire benefits, are sacrificed (or at least, not as 
great as the costs that the arrangements impose on them). In other words, the state might 
temporally and wisely ignore rural residents’ preferences for the benefits of the whole nation’s 
modernization.  
This is not the first time the state ha taken advantages of rural residents. As early as 1953, 
the institution of a state monopoly on the purchase and sale of grain, known as “Unified 
Purchase and Supply of grain” (UPSG) was established. Rural residents had to sell their surplus 
grain in amounts, kinds, and at prices set by the government. “Surplus grain” was, at this point, 
defined as that grain which one cannot eat up oneself and sooner or later will want to sell.331  
This policy was quite successful: During its first five years, it enabled the state to extract 
an average of 26.96 percent of the total grain output from the countryside annually, which, 
together with agricultural taxes, made possible the massive investment in industrialization in the 
1950s.332 The cost was so large that the new policy encountered nationwide resistance in 1954 
and 1955 when the state set no limit on its procurements and failed to sell enough grain back to 
the peasants.333  
But even so, it is also arguable that UPSG, as an extra industrialization tax imposed on 
rural residents, was an efficient paternalistic mechanism because UPSG actually helped China’s 
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speedy industrialization.  
However, when China turned from an import-substitution-industrialization strategy to an 
export-driven development strategy, these extra industrialization taxes 334  levied on rural 
residents became inefficient. During the 1980s, the Household Contract Responsibility System 
(HCRS) and the Agricultural Production Responsibility System (APRS) reforms actually reduced 
this extra tax, and then all agriculture taxes were abandoned in 2005.  
If these mechanisms coordinate with current economic development strategy, it could be 
argued that they are efficient paternalist orders, although they encroach on a significant part of 
the people’s benefits. However, when the mechanisms contradict the main strategy or impose far 
more social costs than the social benefits they generate, it will be hard to say those are still 
efficient paternalist policies. Now, China aims to turn from the export-driven growth to stressing 
on internal-driven, consumption-led growth; China’s rural-urban dual landownership system and 
expropriation mechanism clearly are at odds with this new development strategy. Therefore, 
even if they once contributed to the export-driven strategy, these mechanisms cannot be argued 
as efficient paternalist policies for the whole nation anymore. The state also realized that the 
overwhelming majority of rural residents should “share the fruits of modernization.”335  
 
D. Short Summary 
As the definition of paternalism shows, paternalistic legislation or policies should be 
exercised with a will to achieve a particular goal. It is reasonable to assume that the state’s goal 
is speedy economic growth and modernization. To achieve that goal, one could justify policies 
under which the state sacrifices rural residents for the greater good of the whole nation and labels 
this scarification as an efficient paternalistic care. It is also arguable that rural residents benefited 
from the prior nation-oriented industrialization and later export-driven development strategy 
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under which the well-being of rural residents was sacrificed. However, when the state changed 
its strategy and the older mechanisms contradict the new strategy, paternalist arguments for these 
mechanisms cannot be justified as efficient anymore. 
 
VII. The Setting of This Thesis 
 
The discussion about transaction costs and a market economy is based on 
microeconomics. If China chose a different macroeconomic development strategy that was anti-
market in order to implement mercantilism, and if that strategy was successful, a transaction cost 
analysis would be meaningless, and protests like the Wukan event would not be justified. Those 
protests would be seen as just inevitable friction that arose in the implementation of a wise 
strategy.  
Therefore, the setting of this thesis is that China has a landownership system that creates 
an anticommons problem for the country under its new development strategy. China has changed 
its development strategy in favor of using the market as a way to allocate land. Within this 
process, China needs to find a way to deal with problems that are common in markets. 
It might be true that, during the past decades, the current dual landownership system and 
Hukou system contributed a lot to China’s export-driven economic growth, but now China aims 
to change its growth model and enhance internal consumption. Then the rural-urban distinctive 
system should be reformed so as to allow rural residents to share in the gain from urbanization, 
or at least to stop sacrificing the rural residents’ expected value on their land as a part of the 
development strategy. The reallocation of economic gain might also effectively increase 
domestic demand and thereby comport with the new consumption-driven strategy. The new 
government also realized this possibility:  
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We should reform the land expropriation system and increase the share of gain in 
land value to farmers.336  
And 
The plenum pointed out: The urban-rural dual structure is a main obstacle to the 
integrated development of urban and rural areas.337 
 
Under this setting, an analysis about the anticommons problem of China’s land system 
and its reform can be possible, and an alternative institution of lowering transaction costs other 
than government’s aggressive participation will be meaningful. The basic principle turns back to 
the Coase Theorem’s normative conclusion: Government should create institutions that minimize 
transaction costs so as to allow misallocations of resources to be corrected as cheaply as possible 
The primary setting for this policy is a land market.  
  
                                                
336 Hu Jintao (ǂȟŞ), “Jiandingbuyi Yanzhe Zhongguo Shehui Tese Shehuizhuyi Daolu Qianjin; Wei Quanmian 
Jianshe Xiaokang Shehui er Fendou; Hu Jintao zai Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shiba Ci Daibiao Dahui shang de 
Baogao (¹
ƖŒƇűǆƍ1ȍǹ[ȃ;EȰãǩÄâƍ1ƻ«Ę;ǂȟŞH&DƞhF
ńE+ǘ§1ƞÿ) [Firmly March on the Path of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive to 
Complete the Building of A Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects, Report to the Eighteen National 
Congress of The Communist Party Of China]” (paper presented at the 18th Nat’l Cong., CPC, Beijing, November 8-
14, 2012). 
 
337 Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC (2013). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
A LAW-AND-ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF CHINA’S LANDOWNERSHIP SYSTEM:  
ENTROPY IN PROPERTY AND THE COMMONS & ANTICOMMONS SPECTRUM 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Besides the political-economic “low human rights advantage” theory, is there any 
justification for China’s complicated anti-marketization system? Under a typical law-and-
economics analysis setting, is there any rationalization behind this unique rural-urban dual 
landownership system? The so-called “entropy in property” theory provides a good framework 
for this analysis.  
In his theory of that name, Parisi suggests that property law is also subject to a 
fundamental law of entropy (or the second law of thermodynamics)338 that it is affected by a one-
directional bias leading towards increasing fragmentation. Through applying this hypothesis to 
property law, Parisi states: “Given the greater difficulty of reaggregating property, once 
fragmentation is allowed, legal systems adopt legal mechanisms to combat entropy.” That means 
an efficient legal system provides “less extensive property-type protection to atypical property 
arrangement.”339  
Based on this theory, China’s unique urban land state-owned landownership system and 
expropriation mechanism might be an efficient way to combat the huge entropy created by the 
HCRS and the APRS in the early 1980s, which entitled numerous rights and claims upon rural 
land hold by rural residents and collectives. These powerful mechanisms might have been used 
                                                
338 According to this law, the entropy of an isolated system never decreases, but always increases and it will go in 
one direction only and will result in a release of energy that cannot be recaptured.  
 
339 Francesco Parisi, “Entropy in Property” in Recent Developments in Law and Economics, ed. Robert D. Cooter 
and Francesco Parisi (Northampton Mass.: Edward Elgar Pub, 2010), 284-321.  
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to surmount the huge transaction costs caused by assembling fragmented land rights. And it 
might well be the case that this corrective could have provided an advantage for a rapidly 
developing and urbanizing country. Ignoring the low human rights advantage theory, the urban 
land state-owned landownership system and expropriation mechanism may work together to 
“combat the entropy,” and it might be a significant reason for China’s economic prosperity. 
To support this theory, several questions must be answered. If entropy created by 
fragmented real estate rights impedes economic growth, why did China abandon its highly 
concentrated landownership system and introduce the HCRS and the APRS? And why did the 
leadership believe that the HCRS and APRS would be successful at that time? More than that, if 
the current urban land state-owned landownership system and expropriation mechanism matters 
to China’s economy, why did the civil disorders, as in the Wukan case, which had been caused by 
the government’s expropriation power, burst much later than the establishment of the HCRS and 
the APRS and China’s economic takeoff? To answer these questions, a spectrum to describe the 
changes of China’s land allocation will be introduced. Along this spectrum, I synthesize the 
classic commons and anticommons problems into one theory to help understand the dramatic 
procedure of China’s land system reforms in the past 60 years. Under this theory, I highlight the 
settings of commons and anticommons analysis in a transitional economy. Specifically, the main 
argument here is that if the main purpose or strategy of a transitional economy is changing, then 
the appropriate scope of that transitional economy’s real rights over a valuable resource like land 
should be determined by the changing goal of development, not by a vague and immutable 
standard. This applies whether, before the strategy changes, that transitional economy’s rights are 
over-fragmented or over-concentrated. 
 
II. What is Fragmentation? Two Types of Disunity under the Current Landownership System 
 
If the current landownership rights are so fragmented that a powerful expropriation 
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landownership system?  
The modern conception of absolute property right consists of two main elements: the 
right to use the property and the power to exclude others.340 As the central conception of property 
law, this basic rule guarantees the circulation of real property.341 However, based on the theory of 
entropy in property, absolute property rights might lead to splitting and increasing fragmentation 
in different ways. But due to transaction costs, it might not be possible to reunite these 
fragmented rights into more efficient tracts. Therefore, an efficient legal system should address 
this problem by “developing rules that closely approximate the results the parties would have 
reached in a zero transaction cost world,” 342  or in other words, establishing a “positive 
transaction cost environment.” The current powerful expropriation mechanism, in some ways, 
can be understood as a tool to promote efficient unifications of fragmented rights in land. The 
state can utilize this mechanism to justify its preferred assembly and ignore rights holders, 
especially rural residents’ claims, which are fragmented and, if those claims had to be addressed 
in an arm’s-length bargain, might so increase transaction costs as to prevent the assembly of 
those rights in land into a more efficient bundle. However, the current system of expropriation 
does not entirely solve this problem. It entitles various use rights or leaseholds to individuals that 
also create new fragmentation problems. In other words, the state does not enjoy full ownership 
of urban land, but distributes the rights to urban right holders right after it receives them from 
rural right holders. The current system overcomes the “entropy” caused by the rural HCRS and 
APRS, and then produces a new “entropy” among urban right holders.  
                                                
340 See John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law, third edition, revised., and ed. 
Robert Campbell (London, Spottinswoode and Co., New-street Square and Parliament Street, 1885), 415. 
 
341 Under classical Roman Law, the property owner was not allowed to transfer anything less than the entire bundle 
of rights, privileges, and powers that he had in the property. Therefore, if the owner cannot exclude other’s claim, 
the transaction cost would be much higher, like gathering the information of potential right claimers, enforcing the 
property rights.  
 
342 Parisi, “Entropy in Property,” 295; See Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, “Property Rules, Liability 
Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,” Harvard Law Review 85 (1972): 1089-1128; Ian Ayres and 
Eric Talley “Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement To Facilitate Coasean Trade,” Yale Law Journal 
104 (1995): 1027-117. 
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Parisi summarizes the absolute property right conception into three groups: functional, 
physical, and legal unity.343 If applied to China’s system, the ideal absolute ownership right is 
mainly fragmented in two ways, legal disunity and physical disunity. In these ways, the current 
system increases entropy in China’s landownership system and thereby hinders efficient 
assembly and transaction.  
 
III. Legal Disunity 
 
Just as in the other main civil law system nations,344 property rights in the Chinese legal 
system are defined as absolute rights: “the rights of an owner, according to the law, to possess, 
use, reap benefit from, and dispose of his own property.”345 Property rights thus are defined as 
something that can be clearly delineated in a legal manner. Under this solid frame, the market 
works well to efficiently allocate resources to the right holders. However, if the direct users do 
not hold stable legal property rights that other people or institutions are able to recognize and not 
to interfere in, those users cannot make reasonable plans for their further production. More than 
that, potential buyers might have to negotiate with more latent claimants to get stable ownership. 
In this way, the current landownership system creates massive “entropy” to hamper efficient 
legal assembly.  
In China, individuals’ ability to hold real rights is limited. Individuals have only the right 
or tenure or use rights in land. Taking rural land as an example, the state, the collective, and rural 
residents separately have some parallel claims on the land. Rural residents, like the Wukan 
villagers, are the direct possessor, user, and benefit-receiver of the land.346 At the same time, the 
                                                
343 Parisi, “Entropy in Property,” 300. 
 
344 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 544 (Fr.), “Ownership is the right to enjoy and dispose of things in the most absolute 
manner”. Similar articles show in the Italian and German civil laws.  
 
345 Property Law, art. 39, CLI.1.89386 Chinalawinfo (China). 
 
346 Property Law art. 125 (China), “The holder of the right to the contracted management of land has the right to 
possess, utilize and seek proceeds from the cultivated land, wood land and grassland, etc. under the contracted 
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collective as the legal owner holds the limited right to dispose or redispose of the land among its 
members,347 while the state holds the ultimate power to expropriate the land.348 This arrangement 
shapes the legal disunity of China’s landownership system. More specifically, individuals’ or 
direct users’ rights are always under an unstable status that, on one hand, forces them to focus on 
short-term benefits and give up long-term investments and, on the other hand, induces them to 
fight ardently for their limited short-term benefits if these rights are encroached on by 
governments.  
 
A. The effects of tenure limitation on the real estate market and right holders 
Under the tenure limitation arrangement, the terms of an individual’s rights are different 
depending on the usage of the land. Applying the basic assumption of homo economics (the 
rationally self-interested person),349 this arrangement affects land’s pricing and the right holder’s 
behavior.  
 
a. 70 years tenure in the Right to Use Construction Land (RUCL) for residential usage 
and the Automatic Renewal Clause 
According to law,350 urban residents hold RUCLs on the land upon which their housing is 
built, and the tenure of this RUCL for residential usage is 70 years.  
                                                                                                                                                       
management thereof, and is entitled to such agricultural production activities as the planting, forestry, stockbreeding, 
etc.  
 
347 Land readjustment “be agreed by at least two thirds of the members of the villagers’ representatives and be 
submitted to the town people’s government at the agricultural administration department of a people’s government at 
county level for approval.” Land Administration Law Art. 14 (China), “The land use rights of collectively owned 
land by rural residents must not be grated or assigned to another party or leased out for non-agricultural 
construction.” 
 
348 Land Administration Law Art. 2 (China), “The State may expropriate collectively-owned land in accordance with 
the law if it is in the public interest China.” 
 
349 The assumption is this: humans are rational and narrowly self-interested actors who have decisions that 
contribute to their subjectively defined ends. 
 
350 Interim Regulations Concerning the Assignment and Transfer of the Right to the Use of the State-owned Land in 
the Urban Areas, art. 12 (China). 
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In what follows, I explore the economics of this tenure on the value of the RUCL and the 
house or apartment’s value.  
 
Model 1: Suppose the annual rent (R) of a house or apartment is $1,000. The price of the 
house could be deemed as an annuity that benefits the holder an annual amount of $1,000 in each 
of the next 70 years. The present value (PV) of the ownership of the house may be computed 
based on the interest rate (r) to decide the price of an annuity with those terms by using the 
formula below.  
 
Formula 1: 
PV = R!(1+ r)!!!!!  
 
Let us assume the interest rate is 2%. Then the present value of the house is: 
 
 $",!!!(!!!%)!!"!!! =$1,000×37.50 = $37,500. 
 
If the holder has absolute ownership of the house, then the price of the house could be 
deemed as a perpetuity that benefits the holder an annual amount of $1,000 forever, and the 
present value should base solely on the interest rate. In that case, the present value would be 
computer as follows:  
 
Formula 2:  
 PV = Rr  
 
Thus, the present value of the house is: $1,000/2% = $1,000×50 = $50,000. Therefore, 
 
141 
the 70-year term statute decreases the value of the house (from its value under absolute, 
perpetual ownership) by 25%.  
 
25%=($50,000-$37,500)/$50,000 
 
Now, consider the value of the house if we make more realistic assumptions about 
maintenance and destruction.  
 
Model 2: Suppose that the house needs $510 annually for maintenance, or it will collapse 
in the 35th year. The house that will collapse in the 35th year is also like an annuity that would 
benefit the holder $1,000, so the present value of it can also be decided by Formula 1. The 
present value is  
 $",!!!(!!!%)!!"!!! =!$1,000×25.00 = $25,000. 
 
The present value of the investment to maintain is:  
 $"#$(!!!%)!!"!!! =!$510×25 = $12,750. 
 
Because the loss caused by the collapse would be $12,500 ($37,500-$25,000= $12,500), 
which means the investment surpasses the lost ($12,750>$12,500); therefore, the holder of a 70-
year tenure would not invest in the maintenance.  
But if the owner holds an absolute property right, he would pay for the maintenance, 
because he could save $25,000 ($50,000-$25,000=$25,000) by paying only $12,750.  
As a result, this house would only be maintained for 35 years by a rational right holder 
(with a limited tenure of his right), and then the present value of the house would be determined 
only by rents over 35 years. That would be $25,000. 
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Model 2 explains that even though the statute stipulates the maximum duration of the 
right is 70 years , rational holders would not maintain the house that long if it needs necessary 
maintenance, but maybe only half of the tenure. Furthermore, that will also cause resource waste 
since holders would not continue necessary investment to maintain the property. If we make the 
hypo more complicated – that the risk of collapse dramatically increases after the 25th year if it is 
not well served, and no precise estimate of collapse can be made – the house’s value will be even 
less.  
Under this arrangement, the state-owned urban landownership is settled. However, the 
long-term value of the land, home, or apartment is lost to the individual.  
 
1. Why is the tenure 70-years? 
One of the most important concerns about unlimited ownership is that right holders might 
over-invest on the plot so that inefficient waste will be induced. But this concern alone is not 
enough to justify the 70-year tenure clause. Actually, the progress of drawing up the clause was 
full of arbitrariness rather than rational concerns. 
The origin of the 70-year tenure clause did not derive from residents’ housing problems. 
In 1987, the state council, in order to attract investment, planned to alienate some urban real 
estate rights to foreign investors. A conference was convened at which the members were not 
legal or economic professionals but high officials who constituted the state council‘s foreign 
capital leading group. Maybe that was because this issue was considered more a political issue 
than a legal one. At that time, all urban land and housing had been declared as state-owned under 
the 1982 Constitution. Officials, employees and other urban residents’ housing provisions were 
regarded as part of the wage costs and freely distributed by their work units, such as public 
institutions or enterprises. Although some experiments with the subsidized sale of new housing 
were conducted, they were more like a new type of distribution of benefits instead of 
privatization.351 The legal real estate right conception was ambiguous at that time.352 Therefore, 
                                                
351 The buyer should be employed by a “public enterprise” (different from the conception in the western world, this 
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the urban land use-right’s legal arrangement for foreign holders was more urgent and actually 
preceded the arrangement of internal RUCL holders and the prospect of increasing the openness 
of the real estate market. It was not until 1987 that the first transaction of urban land use right 
was closed at a 50-year tenure. 353  This transaction with a foreign investor signaled the 
establishment of the urban land use right system.  
When the focus of legislation turned to the arrangement of other holders’ urban land use 
rights, the 50-year tenure was considered as an applicable precedent. The first draft of the 
maximum tenure for residential usage was 50 years, just the same as for other usages, with the 
exception of a 40-year tenure for commercial, tourist, or entertainment usages.354 As the first 
director of the State Administration of National Land recalled, the main concerns regarding the 
50-year tenure clause were the possibility of later readjustment of the term and accommodation 
to people’s working life. “A short tenure arrangement is easier for readjustment,” and “a typical 
person’s working life is 50 years, from 20 to 70 years old; so, a 50-year tenure should be enough 
for a lifetime management.” “Based on the value calculation, real estate which has been used for 
50 years would be worthless.” 355 However, because some “main leaders” requested to extend the 
tenure, the maximum tenure was changed to 70 years.356  
                                                                                                                                                       
means a state or collective-owned enterprise) or institution. He should pay one-third of the total costs allocated with 
the house, and the other two-thirds were to be subsidized equally by the employer. And the cost was decided by the 
cost of construction, not by the real market. 
 
352 See Wang Yaping and Alan Murie, “Social and Spatial Implications of Housing Reform in China,” International 
Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 24 (2000): 397-417.  
 
353 Feng Jie (Pķ), “Shenzhen Tudi Guanli Ershi Nian (şƢŷ hÛ) [Two Decades of Land 
Administration in Shenzhen],” Shenzhen Tequ Bao (Y*^A) [Shenzhen SEZ Daily], June 22, 2006, accessed 12 
2015, http://wenku.baidu.com/view/7fced38a84868762caaed5bf.html. 
 
354 The reason for this division might be that the government wanted investments on industrial, technological, 
cultural, sanitarian and sport projects, more than on those usages. However, that might be hard to distinguish the 
nature of projects.  
 
355 Wang Xianjin (ŴBȃ), “Zhuzhai 70 Nian Chanquan de Youlai Yu Anpai (4´hÛ&ıƃžĵ¶Ĉ) [The 
Origin and Arrangement of the Right to Use Construction Land ‘s 70 years tenure China],” Zhongguo Fangdichan 
Bao ((?)	A) [Real Estate Business News], October 17, 2011. 
 
356 Ibid. 
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Just as with other policies introduced during the first decade of Deng’s reform, practices 
and later readjustments based on the test results from local and periodical experiments were 
stressed by the policymakers.357 More than that, the 50- or 70-year tenure clause was not 
considered based on marketization condition that scarcity, over-investment and free circulation 
were out of concern.358  
 
2. Article 149: the Automatic Renewal Clause 
More than a longer tenure, the later 2007 Real Right Law entitled holders of residential 
RUCLs automatic renewal power.359 The working life theory was totally abandoned. It makes 
holders’ rights almost perpetual unless they intend to change the land’s usage. However, the 
society is still worried about what will happen 70 years later, although this worry is not big 
enough to affect the boom of residential real estate market.360 
 
b. The 30 -year tenure clause to Cultivated Land (CL) 
According to law,361 a rural resident, as a member of his collective, holds the CL on a plot 
of land belongs to his collective, and his or her tenure of CL is only 30 years, much shorter than 
the RUCL of an urban resident. Even the short 30-year arrangement derived from constant 
negotiations, interactions, and mediations between the central state, rural collectives, and 
individual rural households. When the APRS was first introduced, the contract signed between 
the collective and individual rural households for the use of the land was usually for a term of 
                                                
357 It is the philosophical declaration of Deng’s reform: practice is the sole criterion for testing truth.  
 
358 Although the market-oriented reform started at that time, high officials’ analysis about the value of real estate 
was still not marketized.  
 
359 Property Law art. 149 (China). 
 
360 Mary Hennock, "Climbing China’s Property Ladder," BBC News, July 15, 2004, accessed July 12, 2015, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3861003.stm. 
 
361 Property Law art. 149 (China), “The contractual term of cultivated land shall be 30 years. The contractual term of 
grassland shall be 30 up to 50 years. The contractual term of wood land shall be 30 up to 70 years.” 
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three to five years subject to renewal. Later, this short term raised a logical concern over tenure 
insecurity and its possible impact on individuals’ short-term land use and investment behavior. A 
compromise was made by the Party in 1984 to extend the term of the land contract for at least 15 
years,362 and this was followed by another CCP decision made in November 1993 to further 
extend the contract for another 30 years after the original 15-year contract expired.363 
However, the extended 30-year tenure should not have changed the short-term effect on 
the investment (or at least not changed it much). To see this, consider the following model.  
 
Model 3: Suppose the right holder plans to plant a kind of apple tree on the land for 
which he has contracted for 30-years’ use. He has to invest $3,500 dollars at the beginning, and 
then he has to wait four years until the trees bear fruit for the first time. Then he will get $1,500 
every year in the following eight years, until the trees no longer bear any fruit. After this 
circulation he has to pay $2,500 to remove the trees to make the land suitable for a new 
circulation.  
Suppose the interest rate is 10%. The value of the fruit will also be like an annuity that 
will benefit him $1,500 annually for eight years. Then Formula 1 can be used to get the value at 
the fifth year. 5th year future value (5th FV). 
 
5th FV= $",!""(!!!"%)!!!!!  = $1,500×4.98 = $7,470. 
 
Then the present value by the formula should be calculated as below: 
 
                                                
362 “Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Yijiubajiu Nian Nongcun Gongzuo de Tongzhi (HªI!FÛO
ĳÑ7ƃȊƉ) [Circular of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on rural work during 1984],” 
Renmin Ribao (
VIA) [People’s Daily], July 12, 1984. 
 
363 Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Jianli Shehui Zhuyi Shichang Jingji Tizhi Ruogan Wenti de Jueding (Hª
I!ãƛƍ1ÔƮř5ZǊÙȣȶƃQ¹) [Decision of the CCP Cent. Committ. On Some Issues 
Concerning the Establishment of A Socialist Market Econ. Structure] (promulgated by the Cent. Committ. of  CCP, 
November 14, 1993, effective November, 14, 1993),  
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66698/4495173.html. 
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Formula 3:  
 PV = !"(!!!)! . 
 
Therefore, the present value of the fruit is PV=$5,102=$7,470/(1+ 10%)!, and the 
present value of the payment of clearing is $$2,500/(1+ 10%)!" = $796. The present value of 
this investment would be $7,470-$796-$3,500=$3,174.  
Then he will do the same thing again at the 13th year. However, at the 25th year, he has 
only 5 years right remaining on the land, which is not enough to finish another cycle of 
cultivation. If he continues to start a new cycle, he will invest another $3,500, but he can only get 
2 years’ worth of fruit in the 29th and the 30th years. The present gross benefit at the 25th year 
from this investment would be  
 
25th PV= $",!""(!!!"%)!!!!!  /(1+ 10%)! = ($1,500×1.73)/!(1+ 10%)! 
=$1,772 < $3,500. 
 
As a result, he will not invest in the same program for the second cycle.  
On the other hand, he could invest on other annuals, like wheat. Suppose this farmer has 
to invest $1,060 every year in order to grow wheat, and then he could get $1,500 at the end of the 
year. The benefit of this investment is just like an annuity for which he could receive $440 for 6 
years. Then the present value at the 25th year of this investment would be $2,464: 
 
$1,395 =! $""#(!!!"%)!!!!! != $440×3.17. 
 
It seems a good investment. However, for making the land suitable for planting wheat, he 
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paid $2,500 at the end of the 24th year for clearing the land. That means the wise choice for a 
rational investor is to idle the land, leaving the fruitless trees there, but that is what the state 
banned.  
 
Model 4: Let’s induce another variable: the probability (P) of successful renewal of the 
contract for another 6 years. If the investor does not know whether he can renew the contract, we 
might assume that P equals 50%. At the end of the 24th year, if he decides to invest in another 
cycle, he would pay $2,500 to clear the land and pay $3,500 to plant. If he could successfully 
renew the contract, he could get the benefit whose present value at the 25th year is $2,470, 
meaning that he can get $7,470-$2,500 -$3,500 = $1,470 from this decision. However, if he 
cannot successfully renew it, he will lose $4,228 = $2,500 + $3,500 -$1,772 (the fruit from the 
last two years’ harvest).  
The expectation value of this investment (EV) could be calculated as below:  
 
EV=$1,470× 50%+(-$4,228)×50%=-$1379. 
 
This means the probabilistic status of the right would lead the investor to cease further 
production, leaving the land idled.  
Let us also calculate the probability P’ that could assure EV> $0. That means that we 
need to solve for the P’ that satisfies 
 
EV=$1,470×P’ +(-$4,228)×(1-P’ )>0 
And that is  
 
P’> $4,228/($1,470+$4,228)=74.20% 
 
In conclusion, even if the farmer is a risk-neutral investor, he would continue his next 
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investment circulation only if he would, at the end of the 24th year, perceive that the probability 
of successful renewal exceeds 74.20%, or he will just leave the land idle. 
However, investors are usually risk-averse people, and tend to overestimate the value of 
the property they actually own. Based on Model 4, we can conclude that even if it is highly 
possible for the original investor to renew the contract (in this model even higher than 74.20%), 
they would not invest in this long-term profitable program again. 
 
c. The idling prohibition statute 
Since the government is always deeply anxious about the food security of the country, it 
is forbidden to idle land more than one year.364 However, over-cultivation would erode the soil, 
and then result in reduction of output, which would make the legislators and administrators 
uneasy.  
 
Model 5: Suppose another type of apple tree. The investor has to invest $5,000 at the 
beginning, and then the tree will produce a $1,500 annual return from the 5th year for 10 years. 
Then if the land was idled for 2 years to restore its fertility, the land will retain same ability to 
grow crops. However, if one continues to plant on the next year, the trees would be fruitless; if it 
is only idle for 1 year, the return would be half of the normal output, and it will need four years 
to recover half of fertility and 8 years to resume full fertility. 
Let us suppose the interest rate is 2%. We can use Formula 1 to calculate the present 
value in the fifth years of the future output of the trees in the succeeding 10 years.  
 
5th FV= $",!""(!!!%)!!!"!!!  = $1,500×8.98 = $13,470. 
 
Then we should compute the present value of this stream of returns by using formula 3. 
The present value of the fruit is 13,470/(1+ 2%)!  = $12,200, and the profit from this 
                                                
364 Land Administration Law, art. 47 §1 (China), “no unit or individual is allowed to let the land idle or go wasted.” 
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investment is $12,200-$5,000 = $7,200.  
If the land holds half of its fertility as this standard, the 5th year future value would be:  
 
Half 5th FV=$1,500/2×8.98=$6,735. 
 
The present value is $6,100=$6,735 /(1+ 2%)!.The profit is:   
 
$1,100=$6,100-$5,000=$1,100. 
 
If the investor left the land idle in the 15th and 16th years, the present value would be: 
 
PV=$7,200 (present value of the first circulation) + $7,200 / (1+ 2%)!"(present value of 
the second circulation)= $7,200+$5,142=$12,342  (Condition 1). 
 
If the investor just leaves the land idle in the 15th  year, the present value would be 
 
PV=$7,200+$1,100/(1+ 2%)!"=$7,200+$801=$8,001 (Condition 2). 
 
Obviously, if the investor chooses to invest as under Condition 1, the present value will 
increase $4,341=$12,342-$8,001. In other words, the profit from the land idled in the 16th year is 
$4,341. However, because of the idling prohibition statute, if the investor chooses to leave the 
land idle in the 16th year, he would probably lose the RCML on this land; so, the wise choice is 
to begin the second circulation in the 16th year, then leave the land idle at the last year of the term 
(Condition 2). If so, this statute causes $4,341 waste in every 30-year term. 
 
Model 6: Furthermore, this decision will cause a negative externality to the next investor. 
After the second investment cycle, the land would be infertile for 4 years. Let us suppose that 
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another investor gets the right after the first investor’s contract expires in the 30th year. He has 
two possible choices: the first is to wait three more years to get half of the output; the second is 
to wait seven more years to get the normal output.  
 
Based on the first possible choice, he could get the output whose present value is $1,037. 
(PV=$1,100 (the whole value of a half output circulation) /(1+ 2%)!=$1,037), while the second 
possible choice will benefit him. The present value of that option is $6,268 (PV=$7,200 (the 
whole value of a half output circulation) /!(1+ 2%)!=$6,268). Definitely, the second possible 
choice looks better. However, he would only have nine years left before the expiration of his 
contract:  
 
9 = 30-7(waited from the beginning)-14(the time needed to finish the circulation)). 
 
Then, after his first cycle, the only possible choice for him is to wait only one year (to 
avoid the retraction of the land by the authorities). Therefore, he would invest at the beginning of 
his 23rd year, and then he could only get four years’ annual benefit (from the 27th to 30th.years).  
We can use Formula 1 again to get the present value of the incomplete cycle at the 27th 
year:  
 
27thFV= $",!""(!!!%)!!!!!! =!$750×3.80=$2,850. 
 
The present value at the 23rd year will be $2,850/(1+ 2%)!= $2,581. Because $2,581 < 
$5,000 (the investment), the second possible choice will also not be pursued. 
As a result, the second investor would choose to idle the land after his first cycle. After 
two years, when the fertility of the land resumes, the land will be expropriated, and a third 
investor would get it.  
Therefore, under the statute, the whole period of this kind of production is 53 years (53= 
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30 years (the first investor holds) + 23 (the second investor holds (7 (waiting from the beginning) 
+ 14( the time needed to finish the cylce) + 2(idled at the end before expropriation))).  
During this period, the profit the land would produce includes the present value $8,001 at 
the beginning of the 1st year, and the present value $6,268 at the beginning of the 31st year. 
Therefore, the present value of every cycle is 
 
$11,461 = $8,001 + $6,268 /(1+ 2%)!"= $8,001 + $3,460. 
 
We can also deem the whole production as an annuity that could produce an annual profit 
(AP) for 53 years. We can calculate that annual profit AP by solving the following equation:   
 
PV (annuity) = $11,462 = !"!!!% !!!"!!! = AP×32.50. 
 
AP = $11,462/32.50 = $353. 
 
If this whole cylce could be maintained seamlessly, the value would be like a perpetuity 
which profits $353 per annum (Type A).  
Taking the profit into Formula 2, the present value of the land: 
 
PV (perpetuity) =$353/2%=$17,650. 
 
If there is no prohibition statute and the investor holds the ownership, he could choose the 
wise program, which means planting for 14 years and then idling for 2 years. This makes 
ownership like a perpetuity that gives $7,200 every 16 years (16 = 14+2) (Type B), and we can 
also deem this an annuity that could produce an annual profit (AP) for 16 years:  
 
PV (annuity) =$7,200= !"!!!% !!!"!!! = AP×13.58. 
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AP= $7,200/13.58= $530. 
 
If this whole circle could be maintained seamlessly, the value would be like a perpetuity 
that generates profits of $530 per annum (Type B).  
Taking the profit into Formula 2, the present value of the land is  
 
PV (perpetuity) = $530/2% = $26,500. 
 
In conclusion, because of the idling prohibition statute, the production of the land will 
decrease ($26,500-$17,650)/ $26,500=33.4%.  
 
d. Over-exploitation Concern 
The relationship between tenancy and land degradation is one of the classic questions of 
economics. The conventional wisdom is that tenancy promotes land degradation: because tenants 
have no material stake in maintaining the productivity of land beyond the expected life of their 
rental contract, they have an incentive to overexploit soils.365 The main problem is how to 
reconcile the conflicting objectives of maximizing rent in the near term versus land value in the 
longer run. The problem here is thus a multi-task principal-agent problem,366 and most debates 
are about the efficiency of a cash-rent contract versus a cropshare contract.367 The optimal 
                                                
365 Erik Lichtenberg, “Tenants, Landlords, and Soil Conservation,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 89 
(2007): 294-307. 
 
366 George P. Baker, “Inventive Contracts and Performance Measurement,” Journal of Political Economics 100 
(1992): 598-614; Bengt Holmstrom, and Paul Milgrom, “Multi-task Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, 
Asset Ownership, and Job Design,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7 (1991):24-52; Robert G. 
Chambersand and John Quiggin, Uncertainty, Production Choice, and Agency; The State-Contingent Approach 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 164-194.  
 
367 For the cash-rent contract, the farmer hires a tract of farmland for a lump-sum fee paid just prior to the growing 
season. In a cropshare contract, the farmer gains exclusive use of the plot of land without paying the landowner prior 
to production. At harvest time, the crop is divided between the farmer and landowner. See: D. Gale Johnson, 
“Resource Allocation under Share Contrats,” Journal of Political Economy 58 (1950), 111-123; Kenneth E. 
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solutions depend on the different geographical areas, the income levels of tenants, the terms of 
leases, and landowners’ risk attitudes. 
However, these tenant-landlord arrangements, which aim to achieve reconciliation 
between long-term and short-term benefits, are constructed outside absolute landownership 
system (under which, by assumption and demonstration, the owner has an incentive to reconcile 
short- and long-term interests).  
Besides choosing types of contracts, landlords can undertake direct actions that 
physically limit tenants’ ability to overexploit soil, or alternatively stipulate that tenants use soil-
conserving practices that leave a durable imprint on the landscape.368 Landlords’ initiatives are 
very important because they probably have specific knowledge of their land and incentives to 
care about their own benefits. It is arguable that China’s CL tenure clause and idling prohibition 
statute are made to avoid overinvestment and overexploitation, but the state’s legislature or even 
local collectives cannot be proper managers to make such specific arrangements. Even if the 
legal intention was for the nation’s efficient agriculture, inflexible statutes would never turn the 
state into a ubiquitous self-interested landowner.  
 
e. Short Summary 
As shown from the discussions above, both the tenure limit and the idle-prohibition 
statute dramatically affect investor’s behavior. A survey also showed that 93 percent of the 
farmers interviewed “responded that they would be willing to make long-term investment in their 
land if they were given use rights of 50 years or more.”369 In fact, the natures of these two 
arrangements are a variety of legal disunity of the property. Collectives and the state have 
potential claims upon the land, even though they are not direct investors. Actually, before 1998, 
                                                                                                                                                       
McConnell, “An Economic Model of Soil Conservation,” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 65 (1983), 
83-89. 
 
368 Lichtenberg, “Tenants,” 294-307. 
 
369 Lin, Developing China, 27-42. 
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when the Land Management Law was revised, rural collectives, as owners of and the contracting 
party for use of the land, may from time to time take back the contracted land for re-allocations 
or re-adjustments in response to either demographic change of the population or other interests. 
Many collectives did not have legal reasons like those discussed above. A great deal of empirical 
research has been undertaken by scholars on rural land re-adjustment, and the results suggest that 
it has been such a widespread practice that more than two-thirds of China’s villages had had at 
least one and some more five episodes of land re-adjustment by the end of the 1990s.370 
After the Land Management Law was revised in 1998, a new clause was added that any 
land readjustment needs to meet more strict requirements.371 Further clarification was made 
when the Rural Land Contract Law was enacted in 2002. The collective was not allowed to take 
back the contracted land for re-adjustment during the periods of the contractual operation – with 
the exception of some very special circumstances, such as natural disasters.372 The Real Property 
Law also prohibited the contracting party (the collective) from taking back the contracted land 
for re-adjustment.373  
Those arrangements could be explained as an attempt to solve the legal disunity problem 
of land, or using the government’s words” to stop ‘big’ land-readjustments and regulate ‘small’ 
readjustments” of the collective.374 However, they have not changed the collective’s interference 
                                                
370 See James Kai-sing Kung and Liu Shouying, “Famer’s preferences regarding ownership and land tenure in post-
Mao China: Unexpected evidence from eight counties,” China Journal 38 (1997), 33-63; Roy Prosterman, 
“Implementation of 30-Year Land Use Rights for Farmers Under China’s 1998 Land Management Law: An Analysis 
and Recommendations Based on a 17-Provinces Survey” Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal, 8 (2000), 507-68; 
Jean C. Oi, “Two decades of rural reform in China: An overview and assessment,” China Quarterly 159 (1999), 618; 
Qian Forrest Zhang , Ma Qingguo, and Xu Xu, “Developing of land rental markets in rural Zhejiang: Growth of off-
farm jobs and institution building,” China Quarterly 180 (2004): 1053-72.  
 
371 Land Administration Law, art. 14 (1986) (China), “Be agreed by at least two thirds of the members of the 
villagers’ meeting or at least two-thirds of the villagers’ representatives and be submitted to the town people’s 
government and the agricultural administration department of a people’s government at county level for approval.” 
 
372 Tudi Chengbao Fa (þdœ) [Law on the Contracting of Rural Land] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., August 29, 2002, effective March 1, 2003, revised August 27, 2007) art. 27 CLI.1.6183 
Chinalawinfo (China) 
 
373 Law on the Contracting of Rural Land art. 130; 131 (China). 
 
374 “Big” or comprehensive adjustments whereby all farmland is given back to the collective for re-allocation, and 
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power or the fragmented ownership right upon rural land.  
Meanwhile, some parts of those laws also aggravated the fragmentation. For example, 
while the contracted agricultural land is permitted for sub-contracting, leasing, exchange, transfer 
or other means of circulation, it “cannot be sold” and is not allowed for the land to pass into non-
agricultural developments.375 Therefore, a new political economic conception was invented “land 
operation rights” (tudi jingying quan) to accommodate rural land circulation. Land operation 
rights are different from landownership, which belongs to collectives, and land use rights, which 
belong to the original contracted rural residents. The direct investors have been moved further 
from an absolute property right, and the legal rights become more fragmented among more 
participants. 
 
B. The effects of the Rural-Urban Dual Landownership System 
As mentioned above, the state- and collective-owned land dichotomy is the basic system 
of China’s landownership system. Land in cities and towns as well as industrial and mining sites 
is owned by the state, whereas rural residents own land in the rural and suburban areas 
collectively. While the state has the final power over every piece of land, including collective-
owned lands, rural collectives are entitled to many of the incidents of absolute ownership, and 
direct rural users hold limited rights. These multiple claim holders sometimes have overlapping 
rights that create legal disunities upon landownerships. 
At the same time, the expropriation mechanism as a method of relieving this disunity 
seems to work well to decrease the transaction costs of assembling land units into more efficient 
bundles, an assembly that might be very difficult given the legal disunities. After being 
expropriated, lands are legally united under the state’s ownership from which the collectives’ 
power is excluded. More than that, various regulations and injunctions upon original rural lands 
                                                                                                                                                       
“small” or partial readjustments through which a small amount of farmland is either added to or taken from a 
household’s existing landholding when its household size is changed (e.g. the household has acquired new members 
or lost some existing ones). See Prosterman, “Implementation of 30-Year Land Use Rights”, 513. 
 
375 Law on the Contracting of Rural Land art. 14; 17 (China); Property Law art. 128 (China). 
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vanish once these land are put into a freer urban land market. Just as the holdout problem has 
been cited as a potential justification for eminent domain, China’s expropriation system might 
also be justified by the unique rural-urban dual landownership system.376 However, the current 
expropriation mechanism is not perfect at handling China’s legal disunity problem upon lands. 
Several problems still need to be solved. 
 
f. The Compensation System of China’s Expropriation System 
The super power of China’s expropriation shows not only in its arbitrariness, but also in 
its rigid compensation process. When the state expropriates rural land, it pays the collectives an 
expropriation fee, which consists of (1) compensation for the land, (2) a resettlement allowance 
for the displaced rural residents, and (3) compensation for collateral losses (such as the value of 
un-harvested or green crops).377  
Of those three types of fees, the first two take the most part, and the standards for 
determining their levels are set by the state in the Land Management Law. When the Land 
Management Law was first introduced in 1986, the compensation fee was set at three to six times 
the average yield of the land in the three years prior to expropriation, and the resettlement 
allowance at two to three times the average yield (with a maximum of ten times).378 The 1998 
Land Management Law raised the compensation significantly, but it is still below the market 
value of the land.379 Furthermore, the law is unclear as to how the compensation should be 
distributed between the collectives and the displaced users, and actual practice varies from region 
                                                
376 Thomas J. Miceli and C. F. Sirmans, “The holdout problem, urban sprawl, and eminent domain,” Journal of 
Housing Economics 16 (2007), 309-319. 
 
377 When there are significant past investments in irrigation, collectives also collect an irrigation compensation fee. 
Some counties also collect additional fees, e.g. “grainland development fund” and “pension fund for commune 
members”, but those are retained by the county. 
 
378 Land Administration Law, art. 27; 28 (1986) (China). 
 
379 Here the market value I used means the price the state charges commercial users for the right to use the 
expropriated land. Under the new standards, the compensation fee is set at six to ten times the average yield of the 
land in the three years prior to the expropriation, and the resettlement fee is set at four to six times the average yield 
(with a maximum of fifteen times) Land Administration Law, art. 47 (China). 
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to region. 380  It is not unusual that rural residents are unaware of the total amount of 
compensation paid to the collective. 
 
Model 7: Let’s suppose that a household A with only one member hold land upon which 
the household plants apple trees. At the beginning, the household invests $5,000 on the trees, but 
still has to wait 5 years for the first apples to appear. From the 6th year, they will get $1,500 
annually for ten years. Using the same calculation above, the present value of the trees would be:  
 PV = $",!""(!!!%)!!"!!! !/ 1+ 2% != $12,200 
 
During the 30-year term, the investor could finish two cycles of investment, so the 
present value of the right would be:  
 
$12,200-$5,000 + ($12,200-$5,000) /! 1+ 2% !" = $7,200+ $6,521 = $13,721. 
 
In practice, crops like apple trees are deemed crops for an economic purpose, and the 
standard of compensation for green crops on the land would be decided by the average height of 
the trees. Let’s assume that in the fourth year, the government will take the land. Because there is 
no output yet, the household cannot get land compensation fees or resettlement allowance, which 
is measured by average output value of the preceding three years. The only type of compensation 
the household can get is for un-harvested crops. Usually, this compensation will be no more than 
future annual output, so the total compensation would be $1,500, which is much lower than the 
present value of the household’s investment.  
 
                                                
380 In some provinces, the collective kept the compensation fee for the land and past investments in irrigation and 
passed the resettlement allowance and crop compensation fee to the displaced rural residents. While in some other 
provinces, villages retain the entire expropriation fee, or entire expropriation fee is distributed to rural residents. See 
Lin, Developing China, 83-86.  
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Model 8: If the taking happens in the eighth year, compensation equals the average 
output value of the preceding three years – namely, $1,500. As the lowest rate, six times should 
be taken as the multiplier in measuring compensation for the land, while four times should be 
taken as the multiplier in measuring the resettlement allowance per capita. Therefore, the total 
compensation should be:  
 
TC=$16,500=$1,500×6 (land) + $1,500×4×1(resettlement)+$1,500 (green crops). 
 
Although the compensation cap for land compensation and resettlement is 30 times, the 
actual compensation should be $16,500=$1,500×11, not reaching the cap. 
 
Model 9: If the household includes two members, the result will be different.  
 
TC=$1,500×6 (land)+ $1,500×4×2(resettlement)+$1,500 (green crops). 
 
The actual compensation should be $1,500×15 = $22,500.  
 
Model 10: If, on the same land, the investors choose to plant wheat rather than apple 
trees, they would spend $750 and get $1,000 annually. Because they could get a profit of $250 
from the land every year, the present value of his right on land would be: 
 
PV= $"#$(!!!%)!!"!!! =$250×22.84 = $5,710. 
 
While, the compensation, as the same type of calculation, should be:  
 
TC=$1,000×6 (land) + $1,000×4×1(resettlement)+$1,000 (green crops) = $11,000. 
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For the same reason, the actual compensation would be $11,000=$1,000×11.  
By comparing Model 7 and Model 8, we can see the dramatic difference in the 
compensation between exactly the same type of crops expropriated at different times. This rigid 
compensation method shows the government’s ignorance of the expectation value and the actual 
investment of investors.  
By comparing Model 8 and Model 9, we can perceive that this system reflects significant 
equalitarian features. Although the target lands have the same expectation values, the total 
compensation in model 9 ($22,500) is 26.67% more than in Model 8 ($16,500), but the 
compensation per capita in model 9 ($11,250 = $22,500/2) is still 31.82% less than in Model 8. 
While if the investors get all compensation based solely on the land’s production, the 
compensation per capita for a two-member household will be only $16,500/2 = $8,250, 50% less 
than for a one-member household. 
By comparing Model 7 and Model 10, another type of unfairness of this arrangement is 
presented. If expropriation happens in the 4th year of their contract, the result will be 
outrageously different. The investment’s present value of Model 7 ($13,721) is larger than the 
counterpart in Model 10 ($5,710), but the compensation is only 13.64% of the latter.  
As reasoned above, although the legislators wanted to make a delicate equalitarian 
compensation system, the standards cannot reflect the actual differences. Or in other words, these 
statutory measures differ from and ignore rural right holders’ subjective value and the 
expectation value upon their land. In reality, since farmers who lose their lands would be unable 
to get agricultural land from other collectives, the subjective value would be much higher than 
the present value. 
To avoid these ridiculous results derived from the unpractical standards, local 
governments and collectives have to adjust the standards to meet rural residents’ requests. But 
because local governments and collective cadres are economically related to the transaction, their 
positions are hard to be neutral. Right holders with respective benefits bargained around these 
standards. On one hand, this bargaining sabotage the efficiency of China’s expropriation, on the 
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other hand; at least some encroached individuals pay for the cost of combating the entropy 
created by this legal disunity.  
 
g. The system of the Right to Use Housing Sites (RUHS) 
The right to use housing sites is strongly adhesive to the residents, and its system is also 
strongly equalitarian.381 The holder cannot sell his RUHS to the buyer who is a non-agricultural 
resident or other corporations; he cannot sell to the buyer who is the member of another 
collective, even if the buyer is also a resident. Moreover, if the collective does not approve the 
transaction, the transaction between members of the same collective is also nullified.382  
For the consideration of food security and environmental sustainability, however, the 
state has imposed considerable constraints over the rural collectives concerning the allocation 
and use of construction land. When allocating construction land to rural users, the collectives 
must comply with the township “overall land utilization plan” and the “annual land utilization 
plan.”383 This arrangement can be deemed as another kind of legal disunity as a result of which 
the transaction costs of reallocating the RUHS land is legally enhanced by the current 
arrangements. Another kind of “entropy” is created.  
In practice, as a qualified seller of RUHS, he must have two more houses in the 
                                                
381 Each rural household is allowed to possess only one residential plot (yihu yizhai), and housing construction must 
comply with the official size standards which vary from province to province. Land Administration Law, art. 62 
(China). 
  
382 By the end of 2002, China had had 694,515 villagers’ committees covering a total rural population of 935 
million. It is interesting to note that in 1988 some rural collectives began to levy a user’s fee on farmers’ housing 
sites similar to one introduced in cities by the urban housing reform. After many complaints, the state ended this 
practice in 1993 because it concluded that the fee placed an “unfair financial burden” on rural residents. Perhaps the 
state also realized that it was unfair for the collectives to charge rural residents for the use of the land they owned 
collectively.  
 
383 Land Administration Law, art. 59; 60 (China). The overall land utilization plan is a long-term plan (usually 10-15 
years) and consists of two maps (current land use and planned land use) and a set of explanatory notes. A top-down 
approach was used to develop the 1996-2010 plan. Based on population and other economic projections, the central 
government issued mandatory national targets on: (1) the conversion of farmland to construction land; (2) the 
development and reclamation of farmland; and (3) net change in farmland. The national targets were disaggregated 
and assigned to provinces and then downward to townships, and governments at lower levels were required to 
develop their plans to meet their assigned mandatory targets. See Lin, Developing China, 108. 
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village.384 Usually, after selling or even leasing the house, the seller or lessor would be incapable 
of applying for a new RUHS. The person who is entitled to apply the RUHS must fulfill at least 
one of three requirements: (1) the applier’s son or daughter needs an RUHS to construct a new 
household because of marriage; (2) the applier immigrated into the collective without an RUHS; 
or (3) the applier’s house was demolished because of catastrophe or for public welfare 
purpose.385 In addition, law also limits the RUHS areas in villages, and holders could not build 
houses exceeding the regulated standards.386 
This system indicates that the RUHS system has significant social security features. In 
the regulation, it emphasizes that, in rural areas, the buyer must possess at least two houses. The 
reason for that is a house or apartment in cities can circulate freely. If a villager who has an extra 
house in a city sells his RUHS in his village, he could also possibly lose his shelter by pledging 
or selling the house in city. Legislators worried that some people would lose their last shelter 
because of false investment; so, they sacrifice holders’ autonomy to avoid this tragedy. However, 
this regulation cannot actually protect rural residents. In some ways, it also hampers urbanization, 
and impairs rural workers’ migration ability. 
 
Model 11: Let’s suppose two rural residents A and B with their houses in suburban areas 
of, respectively, big cities X and Y; X is 500 miles far from Y. Both of them could only find jobs 
with $5,000 salary every year near their homes, while A finds a job in Y with a $10,000 income 
per year, and B also has an occupation with $10,000 as an annual salary in X. Usually, the value 
                                                
384 Land Administration Law, art. 62 (China)“One rural household can own one piece of land for building house, 
with the area not exceeding the standards provided for by provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities. 
Construction of rural houses shall conform to the general plans for the utilization of land of townships (towns) and 
the original land occupied by houses and open spaces of villages shall be used as much as possible for building 
houses.The use of land for building houses shall be examined by the township (town) people’s governments and 
approved by the county people’s governments. Whereas occupation of agricultural land is involved the examination 
and approval procedure provided for in Article 44 of this law is required.” 
 
385 In practice, the stipulations differ in different provinces. Usually, these local regulations are even more strict. 
 
386 Land Administration Law, art. 62 (China),  
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of houses in rural area is much lower than that of urban houses because the ownership of a city 
house belongs to the holder and can circulate freely, while the holder of house in a village just 
has an RUHS, and the circulation of the house is strictly constrained.  
Let’s also suppose the prices of houses in the two cities are $500,000. Because the burden 
of living is forbiddingly high, neither of them could take the chance to change their life by 
leaving their rural area. However, if they could exchange their RUHS’s, the problem will be 
resolved, although law forbids that.  
 
Model 12: It is arguable that they could lease their houses to each other for the same 
purpose, but there are still other unavoidable difficulties. Let us suppose that the opportunities 
500 miles away are not profitable jobs; but businesses, which mean they have to invest $300,000 
for an annual return of $20,000. The only assets they hold are just RUHS’s, but they could not 
deposit them as security to borrow money.387  
The motive of the RUHS might be paternalism, but it created another kind of legal 
disunity that prevents a market from efficiently allocating these properties. 
 
h. The implemental procedure of the expropriation and transaction of land 
 
An individual who wants to buy houses from the market can only get urban 
houses instead of rural houses upon a rural residents’ Housing Site.     —— XIANFA.388  
 
Model 13: Let’s suppose that a graduate student A finds a job in city X; so, he wants to 
buy a house and settle down there. The price of a house in the city is $500,000, while he can only 
afford $300,000. At the same time, B, a holder of an RUHS of a house in his village, very near 
city X does not need his house anymore because he has found a job in another city Y, but he 
                                                
387 Property Law art. 184, § 2 (China). 
 
388 The land use rights of collectively owned land by rural residents must not be grated or assigned to another party 
or leased out for non-agricultural. XIANFA art. 63 (1982) (China). 
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needs $200,000 immediately for his investment in that city. If there is no forbidding regulation 
here, they could engage in an exchange at any price between $300,000 and $200,000, which will 
produce $100,000 surplus for the society. 
 
i. Short Summary 
As shown above, instead of combating “entropy,” China’s current landownership system 
creates various legal disunities. Establishing a functioning market has not been a main interest of 
legislators. In their minds, a stable dualistic society and system might and maybe should be 
maintained, and the expropriation mechanism was devised to handle some rare cases. However, 
if the state wants to change its economic strategy and use the market as the main method to 
allocate land, these arrangements should be reconsidered.  
 
IV. Physical Disunity in Property  
Physical disunity or the physical partition of property means a type of coordination 
breakdown, in which a single resource has numerous rights holders who prevent others from 
using it, frustrating what would be a socially desirable outcome. Under China’s rural land 
circumstances, this type of problem is common, and it is introduced by the Household 
Responsible System. 
Although the HRS was a huge success at the beginning of Deng’s reforms, problem from 
the HRS have been noticed; in particular, the HRS has led to physical fragmentation in land.389 
Upon rural lands, a massive number of collectives and hundreds of million household now hold a 
bewildering number of types of rights, which have been created through the Agricultural 
Production Responsibility System (APRS) and later the HRS. Through these reforms, farmland 
                                                
389 Tin Nguyen, Cheng Enjiang and Christopher Findlay, “Land Fragmentation and farm productivity in the 1990s,” 
China Economic Review 7 (1996), 169-80; Kai Chen and Colin Brown, “Addressing shortcoming in the household 
Responsibility System: Empirical analysis of the Two-Farmland System in Shandong Province,” China Economic 
Review 12 (2001), 280-92; E. Reisch “Land reform policy in China: Political Guidelines,” in From peasant to 
entrepreneur: growth and change in rural China, ed. E.B. Vermeer (Wageningen, Netherlands: Pudoc, 1992), 15–20. 
 
 
164 
has been shared equally not only on an area basis, but also according to soil fertility. Thus, 
individual rural households cultivated land of various qualities in different locations. For 
example, in Pingdu City of Shandong Province, a county level city, most households cultivated 
more than seven pieces of land in 1988 even though their total farm area averaged only 10.5 
mu.390 
Much work has been done to address this problem; however, those discussions are more 
focused on the agricultural production problems like the difficulty of applying modern 
agricultural machines and pesticides across these disparate holdings. Truly, small-scale family 
farming, which limited the amount of land and capital used, is inefficient and hinders efforts to 
improve rural living conditions.  
But the problems are not limited in agricultural production. When the urbanization 
process becomes the main concern of the state, the colossal amount of small-scale land right 
holders hinders efficient land assembly, which is necessary for urban construction. In other 
words, this arrangement creates another kind of disunity in the land market: the physical disunity 
of property. As in the Wukan event, urban constructors face plenty of right holders with whom to 
bargain, if they want to exclude their rights legally.  
 This type of problem is called holdout problem or the tragedy of anticommons because 
of the huge amount of transaction costs. Efficiently reunifying those fragmented plots is 
prohibitively hard through bargaining and negotiation. Based on Parisi’s theory of entropy in 
property, a powerful mechanism like eminent domain is theoretically and practically needed 
under a fragmented rights circumstance to create a “positive transaction cost environment by 
developing rules that closely approximate the results the parties would have reached in a zero 
transaction cost world.”391 In this way, China’s expropriation mechanism can be rationalized due 
to the more fragmented property rights. However, this expropriation power is so powerful that it 
not only redresses the transaction cost variable but also distorts the supply-demand signals. There 
                                                
390 See Chen and Brown, “Addressing shortcoming,” 283. 
 
391 Parisi, “Entropy in Property,” 296. 
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may be a better way to address these problems.  
 
A. The holdout problem and the tragedy of the anticommons 
Large-scale developments often require the assembly of land whose ownership is 
dispersed. The common examples in the U.S. include public projects like highways and also 
private projects like big shopping centers and residential developments. A potential impediment 
to all such projects is the holdout problem, which arises when individual owners, realizing that 
they can impose substantial costs on the developer, seek prices well in excess of their true 
reservation prices, or expectation values. The inefficiencies of the holdout problem are from the 
delay costs and the probability of failed land exchanges.392 The holdout problem is a form of 
monopoly power,393 though it has also been characterized in terms of transaction costs394 and rent 
seeking. 395  This phenomenon in China is better to be labeled as the tragedy of the 
anticommons,396 which is more proper for the transitional age of China. In this way, it represents 
a form of market failure in the land market, which is a common problem in transitional countries 
whose targets are turning from a planned economy to a market economy. 
“Anticommons” refers to the case in which multiple owners of a resource each have the 
power of exclusion, making it difficult for anyone to establish the “full ownership” over a 
                                                
392 See Wolfgang Eckart, “On the land assembly problem,” Journal of Urban Economics 18 (1998), 264-378; 
Brendan O’Flaherty, “Land assembly and urban renewal,” Regional Science and Urban Economics 24 (1994), 171-
198; Paul G. Straub and J. Keith Murnighan, “An experimental investigation of ultimatum games: information, 
fairness, expectations, and lower acceptable offers,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 27 (1995), 
345-64; Flavio Menezes and Rohan Pitchford, “A model of seller holdout,” Economic Theory 24 (2004), 231-53; 
Thomas J. Miceli and Kathleen Segerson, “A bargaining model of holdout and takings,” American Law and 
Economics Review 9(2006), 160-74.  
 
393 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, sixth ed. (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2003): 55. 
 
394 Robert D. Cooter, The Strategic Constitution (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002): 289. 
 
395 Victor P. Goldberg, “Relational exchange, contract law, and the boomer problem,” Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics 141 (1985), 570-5. 
 
396 Michael A. Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx To Market,” 
Harvard Law Review 111 (1998): 621-28. 
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“bundle of rights” necessary for productive use of the resource.397 Although the vision of “empty 
storefronts and full kiosks” in post-Soviet Russia described in Professor Heller’s paper seldom 
happens in China, it is hard to deny that China’s land property rights are shattered among 
hundreds of million of right holders. China’s expropriation arrangement can be used as a 
mechanism that deprives those potential right holders’ of monopoly power and eliminates the 
transaction cost from bargaining. When an expropriation happens, one or several plots of land 
are transferred from a rural collective and thousands of rural residents to the state and sold to one 
developer. During these processes, various rights entitled by the APRS in the early 1980s lose 
protection from the state.  These original right holders are excluded from the target lands. 
By transferring the monopoly power to the state, the state pushes urban sprawl and 
economic growth without economic or legal resistance. This might be one of the reasons that 
China’s economy did not suffer as Russia did.  
 
B. How does the expropriation system work under the dual urban-rural 
landownership system? 
 
Model 14: Under the same assumption as Model 13, because an individual who is not a 
member of the collective has no chance to get an RUHS there, the only way to make the target 
lands and houses into a market, which means to make a house available to, say, urban resident A, 
is to expropriate the house and convert it into state-owned land. That does not mean that A is 
able to ask the state to expropriate rural resident B’s house, which in turn makes A be able to buy 
it directly. In practice, the government will only expropriate a huge tract of land, which includes 
lands upon which hundreds or more residents hold use rights.  
Because a residential purpose is a kind of commercial use for which expropriation is 
deemed appropriate, the government will transfer land use rights (Right to Use Construction 
Land) to commercial users (U2) for 70 years (the term of the RUCL). After deciding that, the 
                                                
397 Frank I. Michelman, “Ethics, economics, and the law of property,” Tulsa Law Review 39 (2003) 663-90. 
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government sells the right by auction. Because the price is usually high, only big developers are 
capable of bidding in these auctions.398  
After getting the rights, companies will demolish the original houses that belonged to 
rural residents before, and then construct new apartments or houses. Buyers like A can buy 
houses from these developer companies, while rural residents like B only get compensation from 
their collectives who get the fees from local government before allocating it to private villagers. 
During this process, city X sprawls. 
The two models’ circulations of rights and money are as below: 
 
(Figure 4.1) 
 
 
(Figure 4.2) 
As shown, there are at least three more intermediates between the buyer and the seller in 
                                                
398 Usually, people call the developer who buys its target plot with incredible amount of money through auction 
“diwang” (king of the land). 
                                                                      Payment 
 
Buyer Seller (Holder of RUHS) 
 
                                                                         House 
Model 13 
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Model 14. Based on the Coase Theorem, if the transaction cost is zero, the result will always be 
efficient whatever the arrangement of law. Let’s suppose the rural seller’s expectation value of 
his house is $150,000, and the buyer would like to pay no more than $500,000 to buy a house. 
Then the local government expropriates the ownership of the land that belongs to the collective, 
including the seller’s house, and pays compensation of $200,000 to each householder. A 
development company buys the RUCL for $300,000 and builds a new house, which costs 
$50,000. Finally, the buyer gets the new house at $450,000.  
While, if there are just the buyer and the seller in the market, as in Model 13, they could 
reach the deal at any price X between $450,000 and $150,000. Then the buyer reconstructs it at 
$50,000. The surplus from the deal is:  
 
$300,000= ($500,000-$50,000-X) (Buyer’s surplus) + (X-$150,000) (Seller’s surplus) 
 
In Model 14, the surplus from the series of conversation is also $300,000:  
 
$300,000= ($500,000-$450,000) (Buyer’s surplus) + ($450,000- $50,000-$300,000) 
(Developer’s surplus) + ($300,000- $200,000) (Local government’s surplus) + ($200,000- 
$150,000) (Seller’s surplus).  
 
Therefore, even if there are three more intervening participants in Model 14, the social 
surplus will not change. The difference is the allocation of the surplus from the deal, which 
means the original participants, the buyer and the seller, get less of the surplus from the deal. 
 
Model 15.1: Let us suppose the expectation value of the house is not $150,000, but 
$300,000, which is higher than the compensation from the government. Since the seller has no 
right to refuse the expropriation, he has to accept it at the price lower than his expectation value. 
Therefore, to the seller, the surplus from the expropriation is negative: 
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$200,000-$300,000 = -$100,000 
 
However, the total surplus of the series still could be positive, which is: 
 
$200,000 = ($500,000-$450,000) (Buyer’s surplus) + ($450,000- $50,000-$300,000) 
(Developer’s surplus) + ($300,000- $200,000) (Local government’s surplus) + ($200,000- 
$300,000) (Seller’s surplus)  
 
Therefore, even if some participants lose money in the transaction, the social surplus 
might still be positive so that the transaction as whole is efficient. The lost profit of the seller 
could be deemed as taxation imposed by the local government. China’s expropriation system 
works well from the point of the society, even if not for some specific participants. This makes 
the expropriation system morally controversial, but no social harm derives directly from this 
transaction. 
 
Model 15.2: Let’s suppose the expectation value of the house goes up to $500,000. Then 
the social surplus decrease to zero:  
 
$0= ($500,000-$450,000) (Buyer’s surplus) + ($450,000- $50,000-$300,000) 
(Developer’s surplus) + ($300,000- $200,000) (Local government’s surplus) + ($200,000- 
$500,000) (Seller’s surplus). 
 
In this condition, however, the transaction could still continue because the local 
government has the incentive to continue the transaction. The result is to build redundant 
projects, which means, although new buildings have been constructed, they have exactly the 
same value as the old ones. This could be a kind of waste, but still not inefficient.  
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Model 15.3: If the seller’s expectation value is higher than $500,000, that will cause 
inefficient transaction, which means valuable resources were allocated to the holders who do not 
need them that much.  
However, if local governments have no incentive to raise the compensation of 
expropriation, this type of inefficiency would last. If we can perceive the taxation in Model 15.1 
as helpful to social welfare, the taxation in Model 15.3 is harmful to the economy in that it 
creates an inefficient transaction – a kind of theft.  
 
C. A complementary mechanism: Put option 
One of the reasons for this kind of inefficient assembly problem is that the government 
and the developers cannot get valid information about residents’ expectation values. Residents 
have an incentive to lie about their subjective value to get more surplus from the assembly.  In 
this way, simple traditional wisdom can help if the government wants to solve the problem. 
Giving a put option to the seller is an ideal resolution to the deadlock caused by the invisibility of 
seller’s expectation value.  
 
Model 16.1: Let’s suppose a buyer wants to buy a piece of land at a price no more than 
$400,000, but he does not know the seller’s subjective expectation value. By giving the seller a 
put option, the buyer could ask the seller to make a choice of either dealing at the price of 
$400,000 or keeping the land. As a result, if the seller’s expectation value of the land is lower 
than $400,000, he will accept it because he will be better off, and the surplus from this 
transaction is the amount between his EV and the deal price $400,000. While, if his EV is higher 
than $400,000, he will keep the land, and an inefficient transaction will be avoided. 
 
Model 16.2: However, under the system of Model 14, this type of resolution could not 
work well. Suppose the local government gives the seller the put option of $200,000, then if the 
 
171 
EV of the seller is lower than $200,000, the transaction will continue smoothly. However, if the 
seller’s EV is higher, say $250,000, the transaction will be canceled. In fact, even if the EV is 
higher than the local government’s compensation, the social surplus could also be positive, as in 
Model 16.1. Therefore, although a put option is an effective way to measure the EV of the seller, 
that cannot guarantee that the system of Model 14 works smoothly. 
 
D. Inefficient Assembly: the downside of expropriation to handle physical disunity 
problem 
Although there are some flaws in the put option solution, it is obvious that it can avoid 
some kinds of serious inefficient assembly consequences from the expropriation system. 
However, the main problem here is that it does not specify who is entitled to extend the put 
option – local governments or developers. Because governments can earn from both efficient and 
inefficient assembly situations, they are indifferent with the results.   
The “ghost town” phenomenon in China can be seen as an example of this problem.  A 
ghost town is usually referred as an abandoned town or city that contains substantial visible 
remains. The reasons for becoming such a town include such factors as that the economic 
activity that supported the town has failed, or that natural or human-caused disasters such as 
floods or war have occurred. For most of these towns, they had at least a period of economic 
flourishing. However, in China, some towns or districts become ghost towns right after they are 
constructed.399 In these areas, big amount of settlements are vacant. Whether local governments 
admit these new urban districts are inefficient assembly programs, they made profits from them. 
 
V. The Reason for the Current Disunities: A Correction of Marxism Utopia   
                                                
399 Yifei Chen, “Zhuizong Zhongguo ‘Guicheng;’ Zhongguo Xiayibo ‘Xinchengqu’ Hui Zai Nali Chuxian (ȇǺ
‘Ƚ’;	Ŕ‘ęg’1ȘTŵ?) [Chasing Ghosts; Where is China’s Next Wave of Empty ‘New 
Towns’?]” South China Morning Post, February 13, 2015, accessed July 12, 2015, 
http://www.nanzaozhinan.com/media/china-ghost-
towns/tc/index.html?utm_content=buffer8be37&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=bu
ffer. 
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Although the expropriation system is far less than an ideal mechanism, it works as a 
necessarily complementary mechanism of the HCRS and the APRS to combat the entropy they 
have created. If these two basic landownership systems introduced in the early 1980s are the 
cause of the current holdout/anticommons problem, and in turn ushered in problems like the 
Wukan events by misusing the state’s necessary expropriation power, why were they introduced 
in the first place? The main argument of this chapter is that the HCRS and the APRS were 
introduced to correct the tragedy of the commons, which troubled China after the communist 
party seized power. Public landownership as a basic Marxist dogma guided the communist 
party’s governance, but the party failed its almost 30 years of explorations and experiments, 
which were haunted by the tragedy of the commons. Then the HCRS and the APRS were 
introduced as the main achievements of 1980s reform.  
 
A. What is the tragedy of the commons?: the relationship between commons and anticommons 
The “tragedy of the commons” is an economic theory that drew much attention from 
1968 when Garrett Hardin’s article was published.400 Different from Marxism, the assumption of 
this theory is that human values or ideas of morality do not change or need any change – that 
individuals acting independently and rationally according to their self-interest behave contrary to 
the best interests of the whole group by depleting some common resource.  
An induction from this theory is that the bigger the common good, the less clear are the 
boundaries of individual interests, and the bigger the group, the more that self-interested 
individuals would grasp and worsen the group. This theory can be used as a crucial attack on 
Marxist collectivism. Some non-Marxist observers, such as Derrick Jensen, criticize the idea as 
propaganda for private ownership. 
The phenomenon of the “tragedy of the anticommons,” first named by Michael Heller,401 
                                                
400 Garret Hardin, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 162 (1968): 1243-8. 
 
401 Heller, “The Tragedy of the Anticommons,” 621-28. 
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has become well known because of a central conception: the holdout problem. That phrase refers 
to a type of coordination breakdown in which a single resource has numerous right holders who 
prevent others from using it, frustrating what would be a socially desirable outcome. Contrary to 
the “tragedy of the commons,” the “tragedy of the anticommons” involves many self-interested 
individuals, rather than a centralized group, excluding each other’s utilization of the resource by 
claiming their clearly defined rights. 
In a “tragedy of the commons,” the problem is that rational individuals are led to overuse 
a commonly own resource. But in a “tragedy of the anticommons,” the problem is that rational 
individuals cannot cooperate so as to make cooperative, joint use of their resources. There will 
“underuse” of a valuable use in an anticommons situation.  
What is the relationship between the two problems? If they are rephrased in terms of 
variation in the right to exclude, it will be clear that they are two extremes on resource allocation. 
The commons problem arises because there is too limited a right to exclude, or a right is entitled 
on too many resources to exclude, while an anticommons problem arises when too many people 
have the right to exclude. In this way, these two problems can be on the pole of a spectrum about 
resource allocation. On both of the commons and the anticommons poles, where too many 
resources are put under one exclusionary right and too many exclusionary rights are entitled 
upon one resource, there are deadlocks that self-interested people cannot cooperate to achieve 
efficiency. And in between, tragedy does not happen. 
 
 
(Figure 4.3) 
Between the two poles, there should be a perfect balance between resources and the 
numbers of rights to exclude, under which individuals cooperate to achieve maximal output, but 
this ideal position is just theoretical. In practice, the combination between resource and the 
  Commons!Anticommons!
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amount of exclusionary rights vacillates around the ideal balance. To describe this spectrum, 
when there are fewer exclusionary rights than the balance, resources or properties are 
concentrated, and when more exclusionary rights appear, property rights scatter. In both of these 
two situations, transaction costs grow with the decrease or increase of the amount of 
exclusionary rights, but they can be conquered so that efficient resource allocations can be still 
achieved. However, when the mismatch between resources and exclusionary right numbers 
deteriorates in a certain degree, transaction costs become too huge that the tragedies of the 
commons or the anticommons happen. In these situations, a mature property system must have 
some mechanisms, which are incompatible with the original allocation, to break the deadlocks. 
Or the legislator has to make an overall resource reallocation to restart the whole property 
system. The eminent domain is a kind of inner adjuster of private ownership system, which also 
contradicts private ownership.  
 
 
 
(Figure 4.4) 
 
B. A hypothetical timeline: An application of the spectrum 
 From the middle of the last century, China’s landownership system has been changed 
dramatically. These changes are so deep and influential to a lot of aspects of the society. But for 
the purpose of this thesis, these changes can also be simply described by the match of land and 
the number of exclusionary rights upon it. Through this approach, the property spectrum can be 
used to analyze China’s landownership conditions behind other noneconomic issues like the 
ideology. By adding a timeline to the spectrum, a historical review on new China’s 
landownership system can be drawn.  
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(Figure. 4.5) 
 
C. The criterion of the spectrum: when did tragedies happen 
The difficulty of this approach that should be solved before the analysis is to recognize 
the two degrees of mismatch between land and the numbers of exclusionary rights. When these 
two degrees are hit, systematic malfunctions or “tragedies” happen. In other words, it should be 
determined that by what criterion China’s landownership can be put into the spectrum.  
For the purpose of this analysis, the object is mainly the rural area, and the standard used 
to rate the degree of mismatch is grain production.  
 
a. Why grain production? 
China has been the most populous country for a long time. Just until several decades ago, 
the subsistence problem was the first concern of every China governor, especially when massive 
wars disturbed normal production orders. The governors had to carefully and efficiently arrange 
the limited agricultural land to meet the basic demands of food. This was the case when 
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communist China was founded, after an uninterrupted 100-year period of international and civil 
wars. And during a short time after that, China’s population almost doubled, which aggravated 
the food pressure.402  
As illustrated in Chapter 2, China chose the planned economy strategy, under which a fast 
heavy industries-oriented development strategy launched. For the capital of this ambitious goal, 
the leaders of this miserable agrarian country did not have another alternative, but to maximize 
the tax levied upon agriculture. 
New China, as a member of the Communist-bloc countries, faced the blockade from most 
of the western industrial countries. And after the Sino-Soviet split in the early 1960s, China 
suffered extreme diplomatic isolation. Therefore, whether because of ideologically communist 
internationalism or practically diplomatic pressure, China made a large amount of foreign aid 
right after the new China was founded. And soon, as an undeveloped agricultural country, China 
became a net donor between the early 1960s and the end of the 1970s.403  
All of these pressures made grain production the main concern of the leaders to adjust 
their rural policies, including the landownership or land allocation system. The famous slogan 
“take grain as the key link,” which was first mentioned by Mao in 1958,404 echoed in China for a 
long time. Therefore, grain production was and should be a consistent standard to measure the 
landownership system. 
 
                                                
402 China’s population was 0.6 billion in 1953, and this number hit 1.0 billion in 1982. See Zhongguo Guojia Tongji 
Ju (¿ƱǠÈ) [National Bureau of Statistics of China], Diyi Ci Quanguo Renkou Pucha Gongbao (kT
(
KQA) [The Communiqué of the First National Census], November 1, 1954, accessed July 12, 2015, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjgb/rkpcgb/qgrkpcgb/200204/t20020404_30316.html; Zhongguo Guojia Tongji Ju (
¿ƱǠÈ) [National Bureau of Statistics of China], Disan Ci Quanguo Renkou Pucha Gongbao (kT(

KQA) [The Communiqué of the Third National Census], October 27, 1982, accessed July 12, 2015, 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjgb/rkpcgb/qgrkpcgb/200204/t20020404_30318.html. 
 
403 Shino Watanabe “Implementation System: Tools and Institutions,” in A Study of China’s Foreign Aid: An Asian 
Perspective, ed. Yasutami Shmomura and Hideo Ohashi (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 58-81. 
 
404 Bo Yibo (ǔŔ), Ruogan Zhongda Juece Yu Shijian de Huigu  (ǊÙș§QƠ/ƃȵ) [The Retrospect 
on Several Important Decision Makings and Events] (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe (*ŌTŮƍ) [People’s 
Publishing House], 1993), 723. 
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b. How to use grain production as a standard 
Various issues determine grain production, and the landownership system is just one of 
these issues. A more sophisticatedly quantificational study is needed to address other variables 
besides the landownership system. However, China’s grain production did suffered extreme 
difficulties right after dramatic legal changes happened. These changes can be described as some 
changes of the number of exclusionary rights upon land. As responses to these difficulties 
occurred, the leadership modified its policies, and soon after these modifications, grain 
production and other related economic conditions were ameliorated.   
For the purpose of this thesis, the property spectrum is a descriptive theory of the 
relationship between China’s historical economic difficulties or tragedies and their related 
changes of landownership system. Therefore, the boundaries between acceptable shatter or 
concentration, and the two tragedy areas, the 0.5 and -0.5 marks only exit theoretically. There are 
very few fine lines in the real world. Even if the most accurate study can be done, a quantitative 
definition of when commons or anticommons problem occur will always be controversial. The 
only measurable variables are the number of exclusionary rights and grain produced, but not 
normative degrees between them.  
Even though the marks on the spectrum might be arbitrary, it does not compromise its 
descriptive purpose. The reason that China’s leadership changed its strategy was probably not 
because it recognized commons or anticommons problems. But its responsive countermeasures 
against difficulties did change the numbers of exclusionary rights on land. Therefore, a historical 
review of this theoretical spectrum is capable of furthering the analysis. 
 
D. A historical review of new China’s rural landownership system 
After clarifying the spectrum, a historical review on China’s rural landownership or 
allocation system can be drawn. The land allocation condition in every certain period will be put 
in the spectrum. This work helps trace the process of landownership system change ignoring 
other less relevant issues.  
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c. Pre-1949 and National Land Reform in 1952 
Just as the eighteenth-century French Revolution had destroyed the power of the landed 
aristocracy and removed feudal institutions hindering the growth of bourgeois property, the 
Chinese Communist revolution in the countryside, by expropriating the landlords and 
redistributing land among the peasantry, created a massive class of individual peasant proprietors 
engaged in pretty capitalist production. This progress was called “Land Reform,” which had been 
implemented in communist occupied areas before 1949, and mainly completed in Mainland 
China in 1952. By that time, Peng Pai’s political ideal, which he promised to his fellows 25 years 
ago, came true.  
Before the reform, the landlords, taking 4 percent of the rural population, owned about 30 
percent of the cultivated land.405 4 million households and approximately 20 million people were 
qualified as landlords by the government, whose members were averagely entitled to 26.32 mu 
(4.3 acre) cultivated land per capita.406 Even for an agrarian country, where the incomes were 
mainly from agriculture, this degree of concentration might not be horrible, and there were also 
tremendous variations within the landlord class. Take Liu Wencai for sexample. He was labeled 
as an evil symbol for accusing landlords of unjustified exploitation for a long time. He got 12063 
mu (1987 acre) cultivated land. 407   However, he did not gain capital from agricultural 
production, but from opium trade and levying tax through controlling a local military force. 
Investment on lands was more like a method of storing wealth. This was also true for other huge 
landlords. It was hard for normal landlords to build wealth solely from agricultural production. 
                                                
405 Maurice Meisner, Mao’s China and After: A History of the People’s Republic of China, Third Edition (New York: 
Free Press, 1999), 93. 
 
406 See Wu Li (ŉ^), “Shilun Jianguo Yilai Nongye Shengyu ji qi Fenpei Zhidu de Bianhua (Ǭǧã,ĵO\
6vJUȗZßƃye) [On the Agriculture Surplus since 1949 and the Transition of Its Allocation System]” 
Fujian Shifan Daxue Xuebao (Zhexue Shehui Kexue Ban) (f96r,00A(%0eg0\)) [Journal of 
Fujian Normal University (Philosophy and Social Science Ed.)], 3 (2004): 8-16. 
 
407 Xiao Shu (Ɲǖ), Liu Wencai Zhenxiang (E;b`) [The Truth about Liu Wencai] (Xi’an: Shanxi Shifan 
Daxue Chubanshe (ȫǚÕǋ§²TŮƍ) [Shaanxi Normal University Press], 1999), 189. 
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Or in other words, it was improbable for landlords to assembly large piece of land from the legal 
land market. Therefore, even if there were some degree of land concentration in pre-1949 China, 
lands were not so concentrated to create the tragedy of the commons. Then the pre-1949 position 
on the spectrum should be far from the warning level of commons problem.  
In 1953, with the completion of the land reform campaign, China was basically a land of 
individual peasant owner-cultivators. A modern Communist state, ironically, had recreated the 
traditional Chinese utopia of a system of more or less equal family-owned and operated farms. 
Although there remained socioeconomic differences between the majority of poor peasants, a 
substantial body of “middle peasants,” and a small minority of “rich peasants,”408 differences in 
land holdings and income were relatively small that landlords and other rural elites disappeared. 
Or in the words of the spectrum, more exclusionary rights were entitled to the land, and the 
position of 1953 moves down. In any way, landownership shattered.  
As declaimed by the Agrarian Reform Law, the land reform’s purpose was “to set free the 
rural productive forces, develop agricultural production.”409 Rather than combating the commons 
problems caused by land concentration, it is more proper to say the reform tried to terminate 
inequity in rural areaa. However, this is not the end of the story. Also claimed in the same article, 
“pave the way for New China’s industrialization” was the long-range goal of the reform.410  
                                                
408 In the land reform political vocabulary, “rich peasants” meant a group of people that they cultivated the lands by 
themselves or by hiring labor, and also rented to tenant farmers. But if leased land did not exceed in size the amount 
cultivated by them and hired laborers, their land would not be confiscated. The tricky thing is this category was 
introduced from the Soviet Union’s conception “кулак”. It can be loosely translated as “tightfisted person” who 
referred to the people who did not want to contribute to the kolkhoz (collective farm). It does not contain the 
meaning of ”rich” or “wealthy.”  But in China, this conception was used before the campaign of agricultural 
cooperation movement.  
 
409 Tudi Gaige Fa (ďȱœ) [Agrarian Reform Law] (promulgated by the Cent. People’s Gov. Comm., June 28, 
1950, effective June 28, 1950), art. 1, CLI.1.129481 Chinalawinfo (China). 
 
410 Ibid.   
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(Figure 4.6) 
 
d. 1956’s Socialist Agrarian Reform and 1959’s Great Leap Forwards 
Modernization and, especially industrialization were never planned to originate from 
rural areas. The Soviet model of industrialization was deemed as the ideal path, and Soviet-type 
forms of political organization and state administration were logically constructed during this 
period. By early 1955 the Communists saw peasant individualism as not only a barrier to social 
change in the countryside, but as a hindrance to the development of the national economy. 
In rural areas, the Communists never assumed that land reform alone would result in 
either the necessary economic revolution in agricultural production or the desired social 
reorganization of the rural areas. From the beginning they saw land reform as a necessary but 
transient stage in a process that would lead to the collectivization of agriculture. But they viewed 
the transformation from individual peasant proprietorship to collective farming as a long-term 
Pre"1949!
1953,&National&Land&Reform!
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process that would proceed gradually through three distinct phases of development. The first step 
would be the organization of mutual aid teams whereby the members of about six or more 
households would assist each other in the working of their still individual family farms, initially 
on a seasonal basis and later as a year-round organization, serving to enlarge the working unit 
and to forge patterns of cooperative work. Second, mutual aid teams would combine into “semi-
socialist” or “lower” agricultural producer cooperatives where land would be pooled and farmed 
cooperatively, although each family would retain private ownership of land and families would 
divide the crop (or its proceeds) partly in accordance with the labor contributed and partly 
according to the amount of property pooled. Finally, “lower” cooperatives eventually would be 
amalgamated into “higher” or “advanced” cooperative farms, i.e., collectives, which would 
abolish private landownership and remunerate its members in accordance with the socialist 
principle of “to each according to one’s labor.” This was the theoretical and ideological origin of 
the rural collective.  
Therefore, right after the Land Reform, the Communist party started another Socialist 
Agrarian Reform. And this progress was even faster than the reform before. By the end of 1956’s 
summer, some 100 million peasants households (or 90 percent of the rural population) were 
members of approximately 485,000 collective farms, officially called “higher-stage agricultural 
producer cooperatives.” Virtually all the rest were drawn in before the spring planting of 1957. 
Except for tiny plots that individual households tilled for their own consumption or for sale on 
the limited private market, private land ownership was abolished and all peasants, at least in 
theory, worked the land collectively in accordance with the principle of “equal pay for equal 
work.”411 
Compared to four million landlord households, the number of collective farms was much 
smaller, and these collective farms held much more cultivated land than their obsolete 
counterparts. Therefore, lands were assembled again. It is hard to determine whether commons 
problem occurred at that time because that period was so ephemeral that the reform’s effect on 
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agricultural production is hard to measure.  However, even most enthusiastic Party leaders felt 
that rural cooperatives were being established too hastily, and it hurt people’s zeal in production. 
Therefore, it might be reasonable to assume that the numbers of exclusionary rights decreased in 
a degree that hit the warning line.   
Contrary to most of his comrades’ judgments, Mao declared the movement was 
proceeding too slowly.412 Then a more ambitious progress the “Great Leap Forward” was 
announced. By 1958, virtually the entire rural population was organized into some 24,000 
people’s communes, which had emerged from the hasty amalgamation of 750,000 collective 
farms. The position on the spectrum from private land to collective land was pushed rapidly 
forwards. At this time, the typical tragedy of the commons happened. For example, peasants 
from richer collectives resented the economic leveling that resulted from their amalgamation 
with peasants from poorer collectives; and they expressed their dissatisfaction by slaughtering 
and consuming farm animals instead of turning them over to the commune. And peasants also 
resented arbitrary work assignments, inequities in remuneration, and inefficient management of 
mess halls and other communal facilities. As a protest, they tried their best to consume and waste 
more foods, actions that they would probably not have done when they managed these by 
themselves.413 And, still applying the grain production standard, the 1960’s output of grain was 
26% less than in 1957.414  
The new communes were not merely productive organizations but were also new social 
organizations that combined economic, cultural, political and military affairs and thus merged 
“workers, peasants, merchants, students, and militiamen into a single entity.” Rural residents 
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from different villages were brought together in production brigades and work teams that 
functioned with military-like discipline to perform specialized tasks, with labor organized as in a 
modern factory. However, the principal feature was the intensive mobilization of labor and the 
lengthening of the working day.  
The most radically utopian aspect of communization was the role assigned to the 
communes in the reorganization and exercise of political power. The commune’s appropriation of 
the administrative functions of the Xiang (township) was interpreted as making the commune a 
political unit “performing the functions of state power” and “the most desirable organizational 
form” for the period of the transition from socialism to communism.415 However, this attempt 
failed. 
 
(Figure 4.7) 
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e. 1960’s Retreat from the Great Leap and after 
Without any anticipation of the difficulty in agriculture, the implementation of China’s 
fast heavy industries-oriented development strategy did not stop until 1960. Huge amounts of 
agricultural products were exported for modern industrialization materials. This aggravated 
domestic difficulties. Three years of Great Famine hit unprepared China in 1960, during which at 
least 15 million excess deaths happened.416 Even worse, the number of famine victims might 
have been 45 million.417  Facing this appalling result, Mao had to retreat from his flinty stance. 
The Great Leap ceased.  
The abandonment of the famous Great Leap did not result in the abolition of the rural 
people’s communes, although it did result in a drastic reduction in their size. The 24,000 
communes were broken down into approximately 74,000 units, each with about 1,600 
households, and each corresponding roughly to the old township structure and the traditional 
rural marketing area.418  While these communes remained as political units, their original 
socioeconomic functions were emasculated. The basic work unit was progressively reduced from 
the commune as a whole to the production brigade, roughly the old village structure, and finally 
to the production team. By the beginning of 1962 the team, consisting of about twenty or thirty 
households (the equivalent of the former “lower” agricultural producer cooperative), was 
established as the principal unit for the organization of labor and production.419  
After these readjustments, the famine stopped. At the same time, because of the reduction 
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of the communes’ size, and smaller production team becoming the basic accounting unit, the 
number of exclusionary right increased. And this basic landownership system, as a main part of 
the rural social order in Mao’s era, mainly maintained till Mao’s death. The commons problem 
got better, but it is too hasty to say this problem was solved during this period. In fact, plenty of 
rural peasants kept struggling to afford a minimal standard of life. Therefore, the position on the 
spectrum should be not far from the warning line.  
 (Figure 4.8) 
 
f. 1978’s Reform and Later 
In 1978 and 1979, some unprompted experiments on agricultural production and land 
allocation secretly took place. The most famous example happened in Xiaogang village, Anhui 
province, which was so poor a village that its own agricultural output could not feed the residents 
there. At that time, the local cadres secretly allowed peasants to produce by household. In return, 
the 18 households involved agreed to take care of the families of the cadres if their illegal 
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scheme was discovered, and they were punished. Some provincial party leaders did not zealously 
restrain these heterodox practices, which continued to decrease the size of the agricultural units 
down to the basic household.420 As a result, peasants were motivated, and agricultural production 
substantially increased in these provinces where these experiments survived. The new leadership 
noticed this satisfactory improvement, and then endorsed and promoted it to the whole nation. 
This new institutional change was called the “household contract responsibility system” (HCRS).  
A miracle happened almost right after the promotion of the new policy.  At that time, 
China did not stop extracting the surplus form villages to finance the modern economic 
development of the nation. Not only the modern economic development but also the increasing 
pressure from growing population needed agricultural production’s supports. However, these 
needs were met so soon after the reform that the government was yet prepared to purchase all 
peasants’ surplus gain they planed to sell. This was inconceivable during Mao’s era.   
Back to the spectrum’s point of view, the number of exclusionary rights dramatically 
increased. Compare to 1953’s condition, the number was much bigger. Different from the Land 
Reform’s reallocation and privatization, the 1982 new Constitution stipulates that all rural 
landownerships belong to rural collectives, and the state also holds the right to expropriate rural 
lands. There are more exclusionary rights than what rural residents hold. Thus, not only 
physically, but also legally the rural landownerships shattered. Even though 1982’s position 
moved further down in terms of fractionated holdings, in no way did it cross the anticommons 
warning line.    
The communes existed in name only. Later, the 1982 Constitution officially transferred 
the administrative functions of the communes to township or county governments, as units of the 
central state administration, not as a kind of landowners. The original production brigades, or 
villages became the collective holders of rural landownership.  From that point on, the current 
landownership system was established. 
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(Figure 4.9) 
 
E. Short Summary 
As I showed in the historical review, the number of exclusionary rights dramatically 
changed several times during a very limited time. However, the main problem on which these 
reforms focused was the commons problem; the anticommons problem did not happen: Even the 
current landownership system, which shattered land rights to the highest level, was established to 
release the pressure from concentrated communes’ power. And if the grain production standard is 
applied, the current system is a success. As I showed above, the rural collective landownership 
system is at least partly the vestige of the communes in Mao’s era. The new leadership after Mao 
did not want a clear separation from prior ideology that communes were still maintained in the 
1982 Constitution. The system persisted until 1993, when it was finally replaced by the HCRS 
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when the reform took place ten years later.421 Therefore, it was political or ideological concerns, 
not practical economic concerns, that led China to create more exclusionary rights, held by rural 
collectives and the state, upon rural lands,.  
 
VI. A explanation of the Wukan cases: urbanization and the movement of the spectrum 
 
After the early 1980s reform, the current landownership system has been established 
without main changes for more than 30 years. It successfully solved the commons problem in 
landownership and especially the grain production areas, although secretly imported the dangers 
of its contrary, the tragedy of the anticommons. However, problems emerged in the late 1990s. 
When people’s attentions were drawn on the first fruit of reform, “mass events” like the Wukan 
case, corruption, and violent demolition became the key words. The state’s expropriation power 
was widely thought to be the cause of these scandals.  
As analyzed before, the economic justification for the expropriation system is that it may 
help efficient assemblies of land or conquer the anticommons problems. But why did these 
problems not emerge in the first years when the current system was established? The main 
argument here is that China’s urbanization process and a series of related reforms moved the 
original spectrum, and in turn the increased exclusionary rights introduced in the early 1980s 
gradually produced the anticommons problems during the motion.  At the same time, the 
expropriation system also changed its role from an ideological icon to a pragmatic tool, which 
was practically used to balance the hypercorrection of the HCRS and the APRS on the commons 
problems.  
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(Figure 4.10) 
In this way, the problems caused by the state’s expropriation power are the manifestations 
of a deeper question: in the current urbanization period, how to efficiently combat the entropy of 
property interests and to counteract the assembly disunities introduced by the HCRS and the 
APRS.  
 
A. What happened in the middle 1990s: a series of reforms not directly related to  
landownership 
Although the landownership system was settled, China did not stop its pace of reform. 
The common features of these new policies were that they helped China gradually transfer from 
being a planned economy with a heavy industries-oriented development strategy to a market-
oriented economy. During this process, China restarted its urbanization process. After the 
Tiananmen Tragedy in 1989, China’s reform stagnated for a short period, but Deng Xiaoping 
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restarted it in 1992.422 A series of new policies were issued from that point on.  
 
a. Open the inland areas 
In late May 1992, after Deng’s talks from the southern tour (nanxun jianghua) were 
published, the party center issued Document No. 4 designed to implement Deng’s Policies. It 
announced the opening of five inland cities along the Yangtze River as well as nine border cities, 
and states that all thirty provincial and prefectural capital cities would enjoy the same privileges 
as the special economic zones.423 Before that, only several coastal cities enjoyed those privileges, 
such as attracting foreign capital, setting up research institutions with foreign entities, and being 
entitled of using more foreign currency.  From then on, China opened its gate to almost all major 
cities.  
 
b. Diversify the sources of foreign capital 
At the beginning, the earlier pack of open cities all located near Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
This arrangement facilitated businessmen from the two areas, which had special relations with 
Mainland China. In fact, during that time, investments from Hong Kong took more than 80 
percent of the whole foreign investments.424 This situation changed in 1990s, when more foreign 
investors, especially competitive ones, recognized the business opportunities in China, and 
invested directly because new open policies established its credibility after the prior period.    
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c. Tax-sharing Fiscal Reform 
In March 1994, the central government took action to introduce a new “tax-sharing 
system,”425 under which local governments are requested to pay a tax that is proportionate to the 
output generated instead of a fixed amount as before. Under this new system, central government 
claimed a larger share of tax revenue without increasing its financial input in local 
developmental affairs.426  
To bear the burden of investment in economic infrastructure with little or no input from 
the central state, local governments’ only choice left was the sale of the land for which local 
governments are delegated by the central state with the power for expropriation, allocation, and 
conveyance.427  
d. Graduates work assignment Reform 
A college degree in China was once as rare and valuable as jade. In 1995, only 7 percent 
of 18- to 22-year-olds attended universities. Then in 1999, China implemented a policy to double 
the number of college students – both to make higher education more accessible and to help fight 
off the Asian economic crisis by keeping young people out of the job market temporarily.428 
Before this period, the state assigned a job to every college graduate, and they did not have 
another choice. Once they got the jobs assigned, their Danwei, mainly the state-owned 
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employers, provided them temporary dormitories, and then they waited for their official housing 
assigned from their Danwei.  
The increasing liberalization of China’s economy led to state-owned enterprises’ being 
put into competition with private enterprise and, increasingly, foreign corporations. And some of 
them failed. In the middle of the 1990s, state-owned enterprise reform took place so that plenty 
of state-owned loss-generating enterprises were sold or went bankrupt. Massive workers were 
“laid off,” put “off the post,” or in Chinese’ official term “xiagang” as a euphemism for urban 
unemployment. From then on, China could not afford to assign graduates jobs.429 Then they lost 
their housing providers, and had to turn their attentions to the real market, and take care of 
themselves.  
e. Welfare Housing Reform 
For those “happy few” who found their Danwei, which is supposed to provide housing, 
the good times did not last long. 
Before the 1980s, the Danwei, which can be loosely translated as “work unit,” was the 
basic unit of economic, social and spatial organization in which economic activity, social life, 
and political control were integrated in China.430 At that time, these units were all institutions 
managed or directly supervised by the party or the government. Apart from salary, the Danwei 
provided employees a comprehensive package of welfare and services, including housing.431 
From the 1980s, the market-oriented economic reform gradually changed the Danwei and its 
dominance in employment. As time went by, market-based employment organizations such as 
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joint-ventures, which were partly invested in by  foreign investors, and privately owned firms 
emerged and employed an increasingly large share of the work force. Different from the 
traditional Danwei, these new employment organizations pay salaries but usually do not provide 
employees with housing. 
The market-oriented economic reforms also changed the Danwei so that, as an important 
factor of the reform, the welfare housing reform aims at gradually removing the housing function 
of the Danwei. As illustrated in Chapter 2, these state-owned Danwei acquire urban land from 
state allocation (huabo) by paying less, and their rights are without time limits. Although thereby 
enjoying a huge advantage, these welfare housings could not quite meet employees’ needs; they 
had to wait several years to get housing after they began their careers. Furthermore, conflicts 
about how to fairly allocate the limited housing always haunted this inefficient welfare method. 
Then, in its early stages, housing reform focused on the selling of Danwei houses to sitting 
employees.432 Later around 1998, Danwei were discouraged from building their own housing. 
Instead, development companies, like Country Garden in the Wukan case, were established to 
undertake urban housing construction in the form of large residential estates,433 and the housing 
market was launched.  
 
f. TVEs’ rise and fall 
After solving the food problem in the early 1980s, besides the elite graduates, massive 
surplus rural laborers were released, and then, at least partly, absorbed by the township and 
village enterprises (TVEs). 
TVEs are rural community (township or village level) enterprises that, in principle, are 
owned by local residents but, in fact, are controlled by community governments.434 When 
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communes were abolished, the small commune workshops and commercial stores automatically 
became enterprises under the jurisdiction of the newly reestablished towns and villages. The 
TVEs started from there. In 1992, the value of TVE production was reported to be 1798 billion 
yuan, almost fifty times as much as 1978’s commune enterprises’ production435 By 1994 the 
TVEs comprised 42 percent of China’s industrial output.436 
In the middle of the 1990s, however, the profit per capita of TVEs began falling and 
eventually China witnessed the large-scale privatization of TVEs. According to a recent survey, 
65 percent of these firms were privatized between 1993 and 2000.437  
Several reasons have been offered to explain the rise and fall of TVEs. First, with 
community government assistance, TVEs were thought to have better access to bank loans than 
did other business entities.438 During that period, China’s banking system essentially functioned 
as government cashiers and operated on political rather than commercial principles. These 
principles expressed themselves through “ideological discrimination” wherein state banks 
favored lending to TVEs.439 Second, by using the government’s political power and their own 
collective identity, TVEs were believed to have easier access to state-owned enterprises and 
better access to inputs that were in short supply.440 Under this circumstance, some private 
entrepreneurs donated their own factories to the collective so that they could enjoy these 
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privileges.  
By 1994, these advantages vanished. The private market was embraced in a market 
system in which the rule of law and equal treatments became the guiding principles. For 
example, banking reforms were initiated that provided banks with incentives to allocate scarce 
financial resources to the most productive uses: In essence, the reforms made banks independent, 
profit-driven units. The impetus for such a move was likely to have been engendered by the 
TVEs increased debt levels and poor debt servicing behavior. Local governments started to use 
market forces to discipline TVE performance.441 Under these pressures, TVEs lost their ability to 
absorb rural labors. Then most of them were forced to leave their hometown and migrate to big 
cities.  
g. Labor Migration and big cities’ sprawl 
According to a survey conducted in1987, because of TVEs, small towns have been the 
most important destination for rural migrant workers, accepting 41% of rural to urban migration 
during 1982-1987, which was ahead of either those accepted by cities (33%) or the countryside 
(26%).442 As the towns continue to grow, many of them have reached the official threshold for 
the designation of a city and have indeed been upgraded to small cities. 
However, with the fall of TVEs, a city-centered and land-based urban expansion has 
gradually taken place through big cities, instead of the countryside where rapid industrialization 
and urbanization happened throughout the 1980s and the early 1990s. Migrant laborers started to 
rush into big cites so much that China’s recent urbanization are divided into two parts: 
“urbanization from the below” and “super cities sprawl.” 
 
B. The effects of these reforms on land 
The series of reforms above profoundly affected the commercial urban land market, and 
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in turn, the whole landownership system. Firstly, from the labor side, the rural lands, which used 
to be the main workplace, could not absorb the rural surplus labor, neither by traditional 
agricultural production, nor by TVEs anymore. And the original methods of transforming rural 
residents into urban residents, such as job assignments and welfare housing allocation, could not 
meet demands of educated laborers. All of these surplus laborers created huge demands for urban 
land as both work place and housing.  
Secondly, from the land side, the Danwei’s demands for traditional non-commercial 
allocated housing land were prohibited. At the same time, foreign-backed investments and 
privatized TVEs enterprises needed more non-collective owned urban commercial land. 
Additionally, local governments also needed more revenue from commercial land to finance their 
daily work. Every one and every sector was under pressure to accommodate change.  
In this way, these reforms, can be categorized as below: 
 
 
Reforms in the middle of 1990s 
 
 
Effects on Urban Commercial Land 
Market 
Open the inland areas (1992) Increase: Commercial Lands Demands 
Sources of foreign capitals (middle 1990s) Increase: Commercial Lands Demands 
Tax-sharing fiscal reform (1994) Increase: Commercial Lands Demands 
Graduates work assignment reform (1996) 
Increase: Commercial Lands Demands 
Shrink: Allocation Lands for U1 
Welfare housing reform (1998) 
Increase: Commercial Lands Demands 
Shrink: Allocation Lands for U1 
TVE’s fall (late 1990s) 
Increase: Commercial Lands Demands 
Shrink: Rural Construction Land 
Migrant labors into big cities (late 1990s) 
Increase: Commercial Lands Demands 
Shrink: Rural Agricultural Land 
(Figure 4.11) 
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To sum up, although the main landownership or the first time allocation, which was 
settled in the early 1980s, has not changed, China’s reforms in the 1990s required a new round of 
reallocation, or a second-time allocation of the land. During this process, plenty of rural land had 
to be transferred into urban use. However, under the dual landownership system fracture, the 
land market could not legally achieve this goal because the “land market” was limited in the 
urban commercial land sector. The expropriation mechanism; therefore, was under heavy 
pressure to reallocate land. 
 
 
(Figure 4.12) 
 
At this time, although China did not abandon its strategy of gathering capital from 
agriculture to implement its industrialization, the output it needed from rural area was not grain 
production anymore, but labor and land. The burgeoning number of exclusionary rights that 
attended rural land was making it increasingly difficult to accommodate this main change. For 
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the urban land uses, such as factory building or urban housing construction, land needed to be 
assembled in a much higher amount that could come from household farming. Therefore, the 
spectrum moves upwards, and with the movement of the spectrum, China’s main land conflict 
became the anticommons problem. If the dual landownership system does not change, this 
problem will continue to hamper China’s industrialization process.   
This is the economic reason why mass events like the Wukan case massively emerged 
from the late 1990s on. The expropriation changed from an ideological icon to a pragmatic tool 
to handle the anticommons problems, to maintain the current landownership system, and, in 
Parisi’ words, to combat the entropy created by the HCRS. 
 
C. Short Summary  
In Mao’s blueprint for China’s development, communes were the “golden bridge” to a 
truly communist society in which the state or the people as a whole would finally become the 
owner of all resources. Contrary to his expectation, communes’ lands were divided and allocated 
to rural residents after his death, as he had done to the landlords’ lands. However, he is not totally 
betrayed by his successors that collectives are still the legal owners of rural owners, although 
plenty of exclusionary rights are added upon the ownerships. In some ways, the current 
landownership is a compromise between the conservatives and reformers in the 1980s. Since that 
time, this system has led China out the tragedy of the commons and helped China solve the food 
problem. It has also planted the dangers of the anticommons problem, although those issues did 
not emerge for a while. 
After the second series of reforms in the middle of the 1990s, lands, instead of food, 
became the main capital the urban areas needed for urbanization. With this change, higher 
concentrated lands were needed so that the commons/anticommons spectrum moved upwards. 
And also with this change, the increased exclusionary rights introduced in the early 1980s’ 
landownership system created the new anticommons problems. Under this circumstance, rural 
residents’ newly entitled land rights, as the “atypical property arrangement” as articulated by 
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Parisi, are provided with justifiably “less extensive property-type.” They become vulnerable 
before the state’s expropriation power. Although the expropriation system cannot solve all types 
of legal and physical disunities, it is justified even from the pure law and economics’ viewpoint. 
Then the further question is whether there is a better mechanism that can be found to combat the 
entropy and mitigate the tenseness of expropriation.    
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CHAPTER FIVE  
A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TO EXPROPRIATION: LAND ASSEMBLY DISTRICT INSTITUTION  
 
 
I. The Criticisms of Expropriation and the Requirements of Better Alternatives 
 
As analyzed above, the expropriation mechanism is now being used to combat the 
entropy created by the early 1980s’ HCRS, and to solve the anticommons problems that emerged 
in the middle 1990s. Nonetheless, just as the anticommons problems were not anticipated by the 
legislators, the expropriation mechanism was not well devised on purpose. It has its own 
limitations that make it inappropriate as a solution to all types of disunities of China’s 
landownership system. For example, simply transforming rural land into urban land cannot 
eliminate individuals’ short-term behavior, because as urban real right holders, they still cannot 
enjoy the privileges of absolute ownership. Therefore, the expropriation system, even though it 
works perfectly well in a limited sense, can only help to efficiently assembly fragmented rural 
lands, or physical disunities, and at the same time, remove collectives’ interruptions to 
individuals’ rights.  
But even for the limited assembly purpose, the current expropriation system works 
imperfectly. Mass events like the Wukan case provide examples of these shortcomings. Based on 
these criticisms, there is a case to be made for further adjustments to the mechanism or for the 
shaping of other alternatives. In this chapter, I shall discuss these requirements and alternatives.    
 
A. Law and Economics Requirement: A deeper analysis on the anticommons problem 
The first and foremost mission of any expropriation mechanism and other alternatives 
should be to solve the anticommons problem or the holdout problem. For this specific purpose, a 
more careful analysis about the anticommons problem or holdout problem should be done. What 
would happen if there were no expropriation mechanism? Or if the expropriation mechanism 
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works, what does it do?  
 
a. The number of sellers and costly delay 
Under common market conditions, the main concern of the holdout problem is assembly 
costs and the probability of failed agreements. We can expect both of these to increase with the 
number of sellers.443 
Based on Miceli and Sirmans’s model,444 costly delay is a likely consequence of projects 
involving land assembly. Delay costs speed up the agreement, and also result in a significant loss 
in the buyer’s final earnings. Further, it is almost certainly the case that this cost will rise with the 
number of parcels that need to be purchased. Therefore, developers will prefer locations where 
ownership is less dispersed, all else equal. Competition significantly increases the buyer’s 
expected payoff. This is also proved by experimental evidence by John et al.445  
 
b. The number of sellers and the allocation of surplus 
Based on Cadigan, Schmitt, Shupp and Swope’ s model,446 we have more predictions: As 
the number of sellers increases, the buyer’s optimal offer to each seller decreases, the sum of the 
shares offered to sellers increases, the probability of a successful exchange decreases, and the 
buyer’s expected payoff decreases. However, there is no significant negative relationship 
between a buyer’s final earnings and the number of sellers.  
 
c. Sellers’ ignorance of externality and their cooperation 
As the number of sellers increases, the individual seller’s equilibrium demand from the 
buyer decreases, the sellers’ joint demand on the buyer increases, and the probability of a 
                                                
443 Eckart, “land assembly problem,” 274-378; Straub and Murnighan, “An experimental Investigation, 345-64. 
 
444 Miceli and Sirmans, “The holdout problem,” 309-19. 
 
445 John Cadigan, Pamela Schmitt, Shupp Robert and Kurtis Swope, “The Holdout Problem and Urban Sprawl: 
Experimental Evidence,” Journal of Urban Economics, 69 (2011), 72-81.  
 
446 Ibid. 
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successful exchange decreases. In setting his demands, each seller ignores the externality 
imposed on other sellers as he raises his demand. This results in excessively high demands and a 
lower probability of acceptance relative to the case when sellers cooperate in their demand 
decisions.  
The joint counteroffer from sellers increases with the number of landowners, as does the 
probability of a failed agreement. This occurs because of the externality problem that arises when 
sellers make demands from a buyer with an unknown project valuation. A buyer has, therefore, 
lower expected earnings as the number of sellers increases.  
From this analysis, we can explain the reasons for the Chinese expropriation system’s 
efficiency (or lack of efficiency) on land assembly.   
Under the current landownership system of China, collectives, not individuals, are the 
owners of rural lands. Therefore, even if rural residents hold some rights, local governments 
legally do not need to negotiate with every rural resident; they only need to bargain with the 
collectives whose land they propose to take. In this way, governments dramatically decrease the 
number “sellers,” and in turn decrease the assembly costs and the probability of failure. Also 
because the governments can legally take land, even if rural residents do not transact voluntarily, 
they avoid costly delays, which reduce the surplus from assembling land. And furthermore, 
collectives as unique agents of their residents organize themselves so as to make it difficult for 
the residents to raise their own demands. 
However, because the current system lacks sensitivity to “sellers,” it might lead to 
inefficient assemblies or over-assemblies. Governments cannot differentiate rural residents’ real 
expected value and their strategic moves. Or in other words, the current system cannot prevent 
inefficient assemblies and might push assemblies from high expected value plots to lower ones.  
If there is a better alternative, the first concern is still to solve the anticommons problems. 
At the same time, it should also remain sensitive to residents’ expected values and find a way to 
measure them. Then the assembly developers can compare the surplus and the existing values 
that they will abandon inefficient assembly plans by themselves, instead of abusing 
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expropriation.  
 
B. Requirement form Rural Residents: Social Cost Analysis 
In the anticommons problem analysis, if an assembly makes profits, it is efficient, and in 
some way justified, without much concerns about the allocation of the surplus from the assembly. 
However, in the real world, the resistances spill outsides the land transactions if costly delays are 
not available as the sellers’ weapon. “Mass events” as in the Wukan case are extreme examples 
of these spillovers, and handling these problems is also costly, although the cost is not as obvious 
as costly delay.  
As I attempted to show in my report on the Wukan case in Chapter 1, rural residents have 
usually focused their attacks on local governments, instead of on real estate developers, because 
local governments are the decisive factor. Compared to the typical eminent domain system, 
China’s expropriation system provided more rent-seeking opportunities for local governments. 
They are legally obligated to intervene in every land transaction without the restriction of the 
“public use” clause of the United States Constitution’s Fifth Amendment.447 They have the last 
word on whether to expropriate, on the terms at which the transactions will be implemented, and 
on how to allocate the profits from the expropriation. Government officials’ intelligence and 
integrity bear the test of this unbridled power. Furthermore, as illustrated in Chapter 2, because 
of China’s public power’s hierarchical tradition, juridical power can barely balance government 
officials’ arbitrary power.    
Therefore, when considering an alternative approach, legislators should carefully 
compare these costs, which can be labeled as “social costs.” It is hard, if not impossible, to 
anticipate every land assembly’s result before it is completed. Other participants in a better 
alternative approach should share the government’s power on land assembly, decrease 
governments’ rent-seeking risks, and at least take part of the blame when inefficient assembly 
                                                
447 Because rural land expropriation is almost the only way to satisfy the vast need for construction land in China’s 
urbanization process, the “public interest clause” has been essentially moot. 
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occur. In this way, the costs of assembly can be internalized within mild market behaviors. 
 
a. The Corruption or Rent-seeking Risks of Governments 
The corruption condition in China is frustrating,448 especially in the land expropriation 
field. Based on a report about corruption in China, the number of land corruption cases, 
increased by a factor of 6 or 7 from 2000 to 2009.449 During that time house prices rose 
dramatically (without allowing rural residents to share in the benefits of those rising prices) and 
so did the number of “mass events.”  
Rent-seeking means the use of social institutions, such as the power of government, to 
redistribute wealth among different groups without creating new wealth.450 Local governments 
do not directly create wealth but facilitate land assembly. Although hiring the government to 
expropriate rural land is much more effective than trying to do it oneself, it is not free. Besides 
the indirect benefits, such as receiving more taxes generated from new commercial or industrial 
outputs of assembled land, China’s local governments receive compensation directly from the 
assemblers.  
Under the normal eminent domain condition, although governments are entitled to take 
land from landowners, they are not the direct beneficiaries from the deal.451 The governments 
and judges hold the public power, but they are not allowed to exchange the power for 
                                                
448 Based on Corruption Perceptions Index 2011 released by Transparency International, the score of China, whose 
rank is 75, is 3.6. It is nearly only a half of the U.S’s score 7.1 whose rank is 24.  
 
449 Gong Tin and Wu Muluan (G¯, ĭȚ), “Woguo 2000-2009 Nian Fubai Anli Yanjiu Baogao; Jiyu 2800 Yu Ge 
Baodao Anli de Fenxi (÷ 2000-2009ÛǄǳŀ9Ɗƚÿ;  ! 28006ÿȍŀ9ƃUĹ) [A Research 
Report on China’s Corruption Cases during 2000-2009],” Shehuixue Yanjiu (e0cj) [Sociological Studies] 4 
(2012), 204-20. The data base of this research is not the whole data base of corruption cases in China because that is 
unavailable. However, the authors collected the base from a nation-level newspaper, “Procuratorate Daily”, which is 
owned and managed by The Supreme Procuratorate. The editors and journalisms are all procurators. Therefore, at 
least this research reflects the government’s attitude and concern towards the land corruption cases, if not the real 
condition.  
 
450 John A. C. Conybeare, “The Rent-Seeking State & Revenue Diversification,” World Politics 35 (1982), 25-42.   
 
451 Like in the Kelo case. Kelo v City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
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consideration. Assemblers lobby government officers and councilors by showing the commercial 
or social value of their plan, but governments as independent institutions are relatively neutral. 
This kind of neutrality is necessary for governments to use their discretion on the assembly 
plan’s externality and cost for the society. Lobbyists might fail, but the only consequence for the 
failure is pushing assemblers, as multiple round players, to take more negotiations with 
landowners, if they still want to implement their plans. They have alternative ways to achieve 
their goals, just more expensive and time-consuming. Although the costly delay is a kind of 
waste, the experimental evidence also shows that the anticipation of delay costs speeds up the 
agreement process.452 
Under the circumstances of China’s expropriation system, the compensation that local 
governments receive are not nominal, but a large amount, and then they distribute a small part to 
rural collective residents. Governments act as mandatory middlemen or brokers. In addition to 
that, there is no mature lobby mechanism or other competition mechanism for assemblers; so, the 
decision-making process is not transparent. The more crucial part is that to apply expropriation is 
the only available way for assemblers to get targeted lands. Or they have to bargain directly with 
collectives in a black market transaction. If they choose this way, they have to handle local rural 
residents’ holdout power by themselves. The agreement between the collective, residents, and 
the assembler, even if they can get one, would lose legal protection. The governments have full 
reason and motivation to nullify the agreement, and burden assemblers’ projects with great legal 
uncertainty. Therefore, it actually leaves assemblers no choice but to cooperate with the 
governments. 
This arrangement leaves local governments in a much stronger bargaining position, not 
unlike a land monopoly. In this position, local governments, especially high officials within the 
governments’ hierarchy, make land expropriation more than an institution of land assembly but a 
profitable land-selling business. Whether the assembly is efficient or not, and whether they can 
get indirect benefits from the assembly are not their main concern. Direct profits make the 
                                                
452 Cadigan, “Experimental Evidence,” 72-81.  
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expropriation system deviate from the pure neutral position. In fact, some assembly projects, 
especially those over-assembly ones, are wealth redistributions in which corrupt governments 
take rural lands, give them to developers, and share the benefits. Rural residents’ fights against 
these redistributions cause social unrest and impose social costs. These fights twist with their 
strategic moves for more assembly surplus under efficient assembly conditions, and then in turn 
harm whatever healthy function on land assembly that the expropriation mechanism might have.  
 
b. Lack of Independent Judicial Review 
Even if the current system is filled with rent-seeking opportunities, governments could 
also be an efficient and uncorrupt institution if the judicial review system were efficient and 
robust. Firstly, the jurisdiction can draw the line between a real external beneficial plan (“public 
use clause”) and governments’ self-interested transactions. Secondly, such review could provide 
a second chance for honest land assemblers to force governments to assemble. Then, this judicial 
jurisdiction would work as a check and balance on the government’s monopolistic power in land 
market. 
However, the juridical power in China is weak. As I showed in Chapter 2, every 
jurisdiction branch is a subordinate under the control of the government and the communist party 
branch on the same level. Judges are obligated to support the orders or other policies from the 
governments’ leaders. Secondly, the financial supports of courts depend on the governments’ 
income, so judges themselves have financial incentives to support government with land 
assembling transactions. The number of land corruption cases has been rising quickly, but the 
majority of the cases are about individually corrupt officials. Judicial power has seldom 
overruled any government’s decision on a land assembling plan.  
Therefore, jurisdiction is neither able to correct governments’ misbehavior, nor draw the 
line that separates governments’ discretions from its indiscretions, as the U.S. Supreme Court did 
in Kelo v. City of New London. Courts are not the right battlefield for these matters; so, rural 
residents, like the Wukan villagers, have generally chosen to appeal and protest on the streets. 
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As mentioned in Chapter 3, the cost to handle these “mass incidents” caused by land 
conflicts is huge. An ideal amendment on the current mechanism would minimize these social 
costs. 
 
C. Political Requirement from the ideology: Constitutionality and Political Cost 
When China started its reforms in the late 1970s, the reformers had to face the ideological 
constraints and challenges from the dogmas of Mao’s era. They had to justify themselves and 
legitimate the deviations from the old ways. To create a space for the reform, Deng laid out the 
Four Cardinal Principles (jiben yuanze), and drew the line between what was acceptable and 
what was unacceptable. During the reform, no one should challenge: (1) the socialist path, (2) the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, (3) the leadership of the Communist Party, and (4) Marxism-
Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.453 Then in the 1982, these four principles were added in the 
new constitution’s preamble, with the change of the dictatorship of the proletariat into the 
people’s democratic dictatorship.454  
At the beginning, the purpose of this statement was to relax ideological control. It implied 
that other political ideas not in the list could be challenged and debated. However, the downside 
is that if some reform proposal is regard as a challenge to the principles, it will not only be a 
political question, but also a violation of the constitution. 
Because of the principles’ vagueness, interpretation matters a lot. For example, whether 
the HCRS is a passage on socialist path can be highly abstract and debatable. On one side, it 
entitles rural residents to land rights and impairs collective landownership; and on the other side, 
it maintains the original collective landownership. Therefore, every new reform should keep a 
certain distance from the high-line, and avoid dangerous ideological challenges, or the political 
cost would be huge.  
                                                
453 Vogel, Deng Xiaoping, 262. 
 
454 XIANFA the Preamble (1982) (China). 
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D. Requirement from Collectives: Collectives’ Role 
As analyzed before, collective are used as a mechanism to decrease the number of 
participants in land assembly situations. However, as I showed in the Wukan case, the 
collectives’ cadres can also manipulate this mechanism to impair rural residents’ rights. 
However, if the collectives are abandoned in further reform because they can be misused, the 
political cost will be huge. Even in the most radical reform period, Deng maintained collectives 
as an element of socialism. Therefore, a better alternative should at least reserve a role for them, 
reconstruct them as a better mechanism for assembly, and improve their governance. 
 
E. Requirement from the Government: Local Governments’ Acceptance 
Local governments get a huge amount of revenue from land expropriation; so, a new 
working mechanism must at least let them maintain some part of the profit if it is supposed to 
work without their resistance, particularly under their current financial situation. Nowadays, 
local government debt problems have become a main concern of the policymaker. 
As mentioned, the new tax-sharing system reform was introduced in 1994. Before that, 
the “tax revenues contract system” fixed or “contracted” some amount that local governments 
should turn into the central government. With the strong economic growth, the central 
government’s portion of the total declined from 40.5% in 1984 to 22.0% in 1993.455 After that, 
the central government took about 40% of national government revenues, while they spent more 
than 60% of national government expenditures.456  
With this process, local governments also passively or actively paid for the series of 
reforms mentioned in Chapter 4.457 For example, governments invested in education with the 
                                                
455 Gang Fan and Yan Lv, “Fiscal Prudence and Growth Sustainability: An Analysis of China’s Public Debts,” Asian 
Economic Policy Review, 7 (2012), 202-20. 
 
456 Ibid. 
 
457 Jun Ma, “Hidden Fiscal Risks in Local China,” Australian Journal of Public Administration, 72 (2013) pp. 278-
292. 
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goal of doubling the number of college students, took contingent liabilities of the bankrupted 
state-owned enterprises during the state-owned enterprises reform, and took a few other big 
steps. Then by the end of 1996, all provincial governments, 353 prefecture-level governments 
(90.05% of them), and 2405 county-level governments (86.54% of them) had become involved 
in debt activities.  
Because the Chinese government implemented fiscal stimulus packages during the 1997-
1998 Asian Financial Crisis, the amount of debt was driven high. After that, the national 
government started to withdraw, gradually, from expansionary policies. Not until 2009’s Global 
Financial Crisis did China undertake another gargantuan economic stimulus. At the end of 2010, 
of 2779 county-level governments, only 54 of them had not borrowed money.458 And at the end 
of June 2013 local governments owed 17.89 trillion yuan, either directly or as the result of 
guaranteeing loans to third parties.459 
The amount of money that local governments owe has doubled from less than 20% of 
GDP in 2007 to nearly 40% today. To temporarily ease the problem, China’s heavily indebted 
local governments will be allowed to issue one trillion yuan ($160 billion) of bonds this year to 
pay off a portion of maturing loans.460 However, the problem cannot be totally handled by that.  
In these circumstances, letting local governments give up the large item of their revenues, 
revenues from land expropriation, is not realistic.461 This issue needs to be borne in mind as we 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
458 “2011 Nian 35 Hao: Quanguo Difangxing Zhaiwu Shenji Jieguo (2011Û 35:EĚðAb¼ǠƯĻ) 
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consider an alternative to the current system of expropriation.  
To sum up, besides solving the anticommons problem, the new amendments of the 
expropriation system should also meet ideological requirements and the differing needs of rural 
residents, collectives, and local governments. These five requirements are the measures against 
which to test potential alternatives. 
 
II. The Proposed Alternative Solutions 
 
In this section, several reform proposals will be presented and tested under the 
requirements noted in the last section. 
 
A. Legitimize Incomplete Property 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, incomplete property stands for the construction that was built 
upon the lands that rural residents or rural collectives lease or transfer to urban commercial users 
without going through the required process of state expropriation so as to capture the appreciated 
value of their land. 
According to the Chinese Ministry of Land Resources, by 2007, Chinese rural residents 
themselves had built over 6.6 billion square meters of houses in evasion of the legal prohibition 
on private rural land development and transfer. People in China call these illegal buildings xiao 
chanquan (directly translated as “small properties”) because their property rights are “smaller” 
(weaker) than those on the urban formal housing market, which have “big” property rights 
protected by government. However, the property rights of this “incomplete property” holders are 
not as small as some other informal rights.  
Conventionally, incomplete property rights, which are based on informal transactions, are 
either limited to people who have continuing business relations462 or supported by systematic 
                                                
462 Stewart Macaulay, “Non-contractual relations in business: A preliminary study,” American sociological review 
(1963), 55-67; Robert Cooter and Janet Landa, “Personal vs. Impersonal Trade: The size of trading Groups and the 
law of contracts,” International Review of Law and Economics 4 (1984): 15-22; Janet Landa, “A theory of the 
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institutions like industrial associations. 463  By contrast to rights in the formal market, an 
incomplete property right is deemed to bring the benefits of a market economy to the poo. 
However, both the selling and the renting of the illegal buildings are limited because of the lack 
of the legal titles.464 In this sense, China’s situation stands in contrast to the traditional point of 
view. For example, in Shenzhen, a sub-provincial level city near Hong Kong, about 12% of the 
small properties are over fifteen floors high and 2,000 square meters under professional 
supervision, most of which are well-built apartments for sale. 
In these instances, neither the holdout nor the anticommons problem arose to slow or stop 
the process of urbanization. Quite to the contrary, the market worked perfectly well in a 
fragmented situation, even without legal protection, the endorsement of the authorities, or proper 
financial supports.  
On the other hand, one possible drawback of these instances is that other rural residents 
might learn about those small property cases and infer that their land rights might be much more 
valuable than the compensation the government typically offers. Incomplete property not only 
makes the expropriation mechanism redundant in some specific cases, but it also shakes its 
justification. In this way, legitimate incomplete property or entitling incomplete property with 
full legal protection cannot coexist with the current expropriation mechanism. However, it might 
be an alternative to it. 
The first concern of legitimizing the incomplete property is its political cost. Can it get 
through the challenge from ideological dogma? At first, I thought that it seemed possible, and 
even promising, but further reflection led me to believe that its prospects were dim. 
In 2013, the newly published Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th 
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Central Committee of the Communist Party of China declares the key to the new round of 
reform: “economic reform is key, and the core solution is the proper relationship between the 
government and the market, leaving the market to play the decisive role in the allocation of 
resources.” Then it lists several main points of the reform, and No. 3 is “to speed up the 
improvement of modern market system.” More than that, No. 5 is more specific: “to improve 
institutions and mechanisms for promoting integrated urban and rural development”; “to grant 
farmers more property rights”; and “to enhance equal exchange of factors of production between 
urban and rural areas and balance the allocation of public resources between them.”465 Usually, 
the Communiqué of every 3rd Plenary Session is decisive and labeled as the roadmap for the 
reform of the new government.466 Therefore, it was widely believed that the government might 
open the door to legitimizing “small property.”  
However, just ten days later, there appeared an “emergent circular about resolutely 
curbing illegal constructing and selling ‘small property’.” That circular was issued by the general 
office of the Ministry of Land and Resources and the general office of the Ministry of Housing 
and Urban-Rural Development.467 It iterated a similar circular issued in 2012 before the third 
plenary session of the 18th CCCPC, 468  which emphasized the prevention of the sale or 
construction of “small property.”  
There is more here than mere ideological disapproval. Additionally, incomplete 
property’s main problem is that it does not provide any solution for the potential holdout 
                                                
465 Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC (2013).  
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problems. The booming in incomplete property housing might have just happened in some 
special areas where the land rights were not so fragmented to hamper efficient assembly or where 
the collective cadres were highly capable. It seems unlikely that it is a solution that can be 
applied in the whole country or that it suits the national fragmentation situation created by the 
HCRS.  
Furthermore, incomplete property almost entirely blocks governments’ participation. On 
the positive side, if incomplete property spreads, governments will not be blamed for any 
problems that arise. On the negative side, if the government legitimizes incomplete property, 
they will probably levy taxes to make up the expropriation revenue they would lose. Then the 
benefit from incomplete property will shrink so that the incentives of both developers and rural 
residents to negotiate will also decrease. As a consequence, the enthusiasm of assembly ebbs, 
and deadlock returns.  
 
B. Privatization 
It is now widely accepted that by protecting property rights and encouraging long-term 
investments, good institutions play an important role in economic development.469 Total land 
retribution and privatization might defend rural residents from governments’ arbitrary 
expropriation power and would probably eradicate inefficient short-term behavior. This would 
also mean a return to China’s landownership condition of the 1953 situation. At that time, the 
current problems did not occur; so, it might be a good alternative to restart the land management 
over again. Then the question is that if it is feasible, what approach should the policymaker take 
and what are the costs of going back?  
 
a. Social Cost: The risk of social turbulence 
In the transitional period of previous non-market economy countries, various leaderships 
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implemented total privatization of resources as the key reform. Even for highly centralized 
governments, this reform creates risks of social turbulence. A short comparative study might help 
understand the situation. 
 
1. Stolypin’s reform in the early 20th century 
Almost a half century before Stolypin’s reform, Russia’s emancipation reform of 1861 
abolished the traditional relationship between the nobles and the serfs, which had maintained a 
tenuous balance in the agricultural economy.470 After that reform, serfs became peasants and 
were no longer personally subsidiary to the lords, while they were still trammeled in their rural 
communes.  
Then right before Stolypin’s reform launched in 1906, Russian peasants held a kind of 
real right called “allotment land,” which they had received as part of their emancipation from 
serfdom and which in that year represented the great majority of all peasant-owned land. Three 
features of allotment land tended to make peasant’s property rights collective rather than 
individual.  
First, a peasant family’s holding was typically subject to periodic redistribution by the 
commune, redistribution intended roughly to match a family’s land holding with the number of 
working family members. Second, each family held a large number of small, intermingled tracts, 
often as many as fifty, scattered over the commune, so that cultivation required close 
coordination with other households and rough unanimity of approach, not to mention long 
journeys to work on distant fields. Third, ownership (if we may call it that) was more in the 
family than in any individual, so that sales or other transfers often required family agreement.471 
 
This system resembled China’s HCRS before the law strongly restricted collectives’ 
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retribution power.  
During his reform, Stolypin gave individual householders a right to opt out of the whole 
redistribution process and gave communes a right to do so as a whole by a two-thirds vote. More 
than that, the reforms gave peasant householders the right to demand replacement of their 
holding with a single consolidated tract of land to reduce plot scattering. Finally, to cure the 
problems of family ownership, the reforms prescribed that a household’s decision to opt out of 
redistribution process would bring individual ownership in its wake.472 Through these reforms, 
the peasantry’s desires were increasingly satisfied because the peasants had always aspired to 
acquire more land as private property. At least Socialist Revolutionaries thought so and deemed 
Stolypin as the chief enemy of collectivism.473 
However, the social cost of this reform was huge. It aggravated pre-existing inequality. 
An increase in a peasant’s wealth might well have tended to equalize income in Russia as a 
whole, by standard measures, as peasants generally would have been among the poorest Russians. 
But that may not be a good measure of the social stress: “the peasant who gained only a little 
from enclosure, and saw some of his peers gaining a good deal more, might have been more 
resentful than if he saw some new riches in a noble’s hand.”474  
Nowadays in China, in some rural residents’ eyes, their peers got windfall gains by 
receiving a compensation fee from land expropriation while they had seen enough news about 
billionaire land developers like the owner of Country Garden. A further privatization as a process 
of reallocating wealth would shake the underlying social norms further. China’s 1953 land 
reform was founded upon the establishment of a new powerful regime and reconstruction of 
previous social norms. The cost was the extermination of the whole landlord caste. These 
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requirements did not exist during Stolypin’s period, and probably do not exist in current China 
either.  
The chaos after Stolypin’s Reform taught reformers to check the balance between the 
short-term social stability and the long-term benefit. The social reactions to a change in China 
today might be as uncomfortable as during Stolypin’s age. A more extreme privatization plan 
would cause larger instability, and based on their knowledge of the tragedy of Stolypin, that is 
definitely not what the policy-makers want. 
 
2. Pahlavi’s Land Reform 
A similar situation with regard to land reform occurred in Iran. In 1962, 17 years before 
the Iranian Revolution, Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, instituted land reform that in practice consisted 
of giving the ownership of land to the cultivating tenants and sharecroppers. By giving land to 
the tenants, he believed that a communist revolution or takeover could be avoided.475 Or in other 
words, the tension on social inequality could be released. 
The situation in Iran was that former landless peasants, the Khoshneshzns, had often 
found employment in the small rural trades and administrative units that had prospered during 
the 1970s, or had left their villages, as most young people had done.476 Peasants who had 
received a plot of land under the monarchy had little interest in a few more extra hectares, not 
only because they could already rent land from relatives who had left for towns, but also due to 
the lack of technical and financial means for cultivating the best plots. And more than that, 
peasants considered land expropriation to be non-Islamic. As a result, the reform did not face 
compliments but questionings.477 
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Both Stolypin’s and Pahlavi’s reforms tried to entitle peasants private lands with the 
anticipations that these moves would ease social pressures.  However, the outcomes surprised the 
policymakers.  
In any circumstance, privatization with its implication of absolute and eternal private 
rights is a highly sensitive and controversial topic. It is tightly related to the social norms and 
social approval of equality and justice. However, the change of social norms cannot complete in 
a short time. It would be imprudent for the policymaker to implement overall land privatization 
with a long-term preparation. It is quite uncertain whether the social cost of privatization is 
higher or lower than the current expropriation system. 
 
3. The Tension between Private Property and Marxist Doctrine 
Besides the social concern, privatization is also an ideological question. China is still in a 
transitional period so that a tiny political change could lead to a huge social cost. The wise 
choice for the reformers is shelving ideological differences, following Deng’s famous motto “no-
argument.”   
By claiming that individuals could acquire land use rights but cannot actually own the 
land itself, the 1982 Constitution “avoids abandoning the Marxist principle of state 
ownership.”478 This arrangement created an opportunity for a commercial real estate market to 
flourish, with the constitutional change presumably designed to afford investors confidence that 
their real estate investments would enjoy greater legal protection than they had in the past.479 
Post-1988 changes to the Chinese Constitution reflect this tense dichotomy between private 
ownership and Marxist doctrine. For example, Article 6 was amended in 1999 by addition of the 
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following sentence: 
 
During the primary stage of socialism, the State adheres to the basic economic system 
with the public ownership remaining dominant and diverse sectors of the economy 
developing side by side, and the distribution system with the distribution according to 
work remaining dominant and the coexistence of a variety of modes of distribution.  
—— Wen Jiabao 480 
 
In fact, this discord between China’s socialist past and its desire to become a part of the 
world economic regime extends beyond constitutional provisions that specifically address 
property rights. 481  The 1993 constitutional amendments added that this task “must be 
accomplished” in accordance with the theory of “building socialism with Chinese 
characteristics.”482 This last phrase was dropped in 2004 and changed to the term “Chinese-style 
socialism.”483 The clause “socialist market economy” first appeared in this paragraph in 1999.484  
Real estate law, which became effective in 2007, continues to reflect this discord. The 
law restates the fact that either the government or rural collectives can own land.485 At the same 
time, Article 3 of this law also states that, “the state shall consolidate and develop unswervingly 
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the public sector of the economy and at the same time encourage, support, and guide the 
development of the non-public sectors of the economy.”486  
Prior to the law’s adoption, the debates within the National People’s Congress about the 
proposed law exposed ideological splits within the Chinese Communist Party. Some argued that 
the protection of non-public sector guaranteed rapid development and others responded that this 
trend was contrary to socialist principles.487 One notable Chinese scholar publicly objected to an 
earlier draft of the law, which contained stronger statements about the protection of private 
ownerships, stating that its provisions “go against the fundamental stance and principles of 
Marxism, and the CPC’s orientation and principles of socialist legislation.”488 Even the Chinese 
government’s own English-language website refers to the final version of the statute as “the most 
controversial law since the Communist Party came to power in 1949” and notes that it passed 
only after an unprecedented seven readings.489 
With the knowledge of the severe opposition to these general declarative principles on 
private protection, policymakers should anticipate the ideological attacks if they implement total 
land privatization.  The political cost is even higher than legitimizing incomplete property.  
 
As is the case with the strategy of legitimizing incomplete property, privatization does 
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not help to solve the holdout problem. On the contrary, it would solidify the fragmentation 
introduced by the HCRS. Local governments would lose the revenue, and collectives would lose 
the very reason of their existence. 
 
C. Strict Regulation of Governments 
Strengthening independent supervision of governments might be the most universal 
method to alleviate public power’s arbitrariness. As I have already illustrated, the rigid demands 
of solving the anticommons problem in landownership are not negligible, and the current 
expropriation mechanism could be used to handle the problem; so, it would be too assertive to 
totally abandon it without a second review.  
To appease rural residents’ dissatisfactions arising from having their land expropriated, 
an efficient way might be to increase the compensation, and this is what the policymakers have 
been trying to do.490 
China recently started a new anti-corruption campaign. On January 7, 2015, the Central 
Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) for the Party released year-end statistics that 
suggest a sharp uptick in both investigations and punishments of party members resulting from 
the “Eight Points” campaign, a major element of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption 
drive. The CCDI claimed that in 2014, it had undertaken 53,085 investigations, disciplined 
71,748 cadres, and “severely disciplined” 23,646.491 By March 20, 2015, 99 party cadres or 
government officials ranked above sub-ministry (sub-provincial) level, or generals from the 
military had been put under investigation since the end of 2012, when the National Congress of 
the Communist Party of China was held, and Xi was elected as the General Secretary of the 
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Party.492  This number was just 145 in 63 years between 1949 and 2012.493    
It is still hard to assess this campaign and its effects on land-expropriation-related 
corruptions, but a strong signal has been sent that the new party leaders have decided to fight 
heavily against corruption in the party and that the cadres and officials should be careful.  
Besides the Party’s disciplining, China has also started its judicial reform. As mentioned, 
China’s judicial power is highly dependent on local governments; so, local party branches and 
government officials probably affect their judgments.  
At the beginning of 2015, in Shenzhen and Shenyang, two circuit courts were 
inaugurated by China’s Supreme People’s Court (SPC), and started full-time work early in the 
year. The purpose of this reform is to “free up the SPC headquarters to concentrate on judicial 
policies and try more complex cases,” and to help the public file cases in local communities and 
get their disputes solved more quickly and locally.494 Because these circuit courts are the SPC’s 
local agents, the judges’ nominations and other aspects of the  courts’ founding are managed by 
the central government. Local governments cannot interfere.495  
However, this crucial reform has yetto be tightly related to expropriation cases. China is a 
unitary state. Unlike a federal state, China only has one judiciary system with the SPC at the 
peak and their circuit courts (and there more levels of courts) standing between the SPC and the 
local courts. The circuit courts are appellate courts and are able to hear very limited appeals and 
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even fewer trials. Even if dissatisfied rural residents believe in these circuit courts’ neutrality, the 
legal process would be still highly time consuming.   
Nonetheless, these judicial reforms have helped to shape a more transparent and efficient 
government, even if they are not directly related to land cases. 
The main problem with the current mechanism is that even if the government is fully 
transparent and efficient, it is still not a qualified decider of land transactions.  
During the past, governments have deemed rural collectives to be purely agricultural 
output units. Rural residents’ property rights are the byproducts from HCRS, and the purpose 
was to secure food security. A market mechanism and under which the subjective values rural 
residents real estate rights are the main concern of the reform. The purpose of higher 
compensation is to appease resentful residents, not to fulfill their expected value, because the 
highly compensated rural residents are not more than free riders of urbanization. 
Heller and Hills’ theory about fairness496 is relevant for considering a normative proposal 
about the land-expropriation and land assembly issue. Their theory suggests, first, that the failure 
to pay over some share of the assembly surplus to rural residents deprives them of the profit that 
landowners or occupants normally retain. The rulral residents have a strong moral claim to enjoy 
the peace to live there without incursion. This peace should not be deprived simply because their 
houses or contracted land happen to lie in a place that assemblers or governments think is 
suitable for their purposes, even if they truly believe so. Secondly, it is an mistake to suppose 
that landowners make no contribution to the success of land assembly beyond giving up their 
rights. The speed with which land is taken depends critically on the attitude of the rural citizens 
whose land has been condemned. If they are more cooperative and trusting of the governments, 
assemblers can go forward much more quickly. 
The compensation amount decided by the governments ignored these issues even if they 
would have been working from an uncorrupted neutral attitude. The cooperation of rural 
residents might be very valuable for the assemblers, and it is economically justified to pay for the 
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cooperation with higher compensation. As mentioned, delay costs result in a significant loss in 
the assemblers’ final earnings. In a market condition, a speedy deal can be achieved, and the rural 
residents can enjoy a part of the surplus from that without the government’s participation. 
Because the governments are not fully equipped with the information the developers and 
rural residents have, their hasty expropriation will still produce over-assemblies. 
 
D. Secret Agency 
Another mechanism that might overcome the holdout problem posed by strategic sellers, 
who ask higher prices than their true subjective value of the land is secret agency of land 
transaction.497 To do that, the real assemblers conceal their own identities and the real plans for 
targeted lands and hire some agencies to negotiate with landowners separately.498 The basic idea 
of this is, without the knowledge of the actual purpose for their land and offers for other 
neighbors, land owners, especially the strategic landowners, will show their true subjective value 
of the land, and make deals with the agencies and the true assemblers concealed behind them. 
The use of these agencies might be dishonest, but “it is intelligent,” or, as pointed out by the 
Sixth Circuit Court of the US, a “common arms-length business practice.”499  
 
a. Secret Agency in the U.S. 
The main concern of this mechanism is to avoid the legal puzzle of “public use” 
requirement for eminent domain and inefficient land transfer. If secret agencies can be efficiently 
used to assemble lands for assemblers whose purposes are not precisely the usual public uses – 
such as a highway, airport, a school, or a public park – then those assemblers cannot ask for 
eminent domain from the government. Then there is no need for judges to use their discretion to 
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draw the line between “public use” and not, which is costly and unpredictable. The landowners 
with high subjective values will voluntarily distinguish themselves from the so-called “strategic 
seller.” They are the ones who do not evaluate their land at a price that is much different from the 
“market” price that they offer to the assemblers. Then the holdout problems, which usually 
originate from these sellers, are solved if they accept the prices, which reflect those landowners’ 
true subjective value, offered by secret agents.  
Based on Cadigan’s model, the assembler would voluntarily make a higher joint offer to 
sellers as a group as the number of sellers increases. Because the agreement requires unanimous 
consent, the probability that a given joint offer is accepted by all decreases as the number of 
sellers increases.  
The reason for that is that the sellers’ subjective values of their lands or their reservation 
prices500 are unavailable to the assembler, and the assembler has no way to distinguish the 
strategic sellers with low reservation prices but high price offers. To make the deal happen, the 
buyer must offset the probability of a high-reservation-price seller’s being a holdout with a 
relatively higher collective offer to sellers.501 But when the amount of the collective offer, which 
has been increased by strategic sellers, is higher than the surplus of assembly, the assembly fails.  
By providing the information of each seller’s reservation price to the buyer, the secret 
agency approach increases the probability of success without providing the opportunity of 
strategic moves to the sellers. On the other side, this mechanism also deprives landowners’ of the 
right to enjoy the assembly surplus. It is debatable whether this kind of benefit distribution is fair, 
but it is an efficient method of solving the holdout problems and has been justified by U.S 
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courts.502  
 
b. Applying Secret Agency to China 
The success of secret agency is built on two preconditions: sellers’ private ownership of 
the land and their willingness to keep the negotiations secret. The two requirements cannot be 
met in China. 
 
1. The Legal Difficulties of Keeping Secret 
The fact that the legitimate owners of rural lands are the collectives makes it very 
unlikely that the secret agency method will work. The justification for rural residents to decide 
whether to accept a developers’ assembly plan is that they are members of the target collective, 
not the actual occupants or utilizers of land.    
In some ways, a collective is like a corporation, every resident holds a share of the whole 
collective. Even if everyone actually lives or produce on a particular part of it, other residents 
still have claims on it. Or, from the point of property law, every resident legally holds a right like 
joint tenancy with right of survivorship. Every resident owns equal and undivided interest in the 
property as a whole. Legally, if the resident leaves her collective or dies, her share ceases.  
All members of the collectives should collectively decide the fate of every piece of land, 
and this is the main different facet of the holdout problem in China from other areas where 
individuals hold complete ownerships. Take the Wukan case for example. The controversial land 
was a pig farm leased to Chen Wenqing, but it still belonged to the collective. However, all 
village residents still thought they should participate in the transaction, or at least the 
compensation plan, even if they had no direct contract with the land during the 1990s. The actual 
occupants should have more compensation because they would suffer physical and subjective 
losses, but they are not justified in having a louder voice on the decision than anyone else. The 
opportunities for a secret agent to make deals with all those occupants are very unlikely.   
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Therefore, aside from the negotiations with local governments, what assemblers should 
do is to make sure the village committee or the majority of residents endorse its offer. Then they 
should negotiate with the special occupants on the targeted plot about some particular 
compensation standards for their assets. This would legitimize their assemblies and decrease 
residents’ resistance to their plans. The usual procedure is that the village committee should 
publicize the information of the offer and the compensation standards first. The Wukan 
committee village failed to do that, and this was the fuse that set off the explosive events there. 
At this publishing stage, assemblers can leave tough residents aside, because they are not critical 
to the final decision-making result. But if tough residents outnumber cooperative ones, the plan 
will fail.  
In some sense, what Country Garden did more or less reflected the idea of secret agency. 
It made a deal with Chen the occupant and village cadres who controlled the village committee. 
They were the key players in this transaction, but only their support proved to be not enough.  
Therefore, under the collective landownership circumstances, even if the secret agency 
mechanism is possible, the objects of it should be all the residents of the target collective. And 
all this should be done before the village committee is obligated to publish the plan. Then the 
question turns to the practical difficulties of keeping the deal secret. 
 
2. The Practical Difficulties of Keeping a Secret 
Besides letting the sellers show their reservation prices, another point of secret agency is 
to save assembly costs by providing discriminative compensation to similar sellers. 
As mentioned, the state owns all land for commercial usage. Assemblers might keep the 
details of their plans secret, but the fact that the targeted lands would not be used as arable land 
will be obvious to all residents. So, the ability to hide the assemblers’ plan is limited. Even if it is 
still possible for the assemblers to hide the plan, it will also hard to hide the discriminative 
compensation among rural residents. 
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The rural society of China has been an acquaintance society for a long time.503 People 
who live in the same collective usually hold some sort of consanguineous or marital relationships. 
With considerable autonomy from the state, the local community itself maintained internal order 
and settled disputes between its members.504 Typically, families who share a few family names 
constitute a collective. Although the tradition is withering, the so-called “pattern of difference 
sequence” still affects the behavior of rural residents. People consciously act for the benefit of 
the extended family or even just an imaginary family, who share the same family name, 
particularly if the cost of help is almost free. And they assume other members of this extended 
family do the same thing.  
Truly, every member has the motive to make an efficient assembly happen, and in turn 
the incentive to keep the deal secret. But the leakage of a secret to very limited members may let 
the information spread among the collective. It is not saying that rural collective members are 
altruists, or collectivists instead of self-interested. Because the risk of the plan’s failure or the 
negative externality of the leakage is unknown or at least hard to measure, village residents in a 
transitional society would probably benefit their extended or imaginary family members by 
telling them of the deal, especially when the cost to them of doing so are not significant. 
This risk might be hedged by confidentiality agreements when the negotiation starts. But 
even rumors will still stimulate strategic moves. This will further encroach on the space of 
discriminative compensations.  
Actually, secret agency is more a bargaining strategy of the seller than a new mechanism. 
In the U.S., its legality and morality was challenged and then supported by the courts, but has 
never changed any basic rule of a private market condition. 
Even if the principal assumption about self-interested individuals does not change much, 
the factors by which people measure their costs and benefits vary. Therefore, adjusting secret 
agency to suit China’s landownership system might be possible, but it might not function as good 
                                                
503 Fei Xiaotong, From the soil: the foundation of Chinese society, trans. Gary G. Hamilton and Zheng Wang 
(California: University of California Press, 1992), 41.  
 
504 Michael Taylor, Community, anarchy, and liberty, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 35.  
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as in its original environment. Secret agency alone is unlikely to solve China’s land problems.  
 
E. The Land Assembly District Approach 
A more ideal solution to China’s anticommons problem is the land assembly districts 
approach. This mechanism can wipe out the unnecessary intervention from governments, and 
more importantly, it allows rural residents to show their reservation prices and enjoy a bigger 
share of the assembly surplus than under China’s expropriation approach, which will in turn 
reduce the social costs of that expropriation. Inefficient plans will be eliminated by the process of 
market selection. At the same time, more than just maintaining the collectives’ role in society, 
the land assembly district (LAD) approach needs the existent collective organizations to provide 
available deliberative institutions for rural members to organize their procedures. Furthermore, 
the current collective landownership system provides the justification and legitimacy for their 
neighbors (non-occupant members) to decide the transaction of occupants’ contracted land. This 
issue is highly debatable in countries where landowners hold absolute property rights.  
 
a. The Background of the Original LAD Idea 
The original purpose of the land assembly district approach was also aimed to handle the 
problems of fragmentation of ownership in a fully market economy where the basic way of 
acquiring land is land transaction while taking is just a alternative, unusual way used under a 
strict judicial scrutiny.505 It works as a mechanism to handle the holdout or anticommons 
problems that happen when the market dysfunctions. Under these circumstances, if only one or a 
small part of individual owners of targeted land wield their right to hold up the transaction, while 
the majority land owner agrees to accept the offer, the potentially efficient assembly transaction 
fails. Neither the assemblers nor the land owners will be better off, including the right wielder’s 
neighbors, no one can enjoy any assembly surplus.   
The economic and moral intuition underlying the LAD is this: Persons who hold a legal 
                                                
505 Heller and Hills, “Land Assembly Districts,” 1465-527.  
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interest in a neighborhood’s land should collectively decide whether the land ought to be 
assembled into a larger parcel. LADs are entitled to exercise the  power of eminent domain over 
all of the land located within the district’s jurisdiction. 
 
1. The Framing of a LAD 
Because there is no such proposed institution in the real world, the first step is to initiate 
LADs. Assemblers or other promoters have to propose it to city planners. Local planning 
commissions should consider whether to certify that a LAD is necessary to overcome the 
problem of excess fragmentation of land. Then, to educate the neighbors about the potential 
benefits and costs, the government would hold a series of hearings in which the private land 
assembler could make the case for land assembly to the neighbors. At these hearings, one would 
expect the developer to pitch the LAD by suggesting how much the proposed land assembly 
would increase the value of the neighbor’s property and how much the typical resident could 
expect to reap from the sale. 
The critical procedure is the vote. The catalyzing expression of intra-neighborhood 
democracy would be the vote by the residents of the proposed LAD. Because the LAD process 
would replace eminent domain in cases where only fragmented ownership prevented land 
assembly, the neighbors residing in the LAD would have an absolute collective vote on all 
economic redevelopment requiring coercive land assembly.  
 
2. Handling the Anticommons Problem 
The purpose of the LAD mechanism is that it can address the anticommons problem. The 
reasons for its effects can be summarized as follows. 
Firstly, contrary to the secret agency approach, LADs help release all information to the 
residents, including the surplus that they could enjoy and the risk of failure. With this 
information, they can make moves with almost all knowledge necessary. 
Secondly, the LAD system provides a mechanism for sellers to play cooperatively. As 
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analyzed in an earlier chapter sellers always ignore the externality imposed on other sellers as he 
raises his demand, and in turn, this action decreases the probability of a successful exchange. An 
LAD lets the low reservation price holders effectively combat with the strategic movers, instead 
of being dealt with by the assemblers. In this way, the social pressure is distracted from the 
assemblers, governments, and courts and transferred to their whole neighborhood that constitutes 
the LAD. Under this mechanism, sellers, even the strategic sellers, are forced to cooperate to 
avoid the failure of efficient assemblies.  
Thirdly, because the assembler has to disclose the whole project, which includes its 
projected valuation for the land, the LAD provides a transparent competitive offer filed by the 
assemblers that inefficient assembling project would fail.  
Although the LAD approach is efficient in the anticommons situation, this approach 
contradicts the absolute property right principle, which entitled the owners to have total control 
upon his land.  
The Government’s power of eminent domain has a different origin from the private right 
of ownershipe. The nature of eminent domain is not an administrative power, but derives from 
the sovereignty of the nation; so, eminent domain trumps (usually) a private property right. On 
the other hand, the LAD does not have such a legal root. It is hard to justify why neighbors have 
the right to decide what someone else may do with his or her land. Therefore, the basic dilemma 
of the LAD approach is, from the view of economics, that it is an efficient way to solve the 
fragmented land problem but that it is, so far, mostly an academic construct rather than 
something with which society has wide experience and has learned its shortcomings and 
strengths and addressed those. China may be in an ideal position to try out the concept.  
 
b. The Advantages of the LAD’s Application in China 
China’s special landownership system provides several advantages for the application of 
the LAD mechanism, including legal convenience, organization preparation and the social 
bedrock. Furthermore, the structure of the compensations also promotes this mechanism.  
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1. Legal Convenience 
In rural areas, collectives own all lands; individuals only hold use rights. All residents in 
a particular collective are equally qualified to decide on the fate of every piece of land belonging 
to their collective even if the majority of residents have no direct contact with those particular 
parts. This power is not just theoretical or illusionary. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the collectives 
used to use this power to readjust rural resident’s contracted land from the very beginning of the 
HCRS reform when residents were first entitled to those rights. In other words, the reason of the 
later restriction of collectives’ readjustment power was not the origin of the power, but the 
arbitrary process of decision-making. It is still possible that the collective ownership 
arrangement could be utilized efficiently if it is not used arbitrarily.  
Thus, the neighborhood’s legal root of the claim on other’s contracted land can be 
derived from the collective ownership theory. Therefore, the LAD approach can be not only 
economically efficient, but also legally justified under China’s legal system.  
Furthermore, as envisioned in the original LAD approach, all village residents will be 
included in the decision process, and enjoy the profit from the assembly if it succeeds. No one in 
the collective will lose anything directly from the project, and all will enjoy some portion of the 
positive externality from the new urban neighborhood. This is different from Cadigan, Schmitt, 
Schupp and Swope’s model,506 which predicts that an increase in the number of sellers decreases 
the probability of success. In China’s situation, the LAD actually increases the number of free 
riders instead of sellers. Their power dilutes the occupants’ who hold higher subjective values.  
 
2. Organization Preparation 
The implementation of the LAD needs an institution to manage the process, which is not 
available in a private market jurisdiction. The cost of the construction and running this institution 
is part of the cost of the LAD approach. Fortunately, in rural China, village committees already 
                                                
506 Cadigan, “Experimental Evidence,” 72-81. 
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exist and can be enlisted as part of the LAD. Village committees, which evolved from production 
brigades before the reform, act as the management organ of the whole collective. There is no 
need to set up another special district organization to manage the vote process for running the 
transaction related affairs.  
On this level, the corruption phenomenon also exists, as in the Wukan case. But because 
the heads of the village committee are the only leaders directly elected by the constituency (other 
higher levels’ occupations are indirectly elected),507 the degree of corruption is relatively 
controllable. And if the procedure of voting can be strictly scrutinized, the potential corruption 
will not hamper the procedure.  
The main difference between the village committee and the original LAD approach is 
that the number of village committee voters is fixed, while the size of the original LAD is more 
flexible, depending on the targeted plot. However, even if an assembler only wants a part of a 
collective’s lot instead of the whole land the collective owns, the decision-maker should be all 
rural residents of the targeted collective.  
 
3. Social Bedrock and Cooperation 
Rural China is still more or less a society of the “pattern of difference sequence.” 
Residents affect each other in different ways. They care for each other’s interests and share 
information. Even though the final decisions are made through a democratic election, before the 
formal election, residents have more motives and powers to affect potential strategic players in 
voting. Different from the governments or assemblers’ canvass, the lobbying from other 
residents is more persuasive. This cooperation decreases seller’s externality imposed on other 
sellers and enhances the probability of a successful transaction.  
 
 
                                                
507 Cunmin Weiyuanhui Zuzhi Fa (ĳŌ®1ƪƬœ) [Organic Law of the Village Committees] (promulgated by 
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. October 28, 2010, effective October 28, 2010) CLI.1.139685 (1998).  
 
 
233 
4. The Structure of Compensation 
The compensation for expropriated land should be divided into two main parts. The first 
part is to compensate the fixtures of the land, which belong to the occupants, and the other part is 
to compensate the collective as the consideration for their ownership of the land. The first part of 
compensation should be evaluated based on the factual cost or objective value of fixtures, while 
the nature of the second part is the subjective value and a share of the assembly surplus. The 
targeted-land occupants cannot hold up the transaction, because objectively, their additional 
compensations are relatively easier to be evaluated, as is their share of the surplus based on their 
memberships of collectives.  
  
5. The Effects of the LAD Approach on Collectives’ Role 
After the transaction, if the targeted lands are only part of the collective’s land, the 
occupants, who lose their contracted rights, should be allocated new tenures in their collectives 
in addition to receiving other forms of compensation. This is under the collective’s re-adjustment 
power. 
If the whole lands are transferred to the assembler, this means the nature of the whole 
piece of land is already changed to state-owned. These collectives have merged with near cities 
and effectively died. The identification of occupants should be changed to urban residents. The 
procedure of land transaction synchronizes with the step of elimination the discriminative Hukou 
system. The role of the collective continues but gradually withers.  
 
6. The Melioration of Governments’ Roles 
For the new urban residents, local governments are obligated to provide social security 
and other social benefits, which are unavailable to rural residents. However, because of the 
introduction of the LAD, land transactions are not profitable for the governments any more, at 
least not directly. This hurts local governments, especially under their current financial situation. 
An amendment is letting local governments impose tax upon the compensation. The first 
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part of compensation, which is the consideration for fixtures that are being taken, should not be 
taxed there.  
The second part of compensation is the assembly surplus. Local governments could levy 
taxes on the second part, the increase of land value. This information should be publicized before 
the vote, so the market signal would not be distorted. And by doing this, over-assembly due to 
governments’ arbitrary expropriation power would be avoided without decreasing governments’ 
revenue from efficient land assembly. 
 
F. Summary and Comparison of the Proposed Alternatives 
Applying the five requirements to the five proposed alternatives, the amendments to 
expropriation system can be summarized as the table below:  
 
 
Efficient 
Assembly 
Social 
Cost 
Constitutionality 
and Political 
Cost 
Collectives’ 
Role 
Local 
Governments’ 
Acceptance 
Legitimize 
Incomplete 
Property 
! ? ! ? ! 
Privatization ! ! ! ! ! 
Strict 
Regulation 
of 
Government 
! " " " " 
Secret 
Agency 
? " " " " 
Land 
Assembly 
District 
" " " " " 
(Figure 5.1) 
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From this table, we can see that, legitimizing incomplete property and total privatization 
face tremendous potential constitutional and political criticisms. They are both overall reforms of 
the current landownership system that would challenge the collective ownership and the role of 
collectives. Local governments’ resistances to these two proposals would also be serious. More 
than that, the most crucial deficit of those two proposals is that although both of them introduce 
the market into the land allocation system, they cannot solve the anticommons problem. They 
legally exterminate the expropriation system in order to overcome its arbitrary nature, but they 
do not provide any substitution of its efficiency.  
Strict regulation of government is the most conservative alternative. It does not change 
any element of the current landownership system, so the cost of it is the least. Actually, 
strengthening the control of government can improve any governmental arbitrariness. But the 
problem here is that governments are not the right decision-makers of land assembly. They do 
not have enough information to make such interest-driven practices. Even if they tried their best, 
it is still possible their plans will not have successful results. Local governments are not qualified 
as responsible takers of rural land. 
Secret agency needs some amendments to be applied to China’s special legal and social 
circumstances. Under these changes, it can help land assembly, but its advantages in a fully 
market condition recedes.  
The LAD approach maintains the current landownership system, and it avoids 
unnecessary ideological and political challenges. It also dissipates the pressure from dissatisfied 
sellers among its neighborhood, and in turn undergirds collective ownership. On the other side, 
the current collective ownership system legitimizes LAD’s unorthodox land transaction, and its 
management, village committees, provides institutional support to the LAD.  
Therefore, besides strengthening the control of governments, I argue that a better 
alternative to the expropriation system is a mechanism that builds itself upon the LAD’s 
approach. To account for the special differences of China, some special amendments should be 
added. 
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II. Advanced LAD Solution for Multiple-Collective Condition 
 
The Land Assembly District approach can efficiently solve the holdout problem in a 
typical single collective condition, under which all land involved belongs to one collective. Then 
the preexisting village committee provides institutional convenience, and the collective 
landownership reinforces legal justification. In almost all land expropriation cases, the single-
collective LAD solution fulfills the purpose of land assembly.508  
However, these conveniences vanish under the circumstance that the targeted land 
straddles multiple collectives. The holdout problem handled by the LAD is, in Parisi’s 
quintessential example, a kind of physical disunity in which several owners or occupants hold 
fragmented plots. In the multiple-collective condition, the problem is more like a legal disunity 
situation that the policymaker should also consider to balance the disunities between rural 
residents and collectives. When targeted land is located across several villages’ boundaries, the 
owners are different collectives in which different village committees are involved, and the 
occupants are from these different committees. How might we allocate the decision-making 
power among owners and occupants is the main concern of the LAD case in multiple-collective 
condition. 
Local governments usually propel these huge projects that involve multiple collectives. 
For example, the influential Shanghai Disney Resort program, which covers 963 acres in 
Pudong, Shanghai, involves 59 collectives and other urban units.509 Such a gigantic project is 
very rare, and, naturally, local government spends much more time and effort on this sort of 
                                                
508 Every year, the buyer of the most expensive transacted plot of a city is entitled with a nickname “diwang” (land 
king). Even the most expensive transacted plots are usually small. For example, in 2009, the most expensive plot of 
Shanghai, which was closed at 1.2 billion yuan, is 2 million square meters (about 50 acres); Beijing, 2.8 million 
square meters (about 70 acres) at 4 billion yuan; Guangzhou 22 thousand square meters (about 5.5 acres). Large plot 
expropriations usually happened at underpopulated areas where are far away from urban or suburban area, and 
collectives own larger land than their suburban counterparts. Such as an expropriation case in Inner Mongolia, 670 
thousand mu (about 110 thousand acres) was expropriated, and even such a huge plot is hold by one collective.  
 
509 Brooks Barnes, “China Approves a Disney Theme Park in Shanghai,” The New York Times, November 4, 2009, 
accessed July 13, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/04/business/global/04disney.html. 
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complex assembly. However, this is not to say that the market should be excluded from these 
projects and return to the older government-dominated method. Rather, the LAD approach 
should be adjusted to handle these rare conditions.  
 
A. The Institutional Pitfalls of LAD under Multiple-Collective Condition 
In its original condition, the LAD is a flexible institution that contains only the owners of 
the lands involved in the project. And in single collective cases, all lands belong to only one legal 
owner, and the village committee substitutes the LAD institution. But when it comes to multiple-
collective condition, the multiple-collective ownership and the involvement of numerous village 
committees might lack this flexibility.  
 
a. Legally Unjustified 
As I elaborated when I introduced the LAD, the rural residents’ privilege to decide their 
collectives’ lot derived from their membership or citizenship of their own collectives. Even if 
they have no direct contact with the targeted part, the collective, as a legal entity, is probably 
entitled to participate in the deal. The decision-making procedure of collectives should be 
processed on a democratic pattern in which every qualified resident has the right to vote. 
Therefore, the right holders, as the actual occupants, are legally incapable to make the decision 
only by themselves.  
However, under the multiple-collective condition, which means that right holders belong 
to multiple collectives, the decision-making rights of other non-use-right-holder residents 
become muddier and more dubious. It is harder to justify full and equal participation of all of the 
collectives. Under typical circumstances, they might actually be entitled to decide on the fate of 
other collectives’ lands, just because some parts of the targeted land (perhaps even a small 
portion of the total target) are located in their collective. Collective ownership does not legally 
justify this right, and multiple collectives’ ownership may well hamper the efficient conclusion 
of an expropriated land situation.  
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1. The Lack of Organizational Preparation 
Another advantage of applying the LAD to China is that the village committee, the 
preexisting organization, can be utilized to reduce the transaction costs for land assembly 
negotiation. However, when it comes to multiple-collective situation, this advantage vanishes. A 
higher-level democratic organization above the village committees does not exist.  
 
2. Retreat to Use-Right Holders’ Decision and Its Problems 
Even if there is no preexisting organization, it is also possible to apply the LAD approach 
to solving the problem by establishing a new district institution, which consists of occupants of 
the targeted land. If the majority of the users agree to make the deal with the assembler, then this 
fact entitles the new institution to “expropriate” the disapproval holders’ lands. Even if this 
management does not have any legal justification, it could help handle the holdout problem, and 
distract the disapproval holders’ pressure from local governments.  
The problem for this new management is the misbalance between the decision makers 
and the beneficiaries of the transaction. Under the current landownership system, because the 
owners are the collectives, every member should enjoy some part of the compensation or the 
surplus. Then if only occupants are entitled to exercise the power of deciding whether to accept 
the deal, they would ask for more compensation until their shares meet their higher subjective 
value or strategic move prices. The occupants hold stronger power to holdout against other 
collective members’ opportunity to participate in the benefits of the taking. 
In this situation, collective ownership does not help tohandle the holdout problem. 
Instead, the legal disunities bring new problems. Therefore, some amendments must be made to 
maintain the LAD in multiple-collective situations. In later parts, several different approaches 
will be discussed.  
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B. The Resurrection of the Collective Decision Approach 
An alternative solution for multiple-collective decisions is to revive the collective 
decision approach that every collective as an independent entity individually participates to the 
decision-making based on the ownership of the piece of land located within its boundary.  
 
a. All Qualified Residents being The Qualified Voters? 
The first question for this Collective Decision Approach is to decide who the legitimate 
voters for the decision are. The answer should be all qualified residents of the collective, not only 
the occupants, because it is more legally justified for all qualified residents to decide their 
collective’s land use, as they legally entitled to do. Besides the legal issue, only allowing 
occupants to vote will unfairly lever the bargaining position of minority occupants, and that will 
deteriorate the holdout problem but not solve it.  
 
1. The Holdout Problem under Only-Occupants-as-Voters Condition 
Suppose an assembly plan involves two collectives’ land. One collective owns the 
majority of the targeted land occupied by more residents, while the other collective owns a minor 
piece occupied by fewer residents. Under the collective decision approach, because both of the 
two collectives hold equal votes, the minority occupants could veto the assembly if they were not 
satisfied with their compensation. In this situation, the minority occupants’ holdout power 
increases even than in a private ownership situation, which contradicts the purpose of the LAD 
approach.  
 
2. The Advantage of All-Qualified-Residents as Qualified Voters 
Letting all qualified members of involved collectives to vote can solve the problem. In 
this situation, the key values of the vote are the two median residents’ reservation prices. If the 
compensation offered meets their amounts, the occupants’ strategic moves would be inessential. 
Based on the two median residents’ approvals, the two collectives vote for the plan.  
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3. The Holdout Problem among multiple collectives 
If every qualified resident can take part in the final vote, the number of voters would be 
hundreds if not thousands; on the other hand, only several collectives would actually be involved 
in an assembly. For example, in a two-collectives-involved assembly, the failure of one 
collective’s sanction would hold up the assembly, even if the majority of the two collectives’ 
residents are inclined to make the deal.510 
When the voters’ rights transfer from individual residents, as in a single collective LAD, 
to collectives, another holdout problem might occur. When the number of decision makers 
dramatically shrinks, the weight of every vote elevates; so, every vote matters to the final 
transaction. Therefore, this approach transfers the holdout position from minor collective 
occupants to the median qualified residents of collectives.  
 
4. Signaling problem 
The holdout position of an occupant is obvious in the occupant decision approach, but it 
is easy for the assembler to identify who holds the holdout power. On the other hand, under the 
all-qualified-residents decision pattern, the holdout voter is indiscernible. In other words, the key 
voter will not be signaled out before or during the bargaining.  
This signaling difficulty creates another obstruction to assembly. Suppose that in the first-
round election, the assembler lost the key collective by offering lower than its median resident’s 
reservation price. A reasonable assembler would bid up in the next round. However, it is 
impossible to identify the median resident, and then it is hard for the assembler to fix the second 
offer. During the process, the delay costs increase. 
The second-round vote might be worse for the assembler because the median resident 
                                                
510 Suppose in a two collectives involved assembly, both of the collectives have 100 residents. 90 collective A 
residents vote for the plan; while 55 collective B residents vote against it. The plan will be abnegated because only 
one collective endorses it, although the majority residents (145/200) of the related collectives consent to the 
assembly.  
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might change. Some previous pro-assembly residents might change their minds and turn into 
strategic players when they detect that they are able to hold up the assembly and enforce the 
assembler to bid up. 
This problem might not only affect the key collective’s residents but also encourage 
residents of pro-assembly collectives to vote strategically during the second round, and try to put 
their own collective in a better bargaining position.   
Therefore, under the collective decision approach, it is hard for the assembler to find out 
the key residents and their reservation prices. Costly delay will probably occur during the 
multiple rounds of vote.  
 
C. Universal Suffrage Approach 
Another way to amend the multiple-collective LAD can be labeled the “universal 
suffrage approach.” Under this approach, every resident of the collectives involved in the 
assembly hold equal rights to vote; then based on the majority rule, the assembly process should 
be decided without any privileged voter.  
 
a. Qualified Voters 
The basic theory of the revised LAD solution under China’s rural land assembly 
condition is that every collective resident is entitled to decide on the taking of every piece of land 
that belongs to their collective. This is the first step and justified by collective landownership.  
Here, the universal suffrage approach aims to solve two different levels of holdout 
problems: the holdout problem within a collective and between multiple collectives.  
 
1. The First Expansion of Decision-Making Subject: within Collectives 
The economic and moral intuition underlying the original LAD approach is that persons 
who hold a legal interest in a neighborhood’s land should collectively decide whether the land 
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ought to be assembled into a larger parcel.511 Based on this theory, LADs are entitled to exercise 
the power of eminent domain over all of the land located within the district’s jurisdiction.  
Based on the collective’s ownership system, residents are not only economically or 
morally justified to exercise their rights to make decisions regarding the land they do not 
physically control; they are also legally entitled to do that. In other words, the election on this 
level was legally justified before the LAD approach is made. Residents legitimately solve this 
first holdout problem by wielding their rights from their collective resident’s identities. 
 
2. The Second Expansion of Decision-Making Subject: between Collectives 
The holdout problem also occurs on the collective level. Collectives as individual players 
make decisions for themselves through a democratic procedure within them. However, when the 
assembly involves multiple collectives, other collectives can void a collective’s decision by 
voting against the assembly. This is another, a different holdout problem, and it is necessary to 
make an amendment to the original approach in order to take account of this difference. The 
basic idea is still that persons who hold a legal interest in a neighborhood’s land should 
collectively decide whether the land ought to be assembled into a larger parcel. In contrast to the 
problem within single collectives, however, there is no legal basis to support this approach; the 
advanced multiple-collective approach might be economically and morally justified but not 
legally. 
Qualified voters of the multiple-collective assembly are all residents of target collectives, 
as if the assembly is done separately. Under this approach, non-occupants are entitled to make 
decisions for the land even if some parts of it is located in other collectives. 
The basic units of a multiple-collective condition LAD are collectives, and all their 
residents are legally justified to make a decision with regard to every piece of land within the 
expropriated area. Then every collective involved should take part in the decision-making for 
every piece of land involved in the plan. Every resident who should receive compensation from 
                                                
511 Heller and Hills, “Land Assembly Districts,” 1465-527.  
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the assembly is equally entitled to decide the plan. And the signaling problem is relieved by the 
fact that the assembler only needs to find out one median resident instead of the median residents 
of all involved collectives. 
 
b. Gerrymander: Artificial Multiple-Collective Condition 
The universal suffrage approach helps solve the legal disunities introduced by collective 
ownerships, lowers the transaction costs of identifying median residents, and in turn avoids 
costly delay. Nonetheless, this approach can also be abused by the assembler to harm the 
landowners. 
Assemblers can easily rewrite their plans to create a multiple-collective condition if they 
anticipate hostility from the target collectives. Then the qualified voter subject is enlarged to all 
residents of the involved collectives, including any collectives that are friendly to the assemblers. 
Even if the majority of true target collective residents votes against the plan, assemblers might 
still achieve success if they get enough support from allies. 
In this situation, the friendly collectives’ nominal lands are worthless to the assemblers; 
the most valuable asset to them is cooperation with the assemblers. Then they can charge much 
more than the prices of the target lands if they are still lower than the costly delay.  
The nature of this problem is that the real targeted land residents’ rights to make decision 
can be easily diluted by assemblers’ manipulating the boundaries of plans. At the same time, this 
possibility creates a rent-seeking problem. If adjacent collectives could be utilized to demolish 
the bargaining equilibrium, the collectives whose participation in the assemblies would create no 
wealth but reallocate the benefits. 
This gerrymander problem is not unique to China’s condition. In its original 
circumstance, the assembler could also buy friendly neighbors to come into the LAD. The 
question here is how to distinguish the true target from the assemblers’ white knights. If this 
question is left unanswered, many single collective LADs inclined not to approve an assembly 
will be circumvented if the assemblers can buy their allies in tangent collectives.  
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D. “Bicameralism” Approach 
An amendment approach could be to set up a bicameralism system, under which both the 
individual residents and collectives vote separately to decide the plan.  
The main idea of bicameralism is to count the election twice. The first election counts all 
residents’ votes, pro and con. In the second election,  every collective counts its residents’ votes 
separately, and the majorities decide their collectives’ pros or cons. A valid assembly should be 
endorsed by both counts.  
 
a. The Necessary of Counting the Second Round 
Under the Universal Suffrage Approach, target land residents’ votes can be easily diluted 
by assemblers’ manipulations. Therefore, the true target collective’s power should be reinforced.  
For example, suppose the majorities of two target collectives do not accept an assembly 
plan. The assembler buys an adjacent collective’s residents vote in favor of the plan. The pro 
assembly voters would win the first round if the adjacent collective were populous enough. 
However, the plan cannot pass the second round unless the target collectives count as two votes 
while the adjacent target only counts as one vote.  
If the assembler still wants to get the target land, it has to buy more votes for the second 
round, but the cost of buying allies increases. The assembler has to invest to search for more 
friendly collectives and must pay to discipline the big numbers of “agents.”  
The purpose of bicameralism is to level the cost of gerrymander manipulating, and to 
push rational assemblers to bargain honestly with the original target collectives.  
 
b. The New Holdout Problem of “Bicameralism” Approach 
The purpose of all discussions about the multiple-collective approach is to eliminate two 
types of holdout problem – within and between collectives. In the “bicameralism approach,” the 
holdout problem between collectives might return because the approach gives much power to the 
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collective entities. 
Suppose the target land is located in two collectives, and only a small piece of land 
belongs to one of those collectives, which is constituted of a small number of residents. The 
minor collective can easily hold up the transaction by voting against it in the second count, even 
if most of the residents involved in the transaction and the collective that owns the majority of 
the target land agree to transact. 
However, this problem can be solved by assemblers’ moves under the approach without 
changing the whole system. In this circumstance, assemblers are economically “justified” to 
bring their allies into the plan and dilute minor collectives’ holdout power. Nonetheless, if both 
of the major and minor collectives disapprove the plan, the assembler’s cost of buying allies will 
be much higher. It must make sure its allies outnumber the target collectives’ residents, and also 
outnumber the target collectives as entities. 
 
E. Proportional Suffrage Approach 
Another approach to level the cost of gerrymandering is to proportionate the voting 
rights. For example, if the part of the targeted land that belongs to Collective A is a, and b 
belongs to Collective B, their voices in the election are based on the relative acreage of their 
land. Suppose that there are x qualified residents in Collective A, and y in Collective B. The total 
weight of Collective A’s vote is a, so the weight of every Collective A’s right is a/x. The total 
weight of Collective B’s vote is b/(a+b), and the weight of every Collective B’s right is b / (ay). 
Under this approach, if the assembler plans to buy an agent, it has to buy a big part of 
land (a bigger “b” in b/(a+b)) located in its friendly collective to make sure its residents can push 
through the plan. At the same time, the dissatisfied minor collective as discussed in part D cannot 
lever their power if their land just takes a small part of the plan (their “b” is too small). 
In this chapter, I have attempted to contribute to the discussions about assemblers’ power 
of manipulating the LAD’s boundary. This phenomenon is not unique to China’s rural collective 
landownership condition but could also happen in a private landownership condition if LAD is 
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implemented. To solve this problem, the system should lever the cost of the assembler’s 
manipulation, and push it to pay more to the sellers and make a deal. Specifically in China’s 
condition, the “bicameralism” approach and the proportional suffrage approach can be used to 
amend the original LAD. In these ways, assemblers’ manipulation power can be checked, and 
also the holdout problem between collectives can also be solved. 
 
III. The Necessary Setting for the Proposed Solutions 
 
Any institutional reform is “rebuilding the ship at sea.”512 New institutional arrangements 
do not work in the field as they do in abstract models “unless the models are well specified, 
empirically valid, and the participants in a field setting understand how to make the new rules 
work.”513 So, even if a unified reform ultimately proved to be necessary, it would be more 
prudent to do it under a fully developed institutional arrangement.514 The successful management 
of the current rural-urban landownership system or other state-owned system requires more than 
choosing the right institutions. No matter what institutions are chosen, a capable state and a well-
functioning political participation system and social environment are necessary to support it.  
 
A. A state landownership system under a capable state and well-functioning political 
participation environment: Israel as an example 
Today Israel is the only democratic, advanced-economy country where state or quasi-
state agencies own the vast majority of the land area, and where government leaseholds 
predominate the land system. However, Israel’s triumph is not a success of centralized anti-
                                                
512 See Jon Elster, Claus Offe and Ulrich K. Preuss, Institutional design in post-communist societies: rebuilding the 
ship at sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
 
513 See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action (Cambridge: 
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247 
market economy. Actually, Israel’s overwhelmingly large public leasehold system has resulted in 
special policies tailored to accommodate it to the private market.515  
 
a. Israel’s State Landownership System 
Clause 1 of the Basic Law: Israel Lands (of 1960) defines “Israel Lands” as owned by 
one of three agencies: the State of Israel, the Jewish National Fund (JNF) or the Development 
Authority. These three categories together are called “national land.” The 1960 Israel Lands 
Administration Law states that all three categories of national land are to be administered by the 
Israel Lands Council (the policy-making body) and the Israel Lands Administration (the 
managing body). The JNF appoints half (less one) of the members of the council, while the 
government appoints the other half (plus one). As a result, 93% of the land in Israel is nationally 
owned, and individuals use these lands as lessees.516  
However, this does not mean the state maintains much power to interfere in the 
marketplace. First, the state is not able to expropriate the land or terminate leases by wielding its 
ownership power. Lessees hold uninhibited right to transfer urban-sector leases at their full 
market value to (almost) anyone at anytime. The real-estate market is very vibrant and represents 
about 12% of the GDP, even though most of that market is under leasehold. More than that, the 
Cabinet and the Lands Council also decided that the Israeli public leasehold system (in the urban 
sector) should not be used for the purpose of land use planning control.517  
 
b. Ideological Origin and Cumulative Readjustments 
Then why did Israel choose this national landownership system? As is the case in China, 
Israel has strong legal and ideological constraints to the transfer of title from national land into 
                                                
515 Rachelle Alterman, “Israel’s Extensive Public Landownership in an Era of Privatization,” in Leasing Public 
Land; Policy Debates and International Experiences, ed. Steven C. Bourassa and Yu-Hung Hong (Cambridge, 
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private hands. The Zionist principle of national landownership,518  which received Zionist 
Congress approval in 1907, was subsequently anchored in Israeli legislation and remains the 
basis of Israel’s national land policy to this day. More than that, a more practical reason is that 
public landownership was seen as a key instrument for achieving the country’s territorial and 
demographic stabilization during Israel’s incipient years.519  
The concept of private landownership has become so dominant in Israel that it has 
gradually encroached into the very idea of public landownership. Over the years, various public 
committees have repeatedly attempted to weaken the principle barring the transfer of ownership 
of nationally owned land. But why has this privatization movement still not become dominant in 
Israeli law? Besides the ideological and political reasons, a more important reason might be that 
the current system strongly protects individuals’ private property rights, even if they lack the 
ownership title.  
Over the decades, most of the property rights gaps between leasehold and freehold have 
been gradually closed. The market’s reaction is a very good signal. The marketplace has never 
been sensitive to the duration of time before the lease runs out. A lease may have only a few 
years remaining, yet the potential buyers will rarely ask about that, nor are they likely to 
negotiate the price accordingly. The property rights granted de facto to leaseholders have 
gradually come to resemble freehold ownership.  
But those readjustments did not come from nowhere. The first few dozens of residential 
leaseholds expired in the 1970s, and the administrator in charge simply sent a notice to the 
residents in accordance with the dry language of the lease.520 According to those leases, upon 
                                                
518 Israel’s national land policy was shaped largely by Zionist ideology at the end of the 19th century. The land Policy 
was also influenced by the Ottoman Lands Law of 1858. See Daniel Friedmann, “The Effect of Foreign Law on the 
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tools that enabled the achievement of population distribution and Jewish presence goals. 
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expiration, the lessee would be obligated to vacate the premises. The lessee would then be 
entitled to receive from the Lands Administration the value of the fixtures (buildings, trees) that 
had been added to the land, just as in China. The notice generously allowed the leaseholders to 
extend the lease for another period, but only if they paid the full reassessment value of the 
property for the new period. Given the high real estate prices in Israel relative to average income, 
the residents raised their voices in protest. Then the Land Council in 1976 and subsequently in 
1986 developed rules that the lessee has the right to extend the lease for another term without 
any up-front payment and for only one-fifth the annual rent payments charged for initial lease. 
 
c. Short Summary: Israel’s Experience 
Even if the Lands Administration failed to develop a coherent policy in advance of the 
first waves of expirations, lessees’ political participation pushed the legislature onto the right 
track. Although Alterman calls the process “crawling privatization,” its nature was interactions 
and negotiations between the government and massive lessees under a well-functioning political 
environment. And the main issue was how to allocate the profits from real estate. The outcome 
does not have to be revolutionary or populist but cumulative. Until today, even though the 
ideological basis is receding, and the near-monopoly of the Israel Lands Administration no 
longer is immune from challenge, the state landownership system remains, and works well. No 
revolutionary privatization has taken place. 
China’s rural residents’ voice was released through the “mass events” like the Wukan 
protests. In some degree, the government responded to that voice either by local officials’ 
conciliations or by the central government announcement conceding error, as in the communiqué 
of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the party. However, this is not 
enough for a well-functioning political environment. 
  
B. A Broaden Perspective: Political Participation and China’s Modernization 
At the very beginning, the collective institution was designed to organize agricultural 
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production and to facilitate the government to take the output to support centralized 
industrialization. It realized the old Regimes’ dream, forging an unmediated link to the rural 
producers. This dream provided the historical foundations of the collectivist experiment.521 
Before the New China, a local elite caste that Kuhn calls “middlemen” used to manage local 
affairs and mediate the conflicts between massive rural residents and the governments. With the 
series of land reforms of the 20th century, these middlemen, as landlords, were annihilated. A new 
cadre cast of party members substituted for them. Their mission was not to organize political 
participation among rural residents but to control the rural areas efficiently.  
 
a. Where did the problem come from: Kuhn’s Dilemmas 
Kuhn points two dilemmas that ancient China bequeathed to the modern Chinese state.  
The first is “how to harness or control the political energies of the mass of educated men 
who could not be absorbed by careers in government.”522 During late ancient China, the spread 
of wealth and education generated increasing numbers of classically literate men; the gateway 
quotas for examination degrees remained quite stable. In local communities, these elites were 
commonly involved in proxy tax-remittance and litigation, both of which were illegal and, in 
some instances, disruptive to local order from government’s point of view. Local literati without 
government jobs were the pool for “parapolitical” elites523 that were active on the local level in a 
realm of officially sanctioned power outside the official system. This group was similar to the 
English of the 19th century as described by Walter Bagehot: “an intelligent and political people” 
who had a sustained interest in public affairs, even though only a minority were franchised to 
participate in those affairs.524  
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The second is “how to govern a huge, complex society with a small field 
administration.”525 Though the population had more than doubled during the late 18th century, the 
number of county-scale units, which were the basic government units, had barely changed at all. 
The result was that the size and complexity of county societies was drastically out of scale with 
the administrative forces charged with controlling and taxing them.526 By the mid-eighteenth 
century, China’s static political framework could barely contain its expanding, dynamic society 
and economy. Not only was the number of counties static; county bureaucratic staffs did not 
grow to meet the expanding needs of government. As the lowest bureaucratically certified 
imperial official, the county magistrate was dependent on a staff of local men who were neither 
evaluated nor disciplined by the central government. The land market, for example, was in chaos; 
a rising population and a relatively free market in land had made tax collection increasingly 
difficult and expensive. In fact it had raised the costs of all aspects of local administration, costs 
that had to be met by whatever the magistrate’s agents could extract from the people. No new 
institutions for the state to penetrate into rural society, or alternatively some forms of local self-
government were built to regulate this nexus of state and society.  
 
b. An alternative path: The First Failure of local self government 
The fundamental reforms of the first decade of the twentieth century established a local 
tax base and possible functional political participation system for the first time. Merchants and 
literati who participated in the “local self-government” movement of the 1900s obtained the 
power to tax their own communities for projects such as Western-style police and schools (to 
name only the most expensive items). This local self-government movement synchronized with 
the self-government experiment in Shanghai Municipal Council, or might have been inspired and 
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encouraged by it. 
For local elites, here was a chance to wrest fiscal authority from their old enemies the 
subbureaucracy of county clerks. From the viewpoint of the state, however, “local self-
government” turned out to be an annoying competitor for revenue. More than that, between 
county towns and rural villages were inserted new administrative units, which were eventually 
standardized at roughly the scale of the market-community, and known as townships. Those were 
the stage for local elites’ participation.527  
Bringing merchants and lower elite, graduates of new style schools, and students returned 
from abroad into public life was a hallmark of the new movement and the community it sought 
to create. Old barriers to political participation were falling. However, this experiment was 
terminated by the communist regime. This local elite level was defeated by a more powerful 
central government. Besides distributing land to destitute peasants, the land reform that occurred 
between 1950 and 1952 destroyed local elites as an economic and political force, often by killing 
them.528 Then there was no resistance to the new state’s reform. Therefore, the new regime not 
only stopped the self-government and political participation movement in urban areas like 
Shanghai, but also in rural areas.  
 
C. The Social and Political Setting of Proposed Solutions 
The core of the proposed solutions is to reconcile the conflicts between the rural area 
behind which is the under-organized rural residents, and the urban area behind which is the 
state’s power. Therefore, the setting of solutions is the rule of law, which restricts the 
government’s power, and a liberal community of self-governance, which enhances rural 
residents’ political participation.  
A liberal community is a voluntary association free from external and internal coercion, 
which requires both the self-refraining and endorsement of state power. Externally, the supreme 
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power of the state tends to encroach on the autonomy of the local community.529 The state must 
restrict itself in order to prevent external coercion. Internally, the old cadre level should be 
retransferred into a well-educated elite level that is capable of running a modern local 
autonomous mechanism instead of obeying upper-level government’s orders, or even worse, 
engaging in graft and cashing out its power like the Wukan village’s cadres.  
Specifically, the LAD solution needs rural residents to really govern themselves and to 
make their collectives into liberal communities free from external coercion. This requires the 
reform of the current Organic Law of the Villagers’ Committee. First, the relationship between 
the village-level party branch and the village committee should be changed. As a self-governance 
institution, the village committee should be the supreme power organ of the village, and it should 
not be subject to the lead of any other institution, at least in the land transaction field. The 
village-level party branch may monitor, but not lead, the activities of the village committee.530 
Second, the government of the township or any upper-level should refrain from intervening in 
the internal affairs of a village, especially village elections. With the relationship between the 
village committee and the village-level party branch changed, the external coercion from the 
government can be greatly weakened.  
Direct elections have been implemented in many Chinese villages and many problems 
arose also, which has led some to argue that grassroots democracy might not work for Chinese 
rural residents.531 Those problems originated either in the external coercion of the governments, 
such as designating the village cadre candidates and denying some dissenting villagers’ 
candidateship, or in the internal coercion of influential individuals, who used their wealth or 
violence to disrupt the villagers’ free voting. These problems do not disprove the utility of self-
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governance. Instead, their existence calls for real self-governance of villagers under and 
protected by the rule of law. 
LAD is a more powerful device than zoning in that it can be used legally to protect rural 
residents’ rights more seriously. If this system is introduced without a well-governing setting, 
local governments and related developers can easily corrupt it and transfer it into another legal 
tool to expropriate rural residents, just as they are doing with collective rural landownership. 
 
IV. A Practical Agenda of LAD 
 
As illustrated above, the necessary setting is not available in China. In other words, 
currently, China has not have a comprehensively mature civil society to support a modern self-
governing institution, like LAD. Therefore, applying LAD to China should be synchronized with 
the process of rural autonomy. If the LAD institution were built upon the current centralized or 
hierarchical rural administrative background, it would be usurped by local governments to justify 
their exploitations from land assembly with the cooperation of rural cadres. The antagonistic 
interests between rural residents and developers would not manifest in arm’s length bargains, but 
be covered behind local governments and rural cadres’ orders and obedience.  
Based on these concerns, a practical agenda of LAD should not be simplified as revisions 
or amendments of statutes. It should be considered in a dynamically transitional background 
where the change of law follows the experimental but “not-prefect-legal” practices instead of 
leads such practices. Therefore, a feasible way is selecting some ideal experimental areas to 
show LAD’s advantages and then promote it. During this process, a detailed LAD-forming 
regulation or regulations (in different areas there might be slightly different regulations to see 
which formulation works best, all other things equal ) will be proposed and tested. At this stage, 
jurists’ role is justifying these experiments or defending them against legal attacks from vested 
interests. After the efficiency of LAD is widely acknowledged, then comes the need of 
complementary statutes to codify this established institution. This should be the practical agenda 
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of LAD.  
 
A. The Pattern of LAD: Legislation first or Practice first 
Deng always used an expression to stand for the pattern of the reform he led, the 
reformers “groped for the stepping stones as [they] crossed the river.”532 One way of interpreting 
this shows that the reformers did not have a clear blueprint for the whole reform from Mao’s era. 
It also describes a unique reform pattern different from other prior-socialism countries. Any 
politically controversial declaration or agenda of privatization or democratization has never been 
clearly claimed. In the meantime, the central authority selectively ignored the ideological 
sensitivity of some grassroots-initiated local unorthodox experiments, or even granted provincial 
officials some extended liberty to break certain ideological principles. The Xiaogang village case 
(the initiative of the HCRS mentioned in Chapter 4) belongs to the first category, and the 
Shenzhen special economic zone (SEZ) exemplifies the second. Under this pattern, the central 
authority’s prior purposeful law changing and enforcement are not necessary if not harmful. 
However, the state’s knowing ignorance or passive support of voluntary experiments from the 
bottom is essential to the reform. 
The proposed LAD reform should also be practiced in this way. On one hand, through 
this pragmatic pattern, the Party’s political risk would be minimized. If the LAD goes wrong 
under a certain local unique background, it would not jeopardize the established system. More 
than that, it leaves the authority room to readjust the policy. On the other hand, if the LAD turns 
out successfully in the experiments, it would win people’s acceptance, especially the rural 
residents whose benefits are most likely to be harmed by the current expropriation system. 
Therefore, to promote the LAD, wisely selecting experimental areas is essential to the reform. 
Successful experiments would contribute to build a consensus between officials and society. 
For choosing the samples, the decision maker should consider their variety, selecting 
samples from different provinces (inland and coastal). At the same time, because the interests of 
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several participants are involved, several other issues should also be considered. As illustrated, 
the expropriation benefits are vital to local governments, and the LAD will help rural residents to 
share more from that. Therefore, the chosen areas’ local governments should be under 
comparatively lesser local debt pressure, while the social costs or the rural residents’ resistance 
to expropriation should be above the average. Then the local government would be driven to 
implement the LAD, and these experiments would also test the LAD’s capability to handle social 
tensions. For this concern, the sample units should be chosen among prefecture-level cities. Their 
urbanization process is more vigorous, so the problems within the process are more common, 
and they usually have more ways to handle local finance problem than lower county-level cities.  
Also, to simplify the first experiments, we should consider only single-collective LADs.  
 
B. The Details of LAD Formation 
As mentioned in Heller’s original proposal for the LAD, the rules for LAD formation can 
be divided into four stages: rules about (a) who would be permitted to propose a LAD; (b) which 
government agency would initially approve the LAD; (c) how LAD proposals would be 
publicized and negotiated with the residents affected; and (d) how LADs would be approved 
through vote of the involved residents. These four stages give China’s LAD practice a basic 
structure. 
 
a. Who Initiates the LAD and what is the government’s role? 
In the original LAD, the residents or an assembler as a promoter would propose a LAD to 
city planners, including its boundaries and proposed uses. The logic of excluding governments 
from this stage is sound under a competitive free land market. Technically, however, even after a 
LAD is implemented in China, it will not change governments’ role of converting collective-
owned land into state-owned land. They are still legally “taking” rural residents’ land. Therefore, 
the local government can be qualified as a LAD promoter. 
The process of initiation of the LAD should be like this. First, if the government has a 
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specific scheme for the land, it could still “sell” its permit under the scheme by the traditional 
“public tender” or “auction” way (illustrated in Chapter 2). However, it cannot guarantee the 
taking goes smoothly, or in other words; this price does not buy rural residents’ cooperation. 
Then the price will be lower than the prior expropriation way. Second, if the government 
anticipates the assembly would create a tough bargaining process, it can initiate the LAD by 
itself. Compared to the original LAD, the government’s invention happens at a very early stage. 
If the government does not initiate the LAD, the assembler and rural residents are free to 
negotiate in the traditional way. Even if the analysis in Chapter 4 shows that China’s current land 
is highly fragmented, it does not say hold out or anticommons problem must occur in every 
assembly case. In other words, even in the experimental areas, a LAD should not be a mandatory 
process. 
If the government does not initiate a LAD, and the assembler cannot make deals with all 
rural residents, any rural resident involved and the assembler itself are free to initiate a LAD. In 
the original LAD structure, a LAD could be promoted by a nonprofit organization trying to 
revitalize an economically stagnant block, and then sell it or part of it to other builders.533 At 
least during the experiment period in China, this more aggressive way will not be permitted, 
because the state or local government still holds the advance power to dictate whether an 
assembly meets its criterion. Before it “sells” its permit to the assembler, local government 
almost always has a specific plan for the target area. Therefore, if a nonprofit organization’s 
initiation of a LAD is permitted, the government will lose more control of the process of 
urbanization, and then the resistance from the government will be more dramatic.  
To sum up, only local governments, involved rural residents, and assemblers who 
purchase governments’ permits will be able to summon LADs. And a LAD is not a mandatory 
procedure during the rural-urban land conversion. However, if an assembler’s compensation 
cannot pass the LAD’s final vote, the LAD can veto the plan, even if the assembler has bought 
the permit from local government. Then the local government is not justified to exile rural 
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residents or to demolish their property. This does not mean local governments are released from 
later procedures. They must oversee the procedure, from prohibiting assemblers’ bullying to 
hosting collectives’ hearings, to making sure LADs have followed efficient and transparent 
processes.   
 
b. Negotiations for a Final Vote and the Roles of Party Branch and Village Committee 
To educate the residents about the potential benefits and costs of a LAD, the government 
would hold a series of hearings in which the private land assembler or the local governments 
could make the case for land assembly to the rural residents.534 This stage is the core of the LAD, 
and it corresponds with the reform of “publication of administrative affairs of the village.”535 It 
guarantees the party cadres or village committee leaders not dictate the sale of land without rural 
residents’ endorsement. It avoids cases like that of the  Wukan event where residents felt 
deceived and irritated due to a lack of knowledge of the collective’ loss of land. 
Heller emphasized that “more aggressive in-person canvassing” could be engaged to 
“increase attendance where the neighbors might be primarily renters or low-income 
households.”536 His concern is that all involved residents should be fully informed, and then their 
voices with full information should be heard during the decision-making. For the same reasons, 
China’s LAD should be more focused on the roles of collectives’ party branches and village 
committees’ cadres. 
In the current circumstance, these cadres are under more direct controls by party 
disciplinesso it is natural that they support the plan endorsed by higher level governments. The 
problem here is the LAD should isolate their normal supports from the traditional institutional 
privileges. They have more resources to communicate with rural residents, and this is permitted, 
but they should bully or coerce other voters’ decision making. More important, the opposition 
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should be given the equal liberty to organize themselves and to persuade the swing voters. This 
might not need to be mentioned in western society, but it is very important in China’s 
circumstances. This liberty could be understood as a pure economic institution, but if it is labeled 
as an unorthodox political movement, it will be forbidden or punished. If the organization and 
exercise of opposition were forbidden, atomized opposition would be much easier to be forced to 
vote involuntarily, even if it takes the majority of all voters.  
 
c. The Vote 
As reasoned earlier in this chapter, all involved residents should be entitled equal votes as 
collective members. The problem here is the collective members are changing. The number 
increases through joining the collective by marriage or newborns, or decreases through migrating 
to cities or members’ deaths. In a limited time, these changes might not be huge, but for some 
specific households these occurrences dramatically affect their voices on the voting and later 
benefits sharing.  
This is not a problem introduced by a LAD but is common during every current 
expropriation case. A normal way to solve it is entitling compensation based on the household 
registration system. Once the information about an expropriation is released, the government 
“freezes” the household registration system change and allocates compensation based on the 
registration before. In a LAD, this qualification requirement should be maintained. Or in other 
words, without proper privatization, a comparative strict voter qualification requirement is still 
needed in a LAD.  
Also, to protect this liberty from bullying, a secret ballot should be a mandatory process 
during the voting. In Heller’s original LAD, a secret ballot or not was not mentioned or not even 
worth considering. However, combined with the liberty of opposition organization, a secret 
ballot is critical to guarantee rural residents’ free choices. Whether from cadres’ bullying or fears 
of hurting relatives or neighbors’ feelings, China’s rural residents’ free choices are more fragile 
than their counterparts in the U.S. 
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d. The Enforcement of the Vote 
The whole point of a LAD is to restrain governments’ expropriation or eminent domain 
power. Thereforeas Heller says, “if the neighbors refuse to approve a LAD, then all possibility 
of assembly by any means other than voluntary private assembly would be at an end.” In China’s 
circumstance, voluntary private assembly or transaction is out of the picture from the very 
beginning, so if someone initiates a LAD, it will nearly be the only way to close the assembly. If 
one round of vote is refused, the assembler should amend its offer to the residents and then 
initiate another vote.  
The cost of the assemblers’ canvassing and the administration of the votes should be paid 
by the assemblers, even if the assembler does not initiate the LAD. It will push the assembler to 
share the time benefits from prompt assembly. However, these opposition residents should pay 
the cost of their activities. On one hand, their transaction costs to communicate with other 
residents are comparatively low because they usually live in the neighborhoods and know each 
other well. On the other hand, if the reimbursement of opposition’s spends is allowed, it would 
also ask for detailed financial reports. When rural autonomy just starts, it is rational to assume 
rural residents’ organization usually lacks well-disciplined organizers. Opposition rural residents, 
especially in these temporal groups, do not have high incentives to keep the organization honest. 
Therefore, under an immature autonomous culture, these groups will easily become corrupted if 
they have the chance. If that happens, the governments or other antagonistic parties will have 
excuses to terminate the opposition groups. Then a pure economic institution will turn into 
another highly political battlefield. For this reason, even if the no-reimbursement policy seems 
unfair to the opposition in the short-term, it is necessary for a long-term healthy LAD institution.   
In another way of thinking, if the insurgent opposition groups successfully postpone the 
assembly, their costs will be reimbursed in the assemblers’ later offers. If they fail, it means their 
holdout moves cost instead of benefit for themselves. Therefore, rational residents would drop 
nuisance defiance, and it makes assembly process more smoothly.   
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C. Jurists’ Role in this process 
Under the special pattern of China’s reforms, the Party’s knowing ignorance is necessary. 
Better than only ignorance, the Party expressly stated that the land expropriation system should 
be reformed, and the rural residents’ share of gain from land conversions should also be 
increased.537 However, it does not mean an active overall law change for a LAD is necessary. A 
LAD involves property law, administrative law, and even constitutional law aspects. A brand 
new hardcore “LAD law,” even it is a perfectly detailed institution, might contradict with other 
higher-level laws. The modification of all these laws to accommodate “the LAD law” before the 
experimental period will postpone the experiments significantly and draw more attacks from 
political and even legal concerns. Therefore, it is probably not a smart way to propel legislation 
first.   
It does not mean the jurists are useless before or during the LAD experiments. On the 
contrary, they should try their best to defend the LAD under the current legal environment. For 
example, a LAD is just a way to maintain the constitutional rural collective landownerships 
instead of to subvert it. And a LAD does not deprive the state of its constitutional expropriation 
power but is just a technical method to implement the compensation, which is also stipulated in 
the constitution and the law of land administration.  
More than that, jurists should help these experimental areas’ governments to stipulate 
some guidelines for the LAD practices. These guidelines should be based on the principles 
discussed above, but not too strictly, or it would harm the purpose of the experiments, which is to 
find a suitable and flexible application of LAD.  
Also, jurists and other lawyers should participate in the practice of the LADs by helpubg 
rural residents, especially the oppositions, organize themselves, monitoring the process of vote, 
and enforcing the results.  
 
                                                
537  Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the CPC (2013). 
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D. Empirical Studies after a period of experiments 
After a period of time, say three years, more data will be available. The more concrete 
analysis about the correlation between governments’ public services and their benefits from 
expropriation will be possible. For example, whether the local governments where a LAD is 
implemented would invest less in the infrastructure than others? Would they be more reluctant to 
invest because urbanization or land expropriation is less profitable for them? Or would they be 
more enthusiastic to invest in infrastructure and promote more friendly policies to attract higher 
valuable assemblies to make up the loss from fewer shares from land compensation? If rural 
residents enjoy more shares after a LAD is introduced, where will they invest these profits? If 
they invest for local infrastructure and construction, is it a more efficient way of urbanization? 
The most important one is whether a LAD efficiently reduces mass events like the Wukan event 
than does the traditional expropriation way. 
These questions could be answered after empirical comparisons between the samples of 
LAD cities and other traditional expropriation ones. But a period of stable LAD experiments 
must be implemented seriously. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
I. The Sequel of the Wukan Case 
 
On November 28, 2014, Zhu Mingguo, the Deputy of the Guangdong Provincial Party 
Committee whose appearance and participation finally appeased the Wukan villagers, was 
reported as being investigated by the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the 
Communist Party of China (CCDI).538 The investigation concluded that he had abused his power 
and said that he had taken “massive bribes” as kickbacks for giving preferential treatment in the 
promotions of officials and operations of some businesses. As bribery constituted a criminal 
offense, his case was moved to the appropriate legal authorities for prosecution.539 Mr. Zhu’s 
political wisdom, which saved the Wukan event, did not save himself, and it will not save other 
similar “mass events” anymore. However, his former colleagues and successors have to face the 
same problems, how to deal with the dissatisfied rural residents and how to balance the regional 
finances.  
Yang Semao, the former deputy village chief of Wukan elected after the event, was also 
detained and accused of taking bribes for village public projects. His courage and organizing 
ability cannot serve the villagers any longer. But the villagers will still live on the land where 
Peng Pai, the revolutionary, fought for the tillers’ land, where a Maoist commune was founded, 
and where Deng redistributed the land to the villagers.  They successfully stopped the entry into 
                                                
538 Zheng Caixiong, “Top adviser in Guangdong faces probe,” China Daly, November 28, 2014, accessed July 13, 
2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-11/29/content_18996402.htm. 
539 “Guangdongsheng Zhengxie Yuan Zhuxi Bei Shuangkai (ÜƆđjs×įĠǙwä) [The Former 
Chairmen of Guangdong Provincial CPPCC Zhu Mingguo is expelled from the party and the governmen],” 
Zhongyang Jiwei Jiancha Bu Wangzhan (ªƨ®ƄÂȔƵƜ) [Central Commission for Discipline Inspection’s 
official website], February 17, 2015, accessed July 13, 2015, 
http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/yw/201502/t20150217_51611.html.  
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their village by armed police, but they will fail to stop urbanization in China’s most wealthy 
province. They do not even want to stop it, because they also want modernized lives, like so 
many others. However, they still have to reserve their collective’s land, to make sure their 
benefits are maximized in the future. In that future, Xue Jinbo, the name of the victim in the 
Wukan event may be remembered, cherished, or maybe not. 
Yang Huiyan, the owner of Country Garden, is still building and managing her garden 
(that is, her real estate empire). Her agents still have to deal with local government officials and 
village cadres and must try to avoid irritating local residents before every actual construction. 
Maybe she and other developers ought to be acclaimed for their endeavors in China’s 
urbanization, because they are building a modernized China for the most populous rural 
residents. And the buildings are constructed upon the relics of thousands of years’ worth of 
offensive walls.  
 
II. A Short Summary of the Thesis 
 
The relics of China’s historical urbanization path provided an uneven stage for the roles 
in cases like the Wukan event (Chapter 2). The walled areas, cheng, which were dominated and 
managed by the government officials, had never been autonomous institutions. Businessmen 
lived and worked in these areas, but their commercial intelligence did not have a chance to run 
these prior holy places, except in a very limited area during an ephemeral period of the late 
empire age. The urban area and the government’s power on that had always been superior to the 
rural area, economically and politically. The walled areas constituted a hierarchy with several 
administrative levels, and under them was the rural area. The rural residents who lived there did 
not participate in the urbanization. 
The change happened around 1949. With the landlord caste destroyed, the government’s 
power permeated into the rural areas. After a few years of government-driven land’s equal 
redistribution and privatization, centralized communes were established to manage agricultural 
production and support the leadership’s ambitious industrialization strategy. Rural residents were 
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not qualified landowners anymore, but workers of communes. From that time on, they were put 
into the state hierarchy. While they were still at the bottom, the hierarchy officially absorbed 
them. After almost 100 years of anti-aggression and civil wars, the theme of that time was 
national independence and modernization, and a totalitarian way seemed a promising means of 
achieving that goal. The market mechanism, which was built upon individualism, was abandoned 
with weak local autonomy. However, the result of the totalitarian experiment was not as good as 
planned.  
The pragmatic reforms in the early 1980s redistributed the rural land to individual 
households with the reservation of the collective landownership, and no later than the middle of 
the 1990s, China chose another claimed “market-oriented” strategy, but actually using what some 
scholars labeled a “low human right advantage” strategy (Chapter 3). Self-interested 
individualism replaced collectivism and nationalism as the moving force of the economy, and 
soon the market replaced the ubiquitous government as the driver of this newly released power. A 
dramatic increase of agricultural output testified to the reform’s success, but the reform also 
introduced the danger of market failure. This danger hid itself until the late 1990s, when 
agricultural output was no longer the ideal capital of China’s industrialization and urbanization.  
To decipher the discordances among the failures of the land market, which had been 
liberalized in the the 1980’s reform, the social event surge begun in the middle of the 1990s amid 
China’s later continuous high-speed economic growth. I applied a modified commons-
anticommons problem analysis to those events in Chapter 4. The expansion of urban areas 
created a need for land from the country’s rural areas, especially after the middle of the 1990s. At 
that time, the highly fragmented rural landownership system hampered efficient land assembly 
for urbanization; so, the urban areas used their historical superiority to gather the essential capital 
(land) from rural areas. During this process, this urban superiority guaranteed local governments 
and developers’ extra benefits from the assembly surplus, which they would not have realized 
from a normal land market.  
However, because of the lack of forceful organizations like communes to control rural 
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areas, rural residents fought against local governments’ land expropriation for their own shares 
from the surplus. During the fights, rural residents organized their own autonomous institutions, 
and slowly changed the nature of rural collectives. These new disobedient features of rural 
institutions can be used to handle rural land’s current fragmentation problem to avoid direct 
conflicts caused by the arbitrary expropriation system. 
The LAD approach that I proposed in Chapter 5 was devised to fill the gap between 
eminent domain and a private land market to accommodate the expansion of urban areas into 
rural areas. But I propose to transplant the LAD idea to China’s collective landownership 
circumstances and adjust it to suit China’s special requirements. And I outline details of an 
agenda for the first period of an LAD experiment. 
I also seek to draw attention to the assembler’s potential power to manipulate the LAD by 
including ally sellers to dilute the target seller’s vote, and propose some amendments of the 
original LAD to fix this problem in China’s circumstances. The core of these amendments is to 
lever the cost for the assemblers to buy their ally land sellers and to force them to negotiate with 
the target sellers.  
 
III. The Significance of the LAD to China’s Current Problems 
 
If the LAD had been introduced before the Wukan case or some other similar cases and 
had been implemented smoothly, does that mean those problems would have been solved without 
violence or even avoided? The answer is probably yes. 
Before the Wukan event escalated to a political event and local social crisis, it was a pure 
economic disagreement. The core issue of an LAD is to isolate handling anticommons or holdout 
problem from the state’s expropriation or eminent domain power. Under this structure, a village 
committee’s quasi-administrative (quasi-government) authority would also be removed from 
land transactions, and autonomous organizations would take the committees’ places in 
negotiating with the land assemblers. Then the village cadres would not have the opportunity to 
realize graft from their advantageous roles by conspiring with the developers during the land 
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transactions.  
In the Wukan event, the formal village party secretary and village chief’s accused “black 
box” operations were the fuse of the crisis. Right after upper-level governments did not appease 
the anger towards these village cadres soon enough, rural residents turned their rage on the 
governments, and then it became a political movement. However, if every rural resident had had 
a chance to participate in the transaction, as they would have had in an LAD, the cadres and 
governments would not have been attacked. It is reasonable to assume that if the compensation 
from Country Garden were distributed to all residents, at least not all residents would have been 
against that transaction. In that case, the oppositional residents might have been able to persuade 
the potential obedient ones, and and might even have been able to veto the transaction. Even if 
they finally had to succumb to the majority of the residents, they would not vent their anger on 
the cadres or the governments. Their voices would have been heard, if not heeded. Then the 
government would intervene at this point to enforce an LAD’s decision. 
It is still possible that some radical oppositional residents would still physically fight 
against the assembly. But their resistance would be less vigorous because they would enjoy their 
shares of the compensation from arm’s-length bargaining between the LAD and the assembler. 
More than that, they would lose the support from the majority of the collective members who 
supported the assembly, and even within the opposition group, at least some residents would 
choose to obey the result of procedures that had been strictly implemented and followed. In this 
case, the possibility of transferring from an economic disagreement to a political event would 
have been severely reduced.  
Admittedly, an LAD might slow down the urbanization process. However, the benefits of 
the LAD, such as having no more martyrs like Xue Jinbo or social chaos like that in Wuhan, 
would have been considerable. Also, fewer government officials would be put in jails or would 
lose their political lives for tragedies they are not capable of handling. Real estate billionaires’ 
wealth accumulation would probably be slowed down, but they would also live in a less hostile 
society. 
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IV. Contributions and Further Studies 
 
In this thesis, I contribute to the understanding of commons and anticommons problems 
by putting them in a theoretical spectrum that is also the basic structure to comprehend and 
criticize China’s landownership system’s evolution and status quo. I also adopt the theory of 
entropy in property to support my theory that general property law can be divided into two 
groups or steps, rights allocation law and secondary rights transfer law. The theory of entropy in 
property addresses particularly the secondary area of property law. A secondary property transfer 
system that disobeys the entropy law cannot stabilize the primary allocation system. If this law is 
ignored, then systematic dysfunctions and overwhelming reallocation follow. 
I also introduce the current landownership system and show its relationship with China’s 
economic growth, and make a historical review and law-and-economics analysis of China’s 
landownership system’s evolution. I identify the problems of commons and anticommons in the 
current Chinese property system and consider several alternative solutions to those problems. I 
particularly stress the advantages of the LAD, and discuss some amendments to the basic 
structure of the LAD in order to adapt that proposal to China’s situation.  
In further studies, I hope to provide a more detailed schedule of a Chinese LAD 
mechanism, and to deepen the discussion of these matters, especially to use law-and-economic 
analysis to analyze assemblers’ possible manipulation strategies and to show how law and policy 
might minimize the social costs of those strategies. 
This thesis is mainly about the rights of the “owners,” or the rural residents. In reality, 
these residents, especially those who live near or even within expanded urban areas, are by no 
means the poorest victims under the current state’s expropriation power. The renters, mainly poor 
new graduates and migrant laborers, of the apartments these residents illegally built upon their 
collective-owned land (the “incomplete property”, discussed in Chapter 2) are harmed by the 
expropriation without any compensation. Even if LADs are implemented as I proposed, the 
status of those people will not necessarily be improved. Some modest compensation to them or 
even their participations in LADs are harder to be justified. However, because these “new 
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migrants” are less organized than local residents who lived there for decades, their voices are 
even weaker.  My further studies will also try to internalize the negative externalities of land 
assembly upon them, whether it is processed through expropriation or an LAD.  
If the LAD can truly be put into local experiments, after a period, scholars will be able to 
test this pure theoretical institution upon a concrete database. Whether it is more efficient than 
traditional expropriation or not, whether it can really ease social tensions due to land assembly as 
I anticipate, these questions need to be answered by further empirical studies. But at first, the 
LAD should be put into practice. 
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